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JUROR DELINQUENCY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
IN AMERICA, 1796-1996
Nancy J. King*
This article examines two aspects of the jury system that have at-
tracted far less attention from scholars than from the popular press:
avoidance of jury duty by some citizens, and misconduct while serving
by others. Contemporary reports of juror shortages and jury dodging
portray a system in crisis.' Coverage of recent high-profile cases sug-
gests that misconduct by jurors who do serve is common. In the trial of
Damian Williams and Henry Watson for the beating of Reginald Denny,
a juror was kicked off for failing to deliberate; 2 Exxon, Charles Keat-
ing, and the man accused of murdering Michael Jordan's father all com-
plained of juror misconduct;3 and, of course, several jurors in the trial
of O.J. Simpson were replaced after allegations that they had lied, con-
cealed intentions to profit from the case, or otherwise misbehaved.4 In
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1983, Oberlin College; J.D. 1987,
University of Michigan. - Ed. Special thanks to the hundreds of judges that responded
to the survey, and the dozens that took the time to volunteer comments and other mater-
ials. Thanks also to Dean John Costonis for providing funding, and to Albert W. Al-
schuler, Deborah Denno, James W. Ely, Jean Ledwith King, Stanton D. Krauss, Robert
P. Mosteller, G. Thomas Munsterman, Nancy C. Staudt, Neil Vidmar, and Nicholas
Zeppos, for helpful comments. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance
of Lisa Jepson, Chad Breunig, Michael Dell, Christian Petersen, Stephanie Millet, and
especially Shayne Bland.
1. See, e.g., Andrea Gerlin, Jury-Duty Scofflaws Try Patience of Courts, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1995, at B1, B8; Arleen Jacobius, California Three-Strikes Law Gob-
bling Up Jurors, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 29 (noting that "the juror shortage is almost a
crisis in Los Angeles County"). Other news stories consider efforts to avoid jury ser-
vice amusing - good top-ten list material. See Gary Taylor, Want to Duck Jury Duty?
They've Heard Them All, NATL. L.J., Nov. 27, 1995, at A24 (reporting the Harris
County, Texas, District Court Clerk's top ten excuses offered by folks eager to avoid
serving as jurors, including an astronaut who said he'd be in space that day, someone
who said "I shot holes in my daughter's boyfriend's car," and another who insisted that
she "had to feed [the] bird during the day").
2. See Henry Weinstein, ACLU Asks Ito to Release Juror Hearing Transcripts,
L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1995, at A16.
3. See Request for New Trial for Exxon Is Denied, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1996, at
B2; James S. Granelli, Spotlight Shifts to Keating's Federal Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5,
1996, at D1; Teen: Jordan Suspect Said to Stay Quiet, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc.
(N.C.), Jan. 23, 1996, at B2.
4. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Noble, District Attorney Looks into Accusations of Jury
Tampering in Simpson Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at A12; Barry Tarlow, Perspec-
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the past year, newspaper reports have described less well-known cases
in which jurors refused to answer personal questions, stole jewels intro-
duced as evidence, had sex with courthouse deputies, visited the crime
scene, bit another juror's arm to examine tooth marks, read forbidden
newspaper articles, got drunk, made racist comments, used drugs, and
discussed the case before the end of the trial.5
The research reported here is an effort to place these defects in the
jury system into perspective, to learn how widespread these problems
are, whether they are new (or, if not, how they differ from similar
problems in earlier years), and what courts have done and should do
now about them. The article incorporates a historical overview of jury
dodging and misconduct since 17966 and the results of an original sur-
vey completed in December, 1995, by 562 trial judges across the coun-
try. The survey is the first to collect empirical information about jury
avoidance and misconduct nationwide.
The story of jury delinquency that unfolds holds useful insights for
those who struggle to improve a jury system that today faces criticism
from all sides. First, the rules that govern juror enlistment and oversight
tive on the Simpson Trial; Juror Misconduct Isn't a License to Fish; What Jeanette Har-
ris Claims Isn't Highly Unusual; Investigating Jurors During a Trial Is - or Should Be,
L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1995, at B7 (claiming "serious jury misconduct is often a part of
high-profile cases").
5. See Appeal Filed in Jewel Heist - Evidence Still Missing, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
19, 1996, at A15; Paul Elias, Alleged Misconduct Delays Rape-Murder Case, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at B4; Ken Ellingwood, Henley Says He Didn't Know of Jury-
Bribing Plan; Paul Gustafson,-Jurors take law into own hands; Sometimes, they test the
trial evidence themselves, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Mar. 19, 1995, at Al; Michael
Perlstein, Ex-Exec: I Killed My Wife in 1986; Bathtub Murder Mystery Solved, TIMvES-
PICAYu-NE (New Orleans), Dec. 28, 1995, at Al; John Steenson, Attorney: Jury Erred
on Murder, Defense Lawyer Seeks to Toss Out Conviction in '94 Fatal Shooting, HER.
ALD-SuN (Durham, N.C.), Dec. 6, 1995, at Cl; Nita Thurman, Woman Wins Battle
Over Juror's Right to Privacy, She Was Ordered Jailed Last Year For Refusing to An-
swer Questions, DALLAS MORN. NEws. June 18, 1995, at A37; Misconduct by Jurors
Hurts Justice, THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Apr. 4, 1996, at A24; Hearing:
The Ex-Ram Player, in a Bid To Win a New Trial, Also Testified that Panelists Dis-
cussed the Case While Under Order Not To, L.A. TIMES. Jan. 19, 1996, at B12 (report-
ing allegations of premature deliberations, racist comments, drug use, and bribery in a
single trial). Jury misconduct is even featured in movies and television expos6s. See,
e.g., THE JUROR (Columbia-TriStar 196); Prime 2ime Live (ABC television broadcast,
Jan. 10, 1996).
6. As is true of many aspects of the American jury, little information has been
compiled concerning the history of jury misconduct or truancy. This article draws heav-
ily upon general histories of courts in the nineteenth century, histories of other aspects
of the jury, and nineteenth-century treatises and cases. For an excellent overview of the
history of the criminal jury and a description of the need for more research into jury
history, see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867 (1994).
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have been influenced over the decades by changing conceptions of the
jury's function. Jurors have assumed many roles - group representa-
tives to a lawmaking body, democracy's students, symbols of fairness,
accurate fact finders. Future attempts to regulate the behavior of those
who are called for jury service must respond to the continuing shifts in
sentiment regarding the jury's proper function. Second, both the avoid-
ance of jury duty and the existence of juror misconduct are old
problems that in earlier times seem to have caused even more trouble
for courts than they do today. According to a majority of the judges in
most of the cities surveyed, few cases today are plagued by misconduct
and most people answer the call to jury duty. Over the years efforts to
prevent culpable behavior rather than punish it have proved their value,
a useful lesson for those hoping to improve further juror compliance in
jurisdictions where jury avoidance or juror misconduct affect a signifi-
cant portion of trials.
The first half of this article is devoted to a study of the avoidance
of jury service and the law's response. After introducing theoretical and
practical constraints on the administration of compulsory jury service in
section I.A, I review in section I.B the experience of courts in recruiting
jurors for the past two centuries. Section I.C describes the situation to-
day using the responses of trial judges surveyed. The discussion of jury
avoidance concludes in section I.D with a brief analysis of several pro-
posed reforms. The second half of the article addresses misconduct by
jurors once they have appeared for jury duty. Following an exposition
of historical trends concerning misconduct in section II.A, section IL.B
reports the responses of judges surveyed about jury misconduct in their
courts over the past three years. Section II.C concludes with some ob-
servations about the future regulation of juror misconduct.
I. PERFECTING JURY COMPLIANCE IN AMERICA:
A CONSTANT STRUGGLE
A. Why (Not) Force Jurors To Serve?
Competing views of the role of the criminal jury have influenced
the enforcement of compulsory jury service in America. Some consider
the jury an educational institution that teaches jurors and trial observers
lessons about democratic self-governance. For them, citizens who avoid
service deprive themselves of important knowledge and undermine the
political order.7 For those who believe that jury service is a civic duty
7. Empirical support for the claim that forced jury service enhances jury legiti-
macy is mixed. Some studies show that even unwilling jurors come away with a good
2675August 1996]
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that every American owes to his community and his country, exemp-
tions from service and other manifestations of lax enforcement appear
pernicious.8 For others, the jury is a special kind of law-making body,
one that must fairly represent racial, ethnic, religious, gender, and other
demographic groups in the community which it serves so that it may ar-
rive at acceptable standards of reasonableness and accountability. Vigor-
ous enforcement efforts would appeal to those holding this view of the
jury especially if those efforts would help to alleviate the under-
representation of minority groups on juries.9 Finally, others may con-
attitude about the jury system, while others seem to suggest that reluctant jurors may in-
stead spread ill will about the system long after they have completed service they feel
was extorted from them. For a helpful discussion of several studies, see Shari Seidman
Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as Ju-
rors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282, 284-88 (Robert E. Litan
ed., 1993); see also JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR
FEES AND TERMS OF SERVICE TO JURY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE § 4.3, at 34 [here-
inafter J. MUNSTERMAN ET AL.] (National Ctr. for St. Cts. ed., 1991) (finding that ju-
rors who had unsuccessfully sought an excuse tended to be less satisfied with jury ser-
vice than those who had not, and that a person's willingness to serve had a stronger
effect on satisfaction than fees, term length, and court facilities, but less of an effect
than the method by which the jurors were processed, and how long they waited); Leigh
B. Bienen et al., Conference Survey: Attitudes Toward Jury Service and Reactions to the
Experience in the State of New Jersey, in THE FINAL REPORT OF THE POLICY CON-
FERENCE ON THE AMERICAN JURY: PROTECTOR OF FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS OR ANACHRONISM? app. C, at 9 (Woodrow Wilson Sch. Poly. Conf.
ed., 1994) (reporting recent study finding that of those citizens who reported that they
were "displeased" to receive their jury summons, 43% rated their jury service experi-
ence negatively, compared to the overwhelmingly positive reactions to jury service by
those who were pleased to receive a jury summons).
8. The debate about whether and how to recruit the unwilling juror resembles to
some extent the debate between those who support the draft and those who prefer vol-
unteer armed forces. On one side are the arguments of civic duty, shared burden, equal-
ity, and learned patriotism, ideals that draft supporters claim are undermined by a vol-
untary system because it allows those who are in the most need of such education, and
those who already wield the most influence, to decline to serve. Opponents of the draft
have responded by claiming that love of country is destroyed, not enhanced, by forced
service, and that volunteers make better soldiers. See generally THE MILrrARY DRAFr:
SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION (Martin Anderson & Barbara Honegger
eds., 1982).
9. Courts have considered oversampling particular areas with the highest rates of
nonresponding jurors in jurisdictions in which areas containing higher proportions of
minority residents also have higher nonresponse rates to jury summonses. Because this
means that a person may be summoned for jury service more frequently depending on
his or her neighbor's behavior, this type of structured sampling puts the goal of repre-
sentation before the goal of equalizing the burden of jury service. See Nancy J. King &
G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section By Design, 79 JUDI.
CATuRE 273, 275-76 (1996); see also United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 483-85
(7th Cir.) (Cuhady, J., dissenting) (arguing that failing to take follow-up action to im-
prove response rate to questionnaires of only 30% denies defendant his statutory right
to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845
2676 [Vol. 94.2673
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sider these various roles unimportant compared to the mission of the
criminal jury to determine, accurately, the facts of a case. This idea of
jurors as fact finders, not lawmakers, has prompted adherents to look
favorably upon measures that promise to increase compliance rates of
prospective jurors with the most education and less favorably upon
measures that would increase the compliance rates of those with less
education. The concern for accuracy also may prompt some judges to
routinely excuse reluctant veniremembers who grudgingly appear on the
theory that an unwilling decisionmaker may choose an early exit over
reasoned deliberation, may take out his resentments on one of the liti-
gants, or may simply lack that sense of responsibility that accurate
judgment requires.' 0
In addition to recruitment philosophy, political and financial con-
cerns have influenced judicial responses to jury avoiders. Courts that
may prefer to accept whoever shows up have sometimes been forced
into action when sinking juror yields drive the cost of procuring each
juror to troubling levels or delay court business. On the other hand,
courts that may prefer to coerce each and every eligible person into ser-
vice have encountered their own set of barriers. One problem courts
have yet to surmount is futility. Even if judges could drag every re-
sisting citizen into a venire, peremptory challenges have left judges
powerless to prevent litigants from excluding unwilling jurors during
voir dire. Judges also lack the means to deter or prevent veniremembers
from misrepresenting their beliefs on voir dire in order to escape ser-
vice. Moreover, even if judges agree that simply getting reluctant jurors
to come to the courthouse is worth the effort, the cost of processing
contempt citations has steadily increased as dockets have mushroomed.
The following brief exposition of the history of jury duty avoidance il-
(1984); Matthew Kauffman, Race Mix of Jury at Issue: Pool of Jurors is Unbalanced,
HARmToRD CouRANT, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al (reporting defense counsel concerns that
failure to follow up on or enforce jury summonses results in a less representative jury,
and citing a 1993 study from Washington, D.C. which revealed that 70% of jury sum-
monses sent to predominately minority areas were returned as undeliverable, compared
to 30% of those sent to areas with more whites).
10. See, e.g., Gometz, 730 F.2d at 480 ("[A]nyone with experience as a trial judge
knows that a person forced against his will to serve on a jury is apt to be an angry juror
and that an angry juror is a bad juror."); G. Thomas Munsterman, Jury News: What
Should a Modern Juror Assembly Room Look Like?, CT. MANAGER, Summer 1995, at
6, 44 [hereinafter G.T. Munsterman, Jury News] (stating that courts justify their failure
to do anything about jury avoidance with claims that "these people wouldn't make
good jurors"); Richard A. Posner, Juries on Trial, 99 COMMENTARY, Mar. 1995, at 49,
50-51 (praising those jurors who "make it through [the] gauntlet" of registering to vote,
completing and returning the questionnaire, responding to summonses, and voir dire as
"above average in competence, civic-mindedness, and sense of responsibility").
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lustrates how concerns like these have influenced compulsory jury ser-
vice during the "past two centuries.
B. Compelling Service on Juries: The Past 200 Years
1. Filling the Box- 1796-1870
Early in the nineteenth century, jury avoidance was a continual
nuisance for courts. Many of the reasons for avoiding jury service
before the Civil War seem quaint or surprising to us now, made obso-
lete by the evolution of social and economic conditions and by specific
improvements in the conditions of jury service. For example, finding a
place to sleep while serving one's term as a juror typically poses no
problem today - one simply sleeps at home and travels daily to the
courthouse. But in the early nineteenth century, when travel to the
county seat often entailed a significant journey by horse, wagon, or
even on foot, jury service meant finding and paying for lodgings for
weeks while on duty. Other disincentives facing prospective jurors
before the Civil War continue to deter prospective jurors today, such as
the inconvenience of being kept from one's daily affairs and one's fam-
ily for the duration of service.
Just as some of the disincentives to serve in the early nineteenth
century have disappeared today, so too has a popular method of coping
with juror delinquency during the first half of the nineteenth century -
the use of bystanders or talesmen. The other response to jury dodging
employed by courts of the period - the fine - survives, but may have
been imposed more regularly in earlier years. Judges who served devel-
oping communities during the first half of the nineteenth century fo-
cused on the simple, yet at times extraordinarily difficult, task of secur-
ing enough jurors to complete the court's docket. They had yet to face
the complexity of balancing this task with concerns about widespread
corruption, racially discriminatory selection procedures, or
overburdened criminal justice agencies.
Working conditions for jurors were miserable in many places, even
by standards of the time. Courtrooms were often crude, particularly in
less populated communities." If there was a separate room available for
11. Some communities lacked courthouses, so trials were held in log houses or
barrooms. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 237 (1993) (noting this practice in Illinois). Others made do with courthouses
with leaky roofs and no heat. See John A. Hall, That Onerous Task: Jury Service in
South Carolina During the Early 1790s, 87 S.C. HIST. MAG. 1, 8 (1986). Some of the
earliest tribunals even met under trees. RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S
PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941, at 73 (1963). In more
populated centers, crowded courtrooms were so intolerable in the summer heat that
2678 (Vol. 94:2673
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deliberation,12 it was sometimes sparsely furnished or lacking heat or
ventilation, yet jurors were locked in together, even overnight, until
they reached a verdict. Some judges deprived jurors of food during de-
liberations; for their jurors, holding out meant staying hungry.13 By mid-
century, however, most courts had abandoned the "ancient barbarity"
of starving jurors into agreement.' 4
During the court's term, overnight accommodations for jurors in
the evenings when they were not actively hearing cases were often
crowded or difficult to obtain, at least in rural areas.15 When several
judges and attorneys, eighteen or so grand jurors, two dozen petit ju-
rors, as well as parties and witnesses descended upon a county seat, ac-
commodations at the local taverns filled up fast. Some jurors had to
sleep in haymows or on dirt floors, others found themselves rooming
with attorneys, with the parties in the cases they would hear, or even
with the sheriff.16 The term could keep jurors away from home, family,
farm or business, for weeks.17
spectators and jurors became ill, requiring the court to adjourn until temperatures
cooled. New Hampshire's own chief justice considered "confinement in the bad atmos-
phere" of the courtroom to be a "severe trial" to jurors' health. HON. IRA PERLEY,
TRIaL BY JURY: A CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY 17-18 (1867). As late as 1848 in
Philadelphia, ventilation was so poor that people became ill even in winter. See ALLEN
R. STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA,
1800-1880, at 23 (1989).
12. Sometimes jurors had to deliberate at the other end of the same room in which
witnesses and parties had presented evidence. See YOUNGER, supra note 11, at 73.
13. For example, one South Carolina jury, locked up on a very cold and disagreea-
ble night without food or heat, was supplied through a back window with supper from
some sympathetic, citizens. See JACK KENNY WILLIAMS, VOGUES IN VILLAINY:
CRimE AND RETRIBUTION IN ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA 82 (1959).
14. See Ohio v. Engles, 13 Ohio 490 (1844).
15. See Hall, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that at the end of the eighteenth century,
jurors in South Carolina had to sleep outside, unable to find lodging, and could not ob-
tain provender for their horses).
16. See Martin v. Mitchell, 28 Ga. 382 (1859) (upholding civil judgment when ju-
ror slept in same bed with the sheriff and in the same room with counsel for the prevail-
ing party); Hardy v. Spoule, 32 Me. 594, 596 (1851) (upholding verdict after jury and
defendant lodged in same room, noting "[s]ituated as we are, during the trials of causes,
boarding promiscuously, as juror and parties inevitably do, it is impossible to interdict
all intercourse whatever, however much we may regret it"); Donald 0. Dewey, Hoosier
Justice: The Journal of David McDonald, 1864-68, 62 IND. MAG. OF HIST. 175, 175
(1966) (noting that lawyers and clients lodged four to a room in Indiana in the late
1860s).
17. The situation in 1796 in South Carolina was vividly described by one judge:
Some of those poor men come to Court and return on foot from ten to fifty miles
often without a shilling in their pockets.... The hardships that those poor jurors
suffer are such that men who enjoy plentiful meals and warm beds can form no
idea of, in frosty weather they sit in Court from morning until night thinly clad
and shivering with cold, and discharged at night, their patience is put to new tii-
2679August 1996]
HeinOnline  -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2679 1995-1996
Michigan Law Review
Even though caseloads were very low compared to modem stan-
dards,'8 all pending matters had to be resolved before the end of each
session so that the judges and trial attorneys would be free to travel to
the next jurisdiction. Terms were held only once or twice a year in
many communities. 19 This inflexible schedule created pressure on juries
to decide cases quickly.20 In some jurisdictions judges and juries com-
pleted several trials every day, each lasting no more than a few hours.
For example, in one twelve-day session in the early 1800s, an Illinois
als. The town where the Court sits denies them its comforts and hospitality, they
are obliged to quit it, and retiring into the woods to the brink of some spring or
water course, draw forth out of their wallet a bit of cold victuals if they have it,
and whether the weather freezes or pours down rain or not they pass the night
under the open sky on the cold earth. Coming into court in the morning, their sal-
low sickly and dejected countenances, their apparel wet or frozen or soiled, speak
of what sort of night they had of it. It happens sometimes in Court that they sink
under the double pressure of cold and hunger. This was the case in two instances
at Camden Court on my present circuit, growing too faint to sit longer, they gave
intimattion [sic] of it, and they were discharged, one of them declared that he had
not tasted food for two days, the Gentlemen of the bar were so kind as to raise a
few dollars for him. Reduced and feeble as he was he had then to go home fifty
miles on foot.
Hall, supra note 11, at 5, 8 (quoting letter from Judge Aedanus Burke to Governor A.
Vander Horst, Columbia, South Carolina (Dec. 8, 1796) (General Assembly Papers:
006-674, S.C. Archives)).
18. For example, there were only 15 criminal jury trials in seven years in one dis-
trict in Minnesota. See Jane Lamm Carroll, Criminal Justice on the Minnesota Frontier,
1820-1857, at 135 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota); see
also Kathryn Preyer, Crime, the Criminal Law and Reform in Post-Revolutionary Vir-
ginia, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 71-72 (1983) (reporting that in the most populated judi-
cial district in Virginia for which court records exist for the period between 1789 and
1800, the court heard only 63 felonies over ten years).
19. See, e.g., David J. Bodenhamer, The Efficiency of Criminal Justice in the Ante-
bellum South, 3 CRiM. J. HiST. 81, 89 (1983) [hereinafter Bodenhamer, Antebellum]
(reporting that courts in antebellum Georgia met only twice each year with terms lim-
ited to two weeks or less).
20. For example, during the 1790s in Davidson County, Tennessee, where the
courts had significant legislative and administrative functions, jury trials took up only a
part of the court's six-day term. See Note, The Tennessee County Courts Under the
North Carolina and Territorial Governments: The Davidson County Court of Pleas and
Quarter Sessions, 1783-1796, as a Case Study, 32 VAND. L. REV. 349, 373 (1979)
[hereinafter Note, Tennessee County Cqurts]. In antebellum Indiana, prosecutors spent
the first few days of each term with the grand jury, securing indictments while the
judge and petit jury tried civil cases. Then the judge, the petit jury, and the prosecutor
would try those indicted with crimes for the remainder of the session. See DAVID J.
BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 63
(1992) [hereinafter BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIA]; see also EDwARD L. AYERS, VEN-
GEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERI-
CAN SotrrH 112-13 (1984) ("as many cases as possible had to be tried in the one or
two weeks allotted[; t]he haste and confusion that necessarily grew out of such a system
did not foster careful construction of the state's cases").
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court, sitting in the front room of a large house with judges lined up
against one wall, disposed of twenty-eight civil cases, two murders, five
assaults, a charge of unlawful assembly, and a burglary.21 In Frederick
County, Maryland, in 1817 and 1818, the court attacked the criminal
docket the first week of its two-week session, devoting an average of
forty to forty-five minutes to each trial. 22 Barely half of those Maryland
juries left the box to deliberate before returning a verdict.23 This pattern
of many short trials daily has been documented in several other states
as well, including Tennessee, Indiana, and Pernsylvania. 24 One can ap-
preciate why a judge from this period might joke after one of these ses-
sions, "I have just come from Union[, South Carolina] where I held
court for twelve days and ten nights and only four of the jurors died
from fatigue."' 5
The compensation that jurors received for all of this trouble was
meager. Juror fees were about a dollar or two per day, with a few cents
a mile for travel. This did not begin to compensate jurors for the ex-
penses they incurred, much less for the inconveniefice they often suf-
fered by being away from home for the entire term. For example, in
Montana, where jurors earned two dollars per day, a juror had to spend
three times that amount each day for lodging and meals and feed for his
horse.26 It is possible that some looked forward to jury service out of a
21. See William F. Zacharias, Illinois Courts Prior to Statehood, 56 ILL. B.J. 556,
563-64 & n.29 (1968).
22. See James D. Rice, Crime and Punishment in Frederick County and Maryland,
1748-1837: A Study in Culture, Society, and Law 225-30, 270 (1994) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Md.).
23. See id. at'270-73 & n.20.
24. See BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL, supra note 20, at 64; Note, Tennessee
County Courts, supra note 20, at 373. In antebellum Philadelphia, in a typical larceny
trial "[e]ach side presented a few witnesses, attorneys made brief remarks, and the jury
often rendered a verdict without leaving their box." STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 72.
25. WILLIAMS. supra note 13, at 81-82 (quoting Judge Thomas J. Mackey and
describing one term in which two juries were impaneled to keep up with the caseload,
each working twelve hours a day for over a week).
Jury duty was also dangerous in some communities. After the leader of one west-
ern gang was indicted for embezzlement in Boise in 1865, its members swore revenge
on the grand jury panel that dared to indict him. Men who served on frontier juries were
prepared, it appears, for this type of thing. They frequently were members of "vigilant
committees" themselves and came to court armed. YOUNGER, supra note 11, at 164.
One judge of the period described jurors of early Indiana as "a hardy, heavy-bearded
set of men, with side-knives in their belts, and not a pair of shoes among the whole of
them; all wore moccasins." HON. O.H. SMrrH, EARLY INDIANA TRIALS AND
SKETCHES 177 (1857).
26. See Jom D.W. GucE, THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN BENCH: THE TERRITORIAL
SUPREME COURTS OF COLORADO, MONTANA, AND WYOMING, 1861-1890, at 45
(1972). In the mid 1820s federal jurors in the District of Massachusetts logged over
10,000 miles per year traveling to and from court. Those in the Western District of Vir-
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sense of civic duty or perhaps as an adventure but one can understand
why so many dreaded jury service during these times. One account of a
South Carolina session in 1807 illustrates the problem:
[O]n the first day jurors John Cave and John Hall failed to answer roll
call and were indicted for non-attendance. Three additional jurymen ab-
sented themselves the following morning. On the third day another pair
of jurors managed to obtain permission to return to their homes. On the
fifth day jurors William Weathersbe and Shadrack Stalling failed to ap-
pear. During the afternoon of the sixth day John Nelson was discovered
to be too drunk to sit. His relief, Henry Ford, had apparently slipped out
of court. Another drunk juror was removed from the box on the seventh
day, and two more were missing the following morning. Juror Robert
Bradly blandly refused to serve on the ninth day; and by the close of
court the next afternoon six others had followed his lead. To sum up, in
ten days twenty-one jurors had either failed to appear, left with or with-
out permission, refused to serve, or incapacitated themselves. 27
Just how many potential jurors defied the court's summons is also
revealed by the extent to which courts used bystanders rather than sum-
moned jurors. When too few veniremen showed up, judges, sheriffs, or
bailiffs relied upon bystanders to fill the jury box. 28 Bystanders were
heavily used in several different regions of the country. In antebellum
Kentucky, sheriffs apparently "rounded up as many candidates as [they]
could find."' 29 In Georgia and Minnesota, no-shows delayed court busi-
ness and judges had to turn to bystanders in order to proceed with dock-
ets.30 In most places plenty of bystanders were available - jury trials
attracted the whole town. Trials were one of the few sources of public
entertainment in many communities. 31
ginia traveled over 17,000 miles per year in 1824 and 1825. In the densely populated
Southern District of New York, jurors traveled only about 200 miles annually. See H.R.
Doc. No. 164, 20th Cong., 1st Sess. (1828).
27. WILLIAMS supra note 13, at 84-85.
28. See, e.g., PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, OBSERVATIONS ON SOME OF
THE METHODS KNOWN IN THE LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS TO SECURE THE SELEC-
TION AND APPOINTMENT OF AN IMPARTAL JURY, IN CASES CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
9 (1834) (noting Act of 1807 authorizing up to five bystanders on Massachusetts' ju-
ries); David J. Bodenhamer, The Democratic Impulse and Legal Change in the Age of
Jackson: The Example of Criminal Juries in Antebellum Indiana, 45 HISTORIAN 206,
214-17 (1983).
29. See Robert M. Ireland, Law and Disorder in Nineteenth-Century Kentucky, 32
VAND. L. REV. 281, 291 (1979) (also characterizing some of these bystander jurors as
"courthouse bums who served on juries in order to collect a little wine money").
30. See Bodenhamer, Antebellum, supra note 19, at 89 (noting that this was a
practice decried by Georgia grand juries); Carroll, supra note 18, at 142.
31. See I.P. CALLISON, COURTS OF INJUSTICE 401 (1956) (noting that during the
pioneer period the jury trial was one of few sources of entertainment). Trials in the
1820s in South Carolina resembled county fairs. For the four to ten days each spring
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Where volunteers or bystanders were scarce or ineligible, shortages
of qualified jurors sometimes threatened the very functioning of the
courts. 32 Without jurors, the show could not go on. The options of
charging criminals through information rather than indictment, and dis-
posing of charges through bench trials or plea bargains were not author-
ized until much later in the nineteenth century.33 Until then, a grand jury
was required to bring felony charges, and petit jurors were required to
resolve them. This practical necessity may account for the frequent
fines for non-compliance in some courts of the period.
Fining those who failed to obey summonses appeared to be a uni-
versal response to jury dodging throughout the colonial period,34 and in
the early 1800s statutes in most states authorized fines ranging from
one dollar to $250.35 Enforcement efforts were quite vigorous in some
jurisdictions. For example, court records from the Michigan Territory
reveal that contempt proceedings against delinquent jurors occupied
much of the circuit court's caseload - the court considered twenty-nine
indictments for assault and battery, forty-three indictments for theft-
related crimes, and fifty-eight contempt proceedings against men who
and fall that court was held, much of the county's population gathered and there was
rarely enough room for everyone to watch. See SMrTH, supra note 25, at 7 (noting that
in early Indiana, before 1857, trials were public events filling the courtroom "to suffo-
cation") WILLI mvS, supra note 13, at 13, 76-77.
32. See William Davis, Jr., Western Justice: The Court at Fort Bridger, Utah Ter-
ritory, 23 UTAH HST. Q. 99, 111 (1955) (noting that the judge at Fort Bridger "found
the impaneling of a [even a six-man] jury an extremely difficult matter at times [and
had] to call in some of his farm hands at Fort Supply a dozen miles to the south"); see
also Preyer, supra note 18, at 71 n.69 (reporting that in Accomac District in Virginia,
no grand jury was impanelled in three terms between 1789 and 1801, maybe "because
the required 24 members had not turned up in obedience to process; repeatedly individ-
uals were summoned to answer and pay fines for this offense").
33. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (upholding charge by in-
formation rather than grand jury); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5 (1979) [hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargaining]. In 1852 Ma-
ryland became the first state to allow for jury waiver for all criminal cases; New York
was the last, changing its constitution over a century later in 1957. See HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 22 & n.18 (1966); Susan C.
Towne, The Historical Origins of Bench Trial for Serious Crime, 26 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 123, 145-59 (1982).
34. For example, one scholar studying the courts of North Carolina of the 1700s
concluded based upon the steady increase in the statutory fine and complaints of absen-
teeism that "no more galling problem presented itself to the Carolina court than that of
insufficient juries." DONNA J. SPINDEL, CRIME AND SOCIETY IN NORTH CAROLINA,
1663-1776, at 24, 95 (1989).
35. See, e.g., CHARLES EDWARDS, THE JURYMAN's GUIDE 65-66 (1831) (in
New York jurors were subject to fine of $25 for each day they neglected to attend);
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 84 (in South Carolina fines ranged from 500 to $20);
YOUNGER, supra note 11, at 75 (listing 10 states and noting that fines for failure to ap-
pear ranged from $3 to $50).
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had failed to attend as grand or petit jurors.36 In Williamson County,
Tennessee, "the fining or excusing of jurors was an initial docket mat-
ter at each term of court between 1810-1820." 37
Many less wealthy veniremen complied in order to avoid the
fine.38 For those with means, however, contempt citations appeared to
have operated not as a burden, but as a privilege. Exemption from jury
duty was a perquisite that money could buy.39 A careful investigation of
fines for nonattendance of jurors in South Carolina during the 1790s re-
vealed that fines were sufficient only to assure the attendance of the
less wealthy. Most of those fined for failing to report for jury duty were
the community's most prominent citizens. 40 It is ironic, to say the least,
that many of the men who fought for independence and its resulting
charter, the Constitution with its Bill of Rights, may have undermined
the spirit of that document by avoiding jury service. 4'
36. All but 13 of the 42 contempt prosecutions in the Michigan Supreme Court,
and all of the 58 contempt proceedings in circuit court between 1805 and 1824 were
against jurors. See William Wirt Blume, Criminal Procedure on the American Frontier:
A Study of the Statutes and Court Records of Michigan Territory 1805-1825, 57 MICH.
L. REV. 195, 250-56 (1958). In one district in South Carolina in 1803, 13 citizens were
fined for failure to answer jury roll call. WiLLIAMS, supra note 13, at 84. Another way
that some early courts may have been able to function despite the profound reluctance
of citizens to serve was by impaneling juries of less than twelve, but this was an option
in only a few jurisdictions for felony cases.
37. See Note, Justice on the Tennessee Frontier: The Williamson County Circuit
Court 1810-1820, 32 VAND. L. REV. 413, 418 n.38 (1979) [hereinafter Note, William-
son County Court].
38. See Hall, supra note 11, at 1-3. One citizen complained in a diary entry, "This
evening the Sheriff called with a notice to me to serve as juror... This is a disagreea-
ble duty and if it were possible for me to avoid its performance without being fined I
certainly should do so." WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 83-84. Not surprisingly, once at
the courthouse, many unwilling veniremen tried to get out of serving by lying about
their capacity to serve, just as they do today. "The most popular excuse [in Philadelphia
in the 1850s and 60s]," Steinberg notes, "was deafness, which led to curious scenes of
people explaining to the judge why they could converse with him but could not serve as
a juror." Allen R. Steinberg, The Criminal Courts and the Transformation of Criminal
Justice in Philadelphia, 1815-1874, at 447 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Co-
lumbia University).
39. See 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 205 (James DeWitt Andrews ed.,
1896) (writing around 1800 that the only people serving as jurors were those who
lacked either the influence not to be called in the first place or the means to pay the
fine).
40. See Hall, supra note 11, at 9 (reporting that in one term, all but one of the 35
men paying fines owned slaves, half were Revolutionary War veterans, and nine had
been or were later elected to public office).
41. During roughly the same period in Marion County, Indiana, "[it may have
been cheaper to pay the small fine for contempt than to lose more money because of
court attendance." DAVID J. BODENHAMER, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND
LAW IN ANTEBELLUM INDIANA 54 (1986) [hereinafter BODENHAMER, PURSUIT OF
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Lawmakers of the time manifested little interest in ensuring that
different demographic groups in the community served on juries. Jury
service, like the vote, was reserved for white men of property. And al-
though some critics complained about the competency of jurors,42 early
nineteenth century lawmakers did not seem concerned that their wealth-
ier and more educated citizens avoided jury duty. Not until mid-century
did concerns about the caliber of jurors begin to translate into procedu-
ral reform, with the adoption of measures to combat corruption in the
selection and recruitment of jurors.43
2. The Quest for "Better" Jurors: From "Corruption" to
"Competence" - 1870-1940
As populations grew during the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth, securing jurors remained troublesome. More populous com-
munities brought higher crime rates, more efficient policing, and an
ever-growing number of criminal cases requiring an. increasing number
of jurors. The crush of cases continued despite the advent of plea bar-
gaining and bench trials. 44 In the decades between the Civil War and
World War II, inconvenience and financial loss still topped the list of
reasons for avoiding jury service, and courts and legislatures took their
JuSTIcE]; cf. WILLiAMS, supra note 13, at 84 (despite rigid enforcement, fines "failed
to halt non-attendance" in South Carolina).
Another explanation for the frequency of these fines may be that in many courts of
the time the prosecutor's pay depended upon the amount of fines collected - delin-
quent jurors were a handy source of income. See, e.g., Ayers, supra note 20, at 112
(noting that fines generated revenue to feed pretrial detainees); Ireland, supra note 29,
at 283 (noting that in Kentucky "for most of the century, prosecutors were paid princi-
pally by fees, receiving a percentage of fines recovered"). But see MAss. GEN. CT.
SENATE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE SuBJEcr OF JuRIEs, 18 (1808),
microformed on Early American Imprints, Second Series No. 15541 (noting Act that
provided that juror nonattendance fees of $20 to $40 were "to be divided equally
among the jurors who shall attend and serve").
42. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 880-81 (reporting discontent with ju-
rors as early as 1800).
43. In antebellum Kentucky, for example, the provision of peremptory challenges
to the prosecution and the use of out-of-county jurors in particularly divisive cases were
designed to counter the opportunity for jury packing provided by dependence upon vol-
unteer or bystander jurors. In some counties it was almost routine for defendants with
means to hire jurors to hang the jury. See Ireland, supra note 29, at 291-92. In the late
1850s the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute requiring the sheriff to choose the
names of supplemental jurors, when needed, from the jury wheel. WILLIS REED
BIERLY, JURIES AND JuRY TRIALS, STATE AND FEDERAL, COMMON LAW AND
STATUTORY 77 (1908); see also JOHN PROFFATr, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY
§ 131 n.2 (1877).
44. See supra note 33 (collecting sources tracing the development of plea bargain-
ing and bench trials).
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first steps to ease these burdens. The most defining feature of juror re-
cruitment during this era was the widespread criticism that the wealthy
and educated classes were escaping jury service, that their absence was
harmful and unfair, and that reforms in jury selection and enforcement
procedures were required to remedy this deficiency.
The complaint that those who were better educated were avoiding
service was fueled by dissatisfaction with verdicts. Influential segments
of society were losing faith in juries to reach the right results. The pe-
riod was one in which the "values of uniformity and certainty took on
paramount importance," 45 and juries seemed to many to be standing in
the way of progress. Critics accused jurors in civil cases of undue sym-
pathy toward plaintiffs suing corporations, 46 and accused jurors in crim-
inal cases of lacking the sense to deliver justice (i.e., convictions).47
45. Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J.
170, 191 (1964).
46. See e.g., Note, supra note 45, at 190-92 (noting influential members of the bar
evidently objected to the jury because it would be hostile to their clients and sympa-
thetic to poor litigants); The Jury, An Address Delivered by John Dean, Justice of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Before the Law Academy of Philadelphia, May 20,
1987, at 15-17 ("juries began to swerve from the truth since the multiplication of cor-
porations, and their growth in power and capital... the root of the evil lies in laxity of
enforcement of the law regulating the selection of jurymen").
47. See, e.g., MAXIMuS A. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
JURY SYSTEM 207 (1894) (noting that the abolition of unanimity would be a "heroic[]
remedy" to the "main complaint" about the jury, which is its failure to convict); Carl
A. Ross, The Jury System of Cook County, Illinois, 5 ILL. L. REV. 283 (1910) (noting
criticism of juries intensified after 1907 with repeated acquittals of saloon keepers for
violating Sunday closing laws; and acquittal in 1909 of jury commissioner tried for cor-
ruption); Report on Criminal Procedure, in 2 NATIONAL COMMN. ON LAW OBSER-
VANCE AND ENFORCEmMNT REPORTS 28 (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM RE-
PORT] ("Repeated failure of juries to agree in recent conspicuous criminal trials has
brought about agitation for majority verdicts in prosecutions. Many are now urging abo-
lition of the criminal jury."); cf Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE
MAG., May 1936, reprinted in CAL. TRLAL LAW. J.. Winter 1974-75, at 17 (noting "the
tendency of the wealthy man to want to convict, in order to preserve the institution of
Capitalism and Civilization"). One historian has documented that this dissatisfaction
with the caliber of jurors and their failure to convict in criminal cases began just prior
to the Civil War. See AYERS, supra note 20, at 113.
By the turn of the century the lowered esteem in which juries were held had ena-
bled two important shifts in the relationship between judge and jury: judges had re-
moved questions of law from criminal'as well as civil juries and began ordering new
trials when they believed a jury verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. See,
e.g., MORTON J. HORW1TZ, Tim TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 28-29 (1977); PROEFATT, supra note 43, at 440-45 (assessing, in 1877, the jury's
power to decide the law in criminal cases in various states); Alschuler & Deiss, supra
note 6, at 910-11 (reporting that between 1850 and 1931 the courts of at least 11 states
and the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected the jury's right to judge law as well as fact);
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 582 (1939)
(tracing shift in nineteenth century). Professor Stanton D. Krauss's careful study reveals
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Disagreement with verdicts was not the only catalyst for charges of ju-
ror incompetence. The persistent complaint also coincided with the in-
flux of immigrants and African-Americans into the pool of citizens eli-
gible for jury service.48
Whatever their motive, critics after the Civil War frequently com-
plained that the "better" classes were opting out of jury service. These
protests swelled to a chorus in the first few decades of the twentieth
century.49 By 1930, the Frankfurter-Pound Commission concluded that
in Cleveland "most citizens of means or intelligence avoid service. This
avoidance has become traditional, so that it is a kind of mild disgrace
for a so-called 'respectable citizen' to allow himself to be caught for
jury service - like being swindled, for instance. '50
that the jury's lawmaking power may have been removed much earlier in some jurisdic-
tions. See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine
the Law in Colonial America (manuscript on file with author).
48. See LESSER, supra note 47, at 182 (protesting that in more than a dozen states
where "unnaturalized foreigners are after a brief period of residence permitted to exer-
cise the elective franchise ... aliens may often be in a position to decide the right to
property, and even to personal liberty, of citizens."); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6,
at 916 (reporting dissatisfaction among Congressional Democrats in the late 1870s that
integrated federal juries were corrupt, biased, or incompetent and noting that the decline
in trust in jurors as legal advisers coincided with the increased diversity of the jury and
increased complexity of legal issues); Hon. R.C. Pitman, Juries and Jurymen, 139 No.
AM. REv. 1 (1884), quoted in LESSER. supra note 47, at 182 ("[I]f [the juror qualifica-
tion criterion of] 'good moral character' is as laxly interpreted as the same phrase prac-
tically is in the naturalization proceedings, it affords but little guaranty."); see also
Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of
the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 325 (1995) (arguing that the decline in jury pres-
tige coincided with the influx of women jurors).
49. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 395-96 (complaints focused on profes-
sionals who were routinely excused or bought their way out); MINImUM STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: A SURVEY OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE STAN-
DARDS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FOR IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY 553 (Arthur
T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949) [hereinafter MINIMUM STANDARDS] (in California, reformers
complained that the juries were made up of "housewives, who had no experience in
business or ordinary affairs of life outside of the home, and elderly men whose minds
had become inactive"); Dean, supra note 46, at 20-21 ("The professional man, the boss
mechanic, the city councilman, the thriving farmer, all want to be excused from jury
service because of the pressing nature of their business affairs... with them there, un-
just verdicts would be rare, and the growing dissatisfaction with the jury system would
in a few years disappear."); Eric Fishman, New York City's Criminal Justice System
1895-1932, at 336-37 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University)
(noting that in New York, many believed jurors were uneducated and too sentimental,
and that the best citizens were exempted).
50. RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS
OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 344 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds.,
1922) [hereinafter CLEVELAND REPORT].
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There is some basis for this perception that the middle and upper
classes were fleeing from jury service during the decades between 1870
and 1940. Because the administration of jury summonses remained a
one-man operation in most jurisdictions, it was not difficult to use
money or other influence to gain an exemption from jury service, and
some of the well-to-do took advantage of the opportunity to avoid being
summoned.5 1 Many others simply ignored their summonses 52 or relied
on the liberal granting of excuses, sometimes making illegal payments
or lying for the privilege.5 3 If one believed the'assertions of jurors wish-
ing to be excused from jury service in Cleveland in the mid-1920s, for
example, illness affected the "better" residential districts more seri-
ously than the more modest neighborhoods.5 4 Those with means in
Cleveland also purchased membership in military orders to avoid ser-
vice.55 In one county in Illinois in 1927 at least half of the jurors who
51. See, e.g., STANLEY F. BREWSTER, TWELVE MEN IN A Box 19 (1934) (not-
ing citizens who dodge jury duty by sending substitutes, or lying, but that the most
common means of avoiding service is political - "getting men excused from jury duty
has become one of the most valuable perquisites of the small politician"); ROBERT M.
IRELAND, LrrTLE KINGDOMS: THE COUNTIES OF KENTUCKY, 1850-1891, at 82
(1977) (reporting that in Kentucky many on the commissioners' lists were not sum-
moned and sheriffs instead relied upon 'professional jurymen,' noted for their menial
status and leniency"); Upton Close, Twelve Good Men - and "Untrue," CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR WKLY. MAG., July 20, 1938, at 1 (in several Pennsylvania cities it was
common for a man or woman summoned for jury service to call on a "friend with in-
fluence," who in turn secured the services of a "henchman" of the "boss" to answer to
the name of the summoned citizen and serve out the term). The same circumstance fa-
cilitated jury stacking as well, whenever a litigant sought a particularly receptive jury.
See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 553 (noting that jury stacking had scan-
dalized a number of metropolitan centers).
52. In Cleveland, 37% of those residing in the "better sections" of town simply
ignored the summons to appear for examination before the commissioners compared to
28% overall and 26% for two other sections. CLEVELAND REPORT, supra note 50, at
346. Other communities had higher compliance rates. In Illinois in 1927, only about 8%
did not appear when summoned. ILLINOIS ASSN. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ILLI-
NOIS CrIME SURVEY 232 (John H. Wigmore ed., 1929) [hereinafter ILLINOIS CRIME
SURVEY].
53. The Desire to Avoid Jury Duty, II WASH. L. REP., Feb. 17, 1883, at 91 (re-
porting that "persons eligible for jury service.., have been enabled to escape form the
performance of it, by illegally paying certain sums to those entrusted by law with the
duty of preparing jury lists"). On the "corrupt atmosphere of urban criminal justice" at
the time, see Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, supra note 33, at 26 & n.139.
54. CLEVELAND REPORT, supra note 50, at 346 (residents from exclusive suburbs
claimed to be less healthy than those from poor districts, 12% claiming illness, com-
pared to 9% in the poorer areas).
55. See id. at 347. The resentment against those who managed to escape jury ser-
vice was reminiscent of anger about the ease with which those with means avoided the
draft during the Civil War by purchasing exemptions or substitutes. See generally
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LIBERTY AND UNION 141-43 (1978) (describing draft
avoidance in 1862-63).
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showed up were excused, and 770 of the over 5000 jurors excused had
been excused before - thirty-seven had been excused at least five
times.5 6 Other commentators of the time described how easy it was to
get out of jury service by lying, noting the surprise of attorneys to
"hear a juror whom they hardly knew speak of his friendship and ac-
quaintance with them for no other reason obviously than to be excused
from serving."5 7
If the well-educated and well-to-do were trying to avoid jury ser-
vice,58 it is easy to see why. Although most trials remained relatively
short around the turn of the century, more were stretching on for days
and weeks. Frustrating delays during trials were not uncommon.5 9 Se-
questered jurors found themselves parted from their families and liveli-
hood for extended periods of time, confined in their uncomfortable
juryrooms until they completed each case.60 The practice of shuttling
56. See ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 52, at 234.
57. IRviN STALMASTER, WHAT PRICE JURY TRIALS 74 (1931). Still other criti-
cism centered on the exercise of peremptory challenges to excuse those who had heard
of the case, leaving only "fools, rogues, or hermits." NOBEL BUTLER, BUTLER'S Mis-
CELLANIES: TRIAL BY JURY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMPOSITION, AND OTHER
PIECES 21 (1880).
58. The rhetoric about juror incompetence probably overstated the problem. Con-
trary to the chorus of claims that the intelligence of the average juror was lower than
that of the average citizen, two studies of petit jurors during this period found that juries
in several cities reflected an economic status higher than that of the general population.
Juries in many cities were not made up of the illiterate or feebleminded at all. Instead
they were heavily middle class, with the very highest and lowest classes only lightly
represented. See CLARENCE N. CALLENDER, THm SELECTION OF JURORS: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF THE METHODS OF SELECTION AND THE PERSONNEL OF JU-
RIES IN PHILADELPHIA AND OTHER CITIS 49, 56 (1924) (the occupational and eco-
nomic profile of jurors in several cities was high, 25% or more occupying positions of
responsibility or demanding a degree of education or intelligence higher than average,
while Chicago's juries were "of a somewhat lower occupational grade"). Callender's
work also revealed that the effect of excuses on the economic composition of the jury
panel was not significant. Id. at 36-37; see also Eleanor S. Brussel, A Study of the
Composition of Juries of the District Court 39 (1930) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Minnesota) (concluding from statistical study in Hennepin County, Min-
nesota that venires in 1929 were drawn from the three highest categories of occupation
and intelligence, and that challenges had no effect on the occupational composition of
the jury).
59. For example, an observer describing one case in New York reported that the
judges and attorneys dining together in one case lingered over their midday meal until
the evening hours, two days in a row, although the jurors, eating separately, had re-
turned by two o'clock p.m. as ordered. See HENRY LAUREN CLINTON, EXTRAORDI-
NARY CASES 64-65 (1896).
60. Small, ill-ventilated jury rooms were "almost unendurable," resulting fre-
quently in sickness, especially for older jurors. See Willis B. Perkins, Some Needed Re-
forms in the Methods of Selecting Juries, 13 MICH. L. REv. 391, 399 (1915). Others
contained only 11 chairs so the foreman would be forced to stand. Albert Walker, Jury
Room Sentiments and Diversions, 13 THE GREEN BAG 196 (1901) (describing jury
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them off to a hotel or, even more radically, sending them home for the
night, had not yet caught on.6'
Financial hardship also continued to be a deterrent for all but the
poorest jurors.62 Pay for jurors remained static while income rose,63 and
the more money one lost during jury duty, the greater was the financial
incentive to avoid it. What's more, fines for failing to appear did not in-
crease with the income of prospective jurors either. Those who could
afford the fine preferred to risk it rather than pay an even higher price
in lost time and income.64
rooms in Brooklyn, New York). One juror explained how a judge was finally persuaded
to give jurors cots:
Once, the only comfortable spot I could find was the judge's high backed chair,
tilted back seductively on springs, with my feet propped up on a pile of law
books on his desk; we were not confined to one room during the night, but had
the range of the courthouse, under guard. In the morning, after the jury was dis-
charged, I told him he possessed the only berth in court suitable to a nap. He
placidly replied . . . "I have several times told the county'commissioners that
they ought to provide cot-beds for jurors; I wish you would go to them and make
complaint, and I will support it." Since that time they have been provided ....
Joseph Hornor Coates, Some Difficulties of a Juryman, SCRIBNERS, Jan. 1910, at 89,
90-91. Another juror summed up his opinion of the situation on the juror room wall:
The jury system
Is the guard
Of human liberty.
But when you lock one up all night
The truth one fails to see.
Walker, supra, at 196; see also State v. White, 26 So. 849 (La. 1899) (capital defendant
appealed on the grounds that "the jur[ors] had reached their conclusion with undue
haste, and without proper deliberation ... due to the disagreeable and uncomfortable
condition of the room which had been assigned to the jur[ors] for their deliberations").
61. See Perkins, supra note 60, at 399. In one case, jurors who had not brought
clean clothes had to buy them on a supervised excursion. People v. Fisher, 172 N.E.
743, 754 (Ill. 1930). In another case, jurors slept in a vacant courtroom and bathed once
a week at the YMCA. FRaIDMAN, supra note 11, at 395 (reporting trial from Dedham,
Massachusetts in 1934). But see Harvey N. Shepard, The Wrongs of the Juryman, AT-
LANTfc MONTHLY, Aug. 1895, at 258, 261 (noting that Connecticut jurors were al-
lowed to return home each night and recommending that this practice be adopted
elsewhere).
62. Juror fees were better than no income at all. For the unemployed, jury service
was an attractive opportunity to earn a few dollars and enjoy a free meal or two. For
example, in Cleveland during the winter of 1920-21 with the greatest unemployment
since 1914, many jurors' names remained in venires. A total of 77 served 300 juror
terms, 40 serving six two-week terms each. The study reporting these figures concluded
that these jurors "were tiding over a period of unemployment by attempting to perform
one of the most difficult tasks of democratic government at $2 per day." CLEVELAND
REPORT, supra note 50, at 352.
63. As late as the mid 1950s, only four states paid jurors as much as $10 per day.
See INSTITtEr OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., JURY COSTS (Bernard Kulik ed., 1955).
64. See, e.g, BREWSTER, supra note 51, at 21 (estimating the loss to tradesmen
and skilled mechanics from jury service at about $10 per day in 1934). During this pe-
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The increasing criticism of the caliber of the jury, the growing
number of cases, and the rise of court administration, all contributed to
significant changes in the ways that jurors were selected and to enforce-
ment of that selection process. In the late 1800s and the early 1900s, re-
formers set upon the jury system in earnest. The first task was eliminat-
ing corruption in the selection and enforcement system. After the Civil
War, New York State enacted statutes punishing efforts to pay for the
privilege of not serving, including a provision that made it a misde-
meanor for a summoned juror to fail to report any offer to procure his
discharge or excuse from jury duty.65 Physicians issued so many false
certificates of illness or disability to prospective jurors that the New
York legislature made it a crime for them to do so.66 In order to cease
dependence upon bystanders whom many considered to be inferior
specimens for the jury or tools of corrupt litigants, courts tried harder to
predict the correct number of veniremembers who would be needed,67
outlawed the use of bystanders entirely, or punished anyone seeking a
place for himself or another in the jury box. 6 By the early 1900s, many
riod, the prosecution of those involved in organized crime raised juror fears of retalia-
tion. See HARRY ELMER BARNES, TRIAL BY JURY: THE GREAT BURLESQUE OF
MODERN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-15 (1929) ("The jury may even be covertly
threatened with mob reprisal if it does not render a certain type of verdict."); FRIED-
MAN, supra note 11, at 395 (noting two cases in 1926-27 in which urban jurors may
have been intimidated); ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 52, at 234-36 (reporting
jurors lied to escape service in case in which a witness's house was bombed); DAVID
RAY PAPKE, FRAMING THE CRIMINAL: CRIME, CULTURAL WORK AND THE Loss
OF CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE (1830-1900) 13-14 (1987) (noting that organized and pro-
fessional crime emerged in the late 1800s).
65. See HuGo HIRSH, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON JURIES, THEIm POWERS.
DUTIES. AND USES, IN ALL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL, UNDER THE COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE STATE OF NEW YORK 61 (1879).
66. See N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 1120 (1899) (also making it a misdemeanor to
make a misstatement to evade service); STALMASTER, supra note 57, at 81 (noting that
"the practice of excusing jurors from service upon doctors' certificates grew so flagrant
in New York that a special statute was enacted making it a misdemeanor for a physician
to give a false affidavit or certificate 'for the purpose of enabling a person to be dis-
charged, or excused, or exempted as a trial juror' "). This statute actually first was
passed in the 1870s, as the complaints about the caliber of jurors were beginning to heat
up.
67. See, e.g., The Trouble With the Jury System, 1 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
959, 961 (1911) ("As a rule, the most dangerous juror is the talesman - the idle
hanger-on in the Court House, hungry for the pitiful per diem of a juror, sometimes ob-
truding himself to be called by the sheriff in order to serve a friend, sometimes present
by invitation for that purpose.").
68. See, e.g., SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & EDWIN G. MERRIAM, A TREATISE
ON THE ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF JURIES, INCLUDING GRAND
JURIEs 81-93 (1882).
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jurisdictions had substituted professional jury commissioners for politi-
cally beholden officers.
69
Selection systems in several jurisdictions were overhauled in order
to boost the education levels of jurors.70 The prevailing view among the
judges and attorneys who staffed reform commissions was aptly stated
in a 1933 essay called "The Unfit Juror." 7' The author argued that
"America has long suffered from the false teaching that every citizen is
the equal of every other citizen, and by right is entitled to perform any
service or hold any office of the state." Better care had to be taken, the
author said, to "screen out unfit jurors in order to improve the caliber
of juries. '72 As a result, stricter selection criteria were adopted73 and re-
formers began to tackle those conditions of service that deterred busi-
nessmen from serving, shortening terms of service, and relaxing rules
69. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 547; Alfred C. Coxe, The Tri-
als of Jury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REv. 286, 296 (1901) (complaining that the supervi-
sors, town clerks, and assessors were too influenced by favoritism and politics in their
decisions to leave off or add some persons to the jury list, and that the work should be
done by a jury commissioner). The Wickersham Commission's report of 1931 accused
judges of playing political favorites, too, in their exercise of excuses. WICKERSHAM
REPORT, supra note 47, at 24 ("[T]here is constant heavy pressure to be excused on the
part of those best fitted for jury service. When elected judges, frequently holding for
relatively short terms, are subjected to this pressure, often reinforced by political influ-
ence, it can not be expected that a high standard of competent juries may be
maintained.").
70. See, e.g., CALLENDER, supra note 58, at 9.
71. The essay was published in the most influential publication in the new field of
judicial administration, the Journal of the American Judicature Society. See Albert S.
Osborn, The Unfit Juror, 17 J. AM. JUDICATURE Socy. 113 (1933). For an excellent
overview of the growth of judicial administration, see SHELDEN D. ELLIOTr. IMPROV-
ING OUR COURTS: COLLECTED STUDIES ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1-30
(1959).
72. Osborn, supra note 71, at 115.
73. Jury commissioners in Los Angeles, for example, required two written tests
and a personal interview of every prospective juror. On the first test, "twenty five
words ordinarily used during the trial of cases are set down next to three other words,
one a synonym, which the juror is asked to circle. The second test asked the citizen to
read several common jury instructions and mark statements appearing afterward as right
or wrong." Admirers of the system noted, "No attempt has been made to raise the
mental standard too high. The personal interview... permits the weeding out of per-
sons who, though high in intelligence rating, appear to lack reason, or who have a
wrong conception of government or law enforcement." MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra
note 49, at 554. Of course, we know now that this sort of selection system also made it
easier for officials to "weed out" minority racial and ethnic groups as well. See, e.g.,
S.W. Tucker, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection in Virginia, 52 VA. L. REv. 736,
738-39 (1966) (describing Act of 1919 that placed the selection of jurors in the hands of
nonjudicial officers who presumed that "Negroes were utterly unqualified to sit on
juries").
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against separation. 74 Exemptions that permitted entire professions to opt
out of jury service were targeted for elimination, with mixed success 5
One commentator promised that upon the repeal of the long list of pro-
fessional exemptions in New York, "the average intelligence of juries
will automatically rise 50%.%76
Finally, there was considerable support for more vigorous enforce-
ment of summonses through the use of fines for contempt." Some
judges throughout the period used their contempt powers, but not
strictly enough to satisfy all critics. Said one, "A few fines for con-
tempt of court for failing to respond to mailed summonses ... would
quickly put an end to the present wholesale ignoring of the court's
74. See HIRSH, supra note 65, at 190; Coxe, supra note 69, at 297. By the 1940s,
11 jurisdictions limited jury service to three weeks or less, six others required a month.
Others continued to have very long terms. In California jurors were on call for three
months, in Arizona service lasted as long as four months, and several states required ju-
rors to be on call for an entire year. Twenty-nine states permitted separation before de-
liberations, but 13 states still required sequestration in capital cases. See MINIMUM
STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 195-96, 203-04; see also WILLIAM M. WHERRY. A
STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF LITIGATION AND OF THE JURY TRIAL IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK COUNTY 53 (1931) (reporting that in New York,
starting in 1929, jurors began to be called in pools for several courts, instead of calling
separate panels for each court, reducing waiting time and resulting in savings of over
$63,000 in juror fees).
75. The elimination of exemptions from jury service started quite early in Massa-
chusetts, in 1808. See Dierdre A. Harris, Note, Jury Nullification in Historical Perspec-
tive: Massachusetts as a Case Study, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 968, 993 (1978). In
1938, the American Bar Association issued its recommendations, which recognized that:
[I]f the qualifications and exemptions set by statute are so fanciful and numerous
as to exclude the majority of otherwise available citizens, it will be almost im-
possible for the jury commissioners to select jurors who are honest, and bring to
their task intelligence, sound judgment and courage that will enable them rightly
to decide questions of fact, and to do so without fear or favor.
MImvIMM STANDARDS. supra note 49, at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted). It
wasn't until 1995 that the New York legislature scrapped its list of exempt occupations.
76. BREWSTER, supra note 51, at 15.
77. Fines for nonappearance ranged in 1882 from five dollars in Connecticut to
$500 in Nevada. See THOMPSON & MERRIAM, supra note 68, at 83. An elaborate pro-
cedure for fining delinquent jurors and the review of those fines was in place in New
York at the end of the 1870s, including a board for the enforcement of jury fines, made
up of several judges, the recorder, and he mayor, that met at least twice a year to de-
cide whether to remit jury fines. See HIRSH, supra note 65, at 55-60. During 1904-05 in
New York County, 33,500 jurors were summoned to serve, 60% tried to dodge service,
and 1500 of these were ordered to pay fines. See Samuel R. Stem, Men Not so Good
and Not so True, 13 UNPARTIZAN REv. 287, 288-89 (1920). In the 1920s in New York,
court business was halted by the lack of jurors, and one judge reportedly imposed fines
for the 70% of those summoned who did not show up, subject to remission if they
proved to have valid excuses. See JULIA MARGARET HICKS, WOMEN JURORS 14
(1928).
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call."' 78 The next era in jury enforcement would see an expansion of ef-
forts to remove disincentives, but also a shift in the groups targeted by
those efforts from wealthy and conventional-thinking businessmen79 to
groups historically underrepresented on juries: racial and ethnic minori-
ties and women.
3. Compulsory Jury Service Encounters the Rights Revolution
1940-1995
Beginning around the middle of this century, criminal prosecutions
were transformed by judicial application of the Bill of Rights to all
stages of the adjudicative process. Jury selection and its enforcement
were recast as well. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
court reformers had been concerned that verdicts in criminal cases be
"truthful" and "accurate" and uninfluenced by sympathy or politics
that might undermine business interests. This led them to remove disin-
centives that discouraged educated citizens from serving as jurors and
to delegate considerable discretion to jury commissioners to qualify and
summon only those jurors whom the commissioners considered "fit" to
serve. In a few short decades, this approach was replaced by one based
on distrust of those same commissioners. Discretion once considered vi-
tal to maintain the "caliber" of jurors became despised as a tool for
discrimination that threatened the rights of criminal defendants.
The Court began its renovation of jury selection by prohibiting the
exclusion of women and of wage earners in the federal courts in the
1940s. In the decades that followed, the Court continued by interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Sixth
Amendment to prohibit state as well as federal officials from discrimi-
nating on the basis of race or gender in jury selection, and by requiring
states to defend selection procedures when jury venires did not fairly
represent the racial and ethnic diversity of the communities from which
they were drawn.80 In contrast to the late 1930s and 1940s, when courts
carefully screened potential jurors for "character" or "intelligence," by
78. CLEVELAND REPORT, supra note 50, at 353; see also ILLINOIS CRIME SUR-
vEY, supra note 52, at 1929 (urging that judges cite those who ignore summons with
contempt to improve turnout).
79. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. CHOATE, AMiRICAN ADDRESSES 235-36 (1911) (argu-
ing "competent men, having been selected, must be compelled to serve. Too great ex-
emptions are allowed, too paltry excuses accepted, and the very men who by their
weight and character would leaven the whole lump escape altogether.").
80. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE §§ 22.2(c)-(d), 22.3(d) (2d ed. 1992). Earlier regulation of racial discrimination
in state jury selection under the Equal Protection Clause had not been effective. See Al-
schuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 891-95.
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1980 such screening had been replaced in most jurisdictions by random
and race-blind procedures drawing jurors indiscriminately from voters
lists.,,
In addition to removing much of the discretion that judges and
commissioners earlier had enjoyed, the modem approach to juror com-
pliance has focused more aggressively on eliminating disincentives to
serve. Conditions for jurors had improved considerably by the second
half of the twentieth century, but working people still found it difficult
to remove themselves from jobs and family for jury service. Average
lost earnings for each juror from one term of service in 1975 in some
counties was more than $1000.82 Since 1950 several states have raised
the amount that jurors receive as fees and adopted criminal or civil lia-
bility for employers that retaliate against employees called as jurors,
and six have required employers to pay the salary of employees while
on jury duty.83 In 1978, the American Bar Association issued its Stan-
dards Relating to Juror Use and Management, in which it advocated
several revisions in jury administration, such as the one day/one trial
system designed to reduce burdens on all jurors who serve. States that
adopted them84 reported improved compliance.8 5
81. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1994) (setting separate qualifications for
federal jurors); see generally Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Demo-
cratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 247 (1973); Lester B. Orfield, Trial Jurors in
Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 108-30 (1962). Selection procedures that al-
lowed volunteers to serve as jurors were disapproved as violating the statutory rights of
criminal defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608, 610-11 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 865 (1977); Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 815 (Del. 1994)
(collecting cases), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 132 (1994).
82. See William R. Pabst, Jr. & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Economic Hardship
of Jury Duty, 58 JUDICATURE 494, 497-98 (1975) (reporting also that for about 75% of
jurors, losses were borne by the employer). As of 1958, less than half of the country's
factory workers were guaranteed compensation during jury service by their collective
bargaining agreements. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
SUMMARY OF HEARINGS ON COMPENSATION OF JURORS 9 (1962) (statement of
Thomas L. Pitts, Secretary-Treasurer, California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO).
83. See G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79
JTJDiCATURE 216, 217 & n.4 (1996) [hereinafter G.T. Munsterman, A Brief History]
(noting that mandatory pay for jurors is required of at least some employers for a lim-
ited number of days of service in Alabama, Nebraska, Tennessee, Massachusetts, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, and Louisiana). These mandatory pay statutes were upheld as consti-
tutional in Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp., 412 U.S. 543 (1973) (requiring
employers to pay employees while on jury duty has "no less sturdy a footing" than re-
quiring employers to pay employees while voting).
84. See G.T. Munsterman, A Brief History, supra note 83, at 217-18 (summarizing
history of standards).
85. See, e.g., J. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, § 4.1, at 21-24 (noting that
many courts have reported improved yields with reduced terms of service).
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Despite great strides in reducing disincentives to serve, the shift
from qualification interviews to qualification by mail in most jurisdic-
tions during this period may actually have expanded opportunities to
avoid jury service.86 Many jurisdictions, following the lead of the fed-
eral act, adopted a procedure by which each randomly selected citizen
received a mailed questionnaire, and later, only if he chose to fill out
the questionnaire and mail it back, was summoned for service. Some
courts continued to enforce summonses against qualified respondents
who failed to appear, but very few did anything about those who never
returned their qualification questionnaires.8 7 Shirking jury duty became
easier than ever, even though the duty itself had become less onerous.
No longer did jury dodgers have to procure excuses through influence
or deceit, pay fines, or avoid apprehension by sheriffs who knew per-
fectly well they had been summoned.8 With the advent of the mailed
qualification questionnaire, Americans could avoid being bothered with
jury service simply by tossing their jury questionnaires in the trash
along with other unwanted junk mail.
86. Studies during the late 1970s showed that citizens continued to resist jury ser-
vice. James L. Allen, Attitude Change Following Jury Duty, 2 JUST. Sys. J. 246, 251
(1976) (concluding that most jurors who responded to their summons would still try to
get out of jury service if summoned again, even those that had served as trial jurors);
John P. Richert, Jurors' Attitudes Toward Jury Service, 2 JUSTICE Sys. J. 233, 236
(1976) (noting that more than half of the persons called for jury duty in his study wrote
to get out (1443 of 2703), only 3.6% asked for deferment, and 49.8% asked for
exemption).
87. See G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN ET AL.. A SUPPLEMENT TO THE METHOD-
OLOGY MANUAL FOR JURY SYSTEMS: RELATIONSHIPS TO THE STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT 42 (1987) (stating that "some courts will
carefully follow up all 'no shows' to the summons, yet simply drop from the system
those who do not respond to the qualification questionnaire").
88. In the nineteenth century, jury selection was not nearly as anonymous as it is
today. In some states, the same names appeared on the jury rolls again and again. See
AYERS, supra note 20, at 224 (reporting that in Greene County, Georgia, between 1890
and 1900, 11 families accounted for almost 20% of the grand jurors, and 25 men ap-
peared in the grand jury four times or more); MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON
AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETrS AND
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 154-55 & n.63 (1980); WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at
83. There was no intermediate qualification stage in jury selection. See LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY. CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910. at 55 (1981) (describing se-
lection in Alameda County, California, in the late 1800s). In Fort Wayne in the early
1800s, the sheriff would yell for the jurors to appear when court began. SMrrH, supra
note 25, at 168-70.
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C. Compulsory Jury Service Today
1. Jury Duty Avoidance - Its Extent
Today, high rates of jury avoidance seem to be a localized phe-
nomenon, not a nationwide epidemic. Statistical studies of various juris-
dictions reveal extremely low response rates to questionnaires or to
summonses in some jurisdictions, and near-perfect compliance in
others. 9 People who resist jury duty today are apprehensive about lost
income, the inconvenience of being absent from work and family, un-
pleasant working conditions, and long waits.90 In addition, some poten-
tial jurors may stay away to avoid attention from litigants or the press,91
89. Compare G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT,
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT, JURY MANAGE-
mENT 9, 12 (National Ctr. for State Courts ed., 1995) (reporting that in Wayne County,
Michigan, an average of 26% of those sent questionnaires did not return them, and of
those who did respond and were qualified, 16% failed to appear when summoned) and
Gerlin, supra note 1, at B1 (reporting that only 22-25% of those summoned in Dallas
County responded at the beginning of August, 1995) with G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN,
THIRTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, CALHOUN COUNTY, MICHIGAN,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT 2 (National Ctr. for State Courts ed., 1995) (Cal-
houn County manages a very low 6% nonresponse rate) and ERROL E. GIDDINGS.
COLORADO JURY SYSTEM FAILURE TO APPEAR NOTICES 27-31 (1993) (reporting
4% failure to appear rate).
The judges in Los Angeles are among the most concerned about juror yields. Of all
the citizens summoned to jury service in 1994, 52% ignored the qualification question-
naire; in 1995, after the adoption of follow-up procedures 36% of summoned citizens
failed to respond. The problem has become acute recently because more defendants are
going to trial due to the "three strikes" law, CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp.
1996), and because the large number of peremptory challenges allowed in that state in
criminal cases requires nearly twice the number of veniremembers per trial as in other
states. See Jacobius, supra note 1; see also Bienen et al., supra note 7, app. C at 1-4
(reporting a study of 348 jurors summoned for jury service in 1994 in New Jersey that
revealed that 31.5% of respondents had tried to avoid or postpone having to appear at
the designated time, that 20.5% did not attend, that 27% asked to be excused once they
got to court, and that 39% of the jurors summoned successfully avoided jury service in
these ways).
90. See HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTORNEY'S TASK FORCE ON RACIAL COMPOSI-
TION OF THE GRAND JURY 55 (1992) (noting that the most common reasons people
seek excuse are economic and child care); REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMIS-
SION ON JURY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT 26 (Judicial Council of California et al. eds.,
1996) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA REPORT] (reporting that in some California counties,
60% of hardship excuses involve child care); Bienen et al., supra note 7, at app. C
(78.1% of jurors surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement "the
money allowances I received were adequate" (54.5% reporting strong disagreement),
63.4% of those who sought excuses reported that the statement "I did not want to dis-
please my employer" applied very much or somewhat, and 54.8% said that the state-
ment "I could not afford to lose my pay from work" applied very much).
91. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 90, at 34 ("[M]any jurors are plainly
worried about the threat of intimidation or retaliation."); Nancy J. King, Nameless Jus-
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or to protest a system they feel is unjust. 92
Existing studies, however, do not reveal how, if, or when judges
enforce jury summonses. Nor do they address why judges choose to
spare or punish jury dodgers. To obtain additional information about
jury avoidance and jury misconduct during trial, I mailed 970 surveys
to state and federal trial judges in late November of 1995. The survey
solicited answers to several questions about the behavior of jurors and
prospective jurors in the recipient's court over the past three years, as
well as the recipient's response to that behavior.93 Well over half (562)
of the 970 judges to whom I sent surveys completed and returned them.
tice: The Case for Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Cases, 49 VAND. L.
REv. 123, 126-30, 139 (1996).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Grisham, 841 F. Supp. 1138, 1149 n.22 (N.D. Ala.
1994) (noting an expert's testimony that blacks may return questionnaires at lower rates
than whites because of "sociologically induced mistrust of government"), affd., 63 F.3d
1074 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 798 (1996). One jury supervisor said in a
phone conversation that an older man said he didn't want to participate because, "I
don't believe in the system; all lawyers are weasels." Telephone Interview with Michael
Devereaux, Jury Supervisor, 22d Judicial Circuit, St. Louis (Feb. 1996).
93. The names and addresses of 717 state judges and 253 federal judges were se-
lected from BNA DIRECTORY OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, JUDGES, AND
CLERKS (Kamla J. King & Judith A. Miller, eds., 4th ed. 1996). The judges worked in
both large and small cities in 17 states and 30 federal districts nationwide. Within those
cities, only courts that were listed as having jurisdiction over major felony and civil
cases were selected, and only those with three or more judges at the same address, to
ensure anonymity. Within those courts, each or some (using a regular interval) of the
listed judges' names were selected. Of the state judges sent surveys, 179 were in south-
ern states, 132 in northeastern states, 179 in western states, and 227 in Midwestern
states. Judges were requested -to complete the survey and return it without identifying
themselves.
Approximately the same proportion of federal and state judges responded. One
hundred thirty-three of the returned surveys were from federal judges, 375 from state
judges, and 54 from judges that did not identify themselves as state or federal judges,
for a total of 562 responses. A handful of additional surveys were returned as undeliver-
able; several judges indicated by phone or in writing that they had not tried jury cases
in the last three years and a few judges wrote explaining that they did not answer
surveys.
The sample included judges predominately from courts in larger cities: Of the 549
judges specifying city size, 8% (N=44) worked in courts located in cities of under
100,000; 28.4% (N=156) in cities of between 100,000 and 500,000; 25% (N=137) in
cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000; and 38.6% (N=212) in cities over 1,000,000.
Most of the judges responding estimated that they had tried between 30 and 89 jury
cases in the past three years. Seven and seven-tenths percent (N=43) reported trying less
than 10 jury cases; 18.6% (N=104) reported 10-29 jury trials; 29% (N-162) reported
30-59 jury trials; 23.8% (N-=133) reported 60-89 jury trials; 11.1% (N=62) reported 90-
119 jury trials; and 9.8% (N=55) reported 120-150 jury trials over the past three years.
State judges tried more cases on average than federal judges. Most judges had tried both
civil and criminal cases: 19.0% (N=105) reported trying no civil cases; 18.7% (N=103)
reported less than 25%; 27% (N=149) reported more than 25% but less than 50% civil
cases; 16.7% (N=92) reported trying more than half civil cases; and 18.7% (N=103) re-
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The survey results concerning jury duty enforcement must necessa-
rily be considered as somewhat incomplete. Randomly sampled judicial
impressions of the problem of jury dodging are less exact than statistics
compiled by jury administrators or surveys of prospective jurors, partic-
ularly because in many urban courts, knowledge about jury administra-
tion prior to the voir dire stage is concentrated in a few judges and the
jury staff.94 Moreover, the results reflect the responses of only those
judges who chose to complete and return the questionnaire. Also, be-
cause the survey requested that judges recall three years of litigation,
some responses may be based on incomplete recollections. Finally, be-
cause the sample was limited to cities large enough to have three or
more judges in the same court at the same address, the results do not
necessarily represent the impressions of trial judges in the thousands of
smaller communities across the nation. Nevertheless, the survey pro-
vides the first national snapshot of formal jury enforcement proceed-
ings, judicial attitudes concerning jury dodging, the conduct of jurors
during voir dire, and judicial responses to that conduict.
The survey suggests that most trial judges do not consider jury
avoidance to be a serious problem. For example, when judges on the
bench seven years or more were asked their opinions about whether
compliance with jury summonses had become worse or better or had
stayed the same compared to seven years ago, most judges answered
that compliance was about the same. Of the judges that thought condi-
tions had changed, however, more thought compliance had worsened
than thought that it had improved. This was the case when considering
the responses of all judges95 and also after excluding the responses of
those judges who suggested directly or indirectly that they had no re-
ported trying entirely civil cases. Judges were almost evenly divided three ways be-
tween those on the bench six years or less, those on the bench seven to fourteen years
and those on the bench fifteen years or more (1-6 years: 30.2% (N=170); 7-14 years:
30.4% (N=171); 15+ years 27% (N=152); 12.3% of the respondents did not answer this
question). A complete report of survey data is available from the author.
94. In addition, because the survey asked only about those aspects of juror recruit-
ment likely to be known by trial judges (noncompliance with jury summonses and un-
truthfulness during voir dire) it provides no additional information about nonresponse to
qualification questionnaires in those jurisdictions that continue to use a two-step system
rather than a combined questionnaire/summons.
95. Eleven percent of those judges who responded to this question believed that a
smaller percentage of those summoned for service were ignoring their summonses today
as compared to seven years ago, 34% responded that a greater proportion of those sum-
moned are ignoring their summonses today, and 55% thought that the proportion of re-
calcitrant jurors is about the same today as it was seven years ago. Notably, state judges
were more likely than federal judges to respond that nonappearance was worse today
than seven years ago. Of state judges answering this question, 50% thought compliance
was the same, 38% thought it was worse, and 12% thought it was better. Of federal
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sponsibility for enforcing jury summonses.96 Of the nearly 200 judges
who volunteered comments about the use of contempt to enforce jury
summonses, only a dozen suggested that the rate of noncompliance was
high or was a problem in their courts. 97 Nearly four dozen volunteered
that enforcement was not necessary because all (or almost all) of those
summoned complied.98 Less than one-sixth of the responding judges in-
dicated that they had issued a show cause order to a person who had
failed to comply with a jury summons within the past three years. 99
2. Jury Duty Avoidance - Enforcement
a. Existing Information about Enforcement. Anecdotal information
from judges and jury administrators suggests that courts that have ad-
dressed the problem of juror truancy have preferred to remove disincen-
tives to serve rather than punish those who resist.110 According to G.
judges, 70% thought it was the same, 23% though it was worse, and 7% thought it was
better. These differences were statistically significant. (p<.01).
96. The responsibility for enforcing jury summonses in most cities is not shared
equally among trial judges, but is delegated to particular judges or to a jury administra-
tor. To create a sample of judges who were most likely to have responsibility for enforc-
ing jury summonses, I removed the response of any judge who volunteered that some-
one else took responsibility for enforcing jury summonses, marked as a reason for not
using contempt powers that the court had an alternative enforcement program, or indi-
cated lack of knowledge of who was or was not complying. The remaining 206 judges
were more likely to be actively involved in enforcement. Of the judges in this smaller
sample who had expressed an opinion about the problem today as compared to seven
years ago (N-1 15), 29% (N=33) thought that a greater proportion of people ignore jury
summonses today than did seven years ago compared to 16.5% (N=19) who thought the
situation had improved.
97. Those comments included the following: "In our 40-county district, transpor-
tation problems are severe," "This is an extremely serious problem for us. We are try-
ing to formulate a plan, short of contempt proceedings, to address this issue." "I think
more jurors should be held in contempt for not complying. I think about 1/3 do not show
up in Harris County," "Over 1/3 of all summoned jurors fail to respond in our jurisdic-
tion." "We don't have time to do this, FTA [failure to appear] rate is 40-50%," "we
have many no-shows." "Fewer than 25% of Detroit residents respond to question-
naires." Two judges, one from New York City, and another from San Francisco, ex-
plained that the rate of response to summonses was 20% or less, one characterized the
jury system as "in serious trouble." Another comment echoed a familiar theme: "Our
largest problem with juror misconduct is that well educated and involved persons avoid
jury service like the plague."
98. Forty-seven judges noted adequate or complete compliance in their volun-
teered comments.
99. See infra text accompanying note 108.
100. The story of one honest but conflicted citizen from Houston is an apt illustra-
tion. Reading on his questionnaire that by failing to respond he risked a $100 fine, he
slipped a check for $100 in with his questionnaire along with an explanation that he
simply couldn't serve. The judge called him in and learned that his employer wouldn't
pay him while he was on jury duty and that this had prompted the juror to decide that it
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HeinOnline  -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2700 1995-1996
August 1996] Juror Delinquency 2701
Thomas Munsterman, Director of the Center for Jury Studies of the Na-
tional Center for State Courts, very few courts follow up on those citi-
zens who do not return their qualification questionnaires, and most do
nothing even when summoned jurors do not respond.101 Some jurisdic-
tions that have strengthened enforcement or follow-up procedures may
have done so in part as a response to challenges that lax enforcement
fails to secure jury panels that represent a fair cross section of the sur-
rounding community.1' 2
This is not to say that contemporary courts are satisfied with vol-
unteers and have abandoned enforcement efforts entirely. Rather, they
seem to be using penalties such as contempt as a last resort when re-
forms such as employer-mandated pay and one-day/one-trial fail to at-
tract sufficient numbers of qualified jurors.'03 More courts are replacing
hardship excuses with a single chance to defer service to a more conve-
nient time. Automated follow-up notices and well-coordinated systems
for scheduling deferral dates have proven to be cost-effective ways to
boost compliance in some jurisdictions.'04 Because* many people who
fail to respond to their jury questionnaires do not receive them, are dis-
was better to pay a fine than to miss work. The judge then called the employer, per-
suaded the employer to pay the employee while on jury duty, and sent the $100 back to
the employee. Telephone Interview with G. Thomas Munsterman, Apr., 1996.
101. See G.T. Munsterman, Jury News, supra note 10, at 6, 44-45 (noting the lack
of enforcement efforts against summoned jurors); see also G. THOMAS MTSTERMAN,
TWENTY-SEcoND JUDICIAL'CIRCUIT COURT, WASHTENAW COUNTY, MICHIGAN,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT 2 (National Ctr. for State Courts ed., 1996) (noting
that Washtenaw County "is one of the few counties in Michigan and probably in the
U.S. that follows up on persons who do not return their qualification questionnaire")
(emphasis added).
102. See supra note 9.
103. See, e.g., THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MORE EFFECTIVE
USE OF JURIES, JURORS: THE POWER OF 12, at 49 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter ARIZONA
REPORT] (recommending automated follow-up mailings, but declining to recommend
further enforcement action, noting "public education efforts ... coupled with consider-
ate and efficient treatment and utilization of jurors called to service, will, in the long
term, produce a higher level of compliance with the summons"); Jan Hoffman, Jury-
Duty Dodgers Tell It to the Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at BI (reporting that in
Manhattan, reducing term of service from two weeks to three days in 1996 has doulled
the percentage of those who appeared).
104. See Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Im-
pairment of the "Fair Cross-Section of the Community," 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 155, 170
(1995) (noting success of deferrals in Central District of California); G.T. Munsterman,
Jury News, supra note 10, at 45 (noting that follow-up notices produced 29% of the
nonresponding jurors in some counties of Colorado, reduced to less than 1% of those
originally contacted the number of unexplained nonresponders in San Diego, reduced
the nonresponse rate by 32% in Detroit and by half in Atlanta).
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qualified, or have a legitimate excuse for not serving, 105 most courts
tend to use contempt selectively, only after a prospective juror has not
responded many times or has been found to have had no valid reason to
avoid service.1'6 In many jurisdictions those who are fined must still
serve. In St. Louis, for example, the offer of one self-employed pro-
spective juror to pay the fine instead of serving was refused by a some-
what annoyed judge. Instead, the juror was forced to sit in the court-
house for several hours until he agreed to serve at a later date.
According to the jury supervisor, all steps are taken to assure the public
that a person who can afford the fine cannot buy his way off. 07
b. Survey Results Concerning Enforcement. The survey responses
reflect this preference for carrots over sticks. Although a small but sig-
nificant percentage of judges use their contempt powers, many judges
are reluctant to use contempt as a remedy for juror truancy. Of those
judges who had issued an order to show cause in the past three years
(only 17.5% of all judges responding), 43% used such orders sparingly,
issuing only one or two. Fourteen percent reported that they had issued
eleven or more such orders. 08 The percentage of judges issuing such or-
105. See G.T. Munsterman, Jury News, supra note 10, at 45 (noting that it is not
accurate to presume that all those who fail to respond to their questionnaires are recalci-
trant - many either never received them, or are unqualified or exempted).
106. See id. at 45-46 (noting this approach was adopted recently by some judges
in Houston and Baltimore); Interview with Ms. Norma J. Wagoner, Jury Administrator,
W.D. Tex. (Jan. 1996) (jury supervisor could recall only two hearings to show cause
why prospective juror should not be held in contempt in the past 19 years in the West-
ern District of Texas, both where the person refused service or failed to respond to ear-
lier orders to appear. One was excused, the other deferred for service on a later date).
Other courts continue to try regular punishment to send a message. In Washington,
D.C., judges randomly select the unlucky "juror of the month" to punish, says G.
Thomas Munsterman. See Munsterman, supra note 100. One judge from another city
told me in a telephone conversation on Dec. 14, 1995, that "every six months or so we
haul 10 people in here and try to get a lot of publicity." See also Federal Judges Warn
Jurors to Show Up, ANN ARBOR NEWS, May 2, 1996, at C6 (announcing "crack-
down" in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan).
107. Conversation with Michael D. Devereaux, Jury Supervisor, 22d Judicial Cir-
cuit, St. Louis, Mo. (Feb. 1996); see also Hoffman, supra note 103, at BI (reporting
that jury shirkers in New York are scheduled for service as well as fined).
108. Over 82% of judges surveyed had not issued an order to show cause to a per-
son failing to appear for jury service in the past three years. Of the smaller sample ofjudges referred to in note 96, about 40% had used their contempt powers in the past
three years to issue orders to show cause to those who had failed to appear.
Forty-three percent (N=41) of the judges who had indicated that they had issued an
order to show cause in the past three years had used an order only one or two times,
42% (N=40) had used an order 3-10 times, and 14% (N=14) had ordered 11 or more ju-
rors to appear and explain why they hadn't obeyed their summonses. Most of thesejudges were from cities with a population over 500,000. The relationship between city
size and frequency of show cause orders was statistically significant (p<.01).
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ders is low, probably because most of the judges surveyed lacked re-
sponsibility for doing so,"° but several judges offered other explana-
tions as well: ninety judges noted that using contempt to enforce jury
summons was too costly or inefficient,110 eighty-five judges responded
that coerced jurors make bad jurors,"' nearly fifty explained that com-
pliance was adequate, and sixteen responded that most of those who fail
to appear have a good reason for not appearing.Y2 Particularly interest-
ing were the candid responses of three judges that they have declined to
hold delinquent jurors in contempt because they face election.Y3
Of those judges who have ordered recalcitrant jurors to come to
court to explain their noncompliance, less than half had held a
noncomplier in contempt, and, of these, less than a third held four or
more jurors in contempt during the past three years." 4 Over half of the
judges who had held nonresponders in contempt noted that they had im-
posed a sentence for this offense, but most judges had done so only
109. Of the approximately 450 judges who in the past three years had not issued
any order to show cause to a nonresponder, 182 stated they did not know which pro-
spective jurors did not comply, 161 indicated that their court had an alternative enforce-
ment mechanism, and 80 noted that the responsibility for enforcing jury summons be-
longed to another judge or jury commissioner. One judge reported that he or she used
letters to jurors to appear in chambers to discuss their failure to appeal rather than for-
mal summonses, three others issued bench warrants or had sheriffs round up noncom-
pliers, several simply scheduled no-shows for later service.
110. Typical of the volunteered comments on this point were, "the expense of a
contempt is greater than the return benefit," "those who fail to show are such an insig-
nificant number it is not worth my time or taxpayer dollars to pursue them," and
"[t]here are far better methods to get a response short of contempt - which is like a
significant sanction, we get a good response to our summonses - have one day one
trial." See also Kauffman, supra note 9 (recounting that judges asked the states' attor-
neys to withdraw 400 cases filed in 1992 to collect fines from jury dodgers because of
the strain it put on the courts).
111. One volunteered, "If they do not want to serve, the litigants should not be
forced to take them."
112. Of the smaller sample of judges who were more likely to have had responsi-
bility for enforcing jury summonses, see supra note 96, 33 responded that one of the
reasons that they had not issued orders to show cause was that those who comply make
better jurors than those who must be coerced into compliance, 42 responded that using
contempt in this situation uses too much of the court's resources, and 8 indicated that
they assume nonresponders have good reasons for not complying.
113. "We are elected!." "Judges are elected - reluctance to arrest people who
vote; would expect publicity because so rarely enforced" "Not good p.r. for elected
judges." Two additional responses contained references to public relations or the mes-
sage contempt would send to prospective jurors. These responses project a certain para-
dox: by striving to increase the accountability of judges through judicial elections we
may be indirectly undermining the ability of the jury to fulfill its democratic role.
114. Of the 95 judges, 42 indicated that they had cited at least one potential juror
with contempt. Of these, 32 had held only one to three potential jurors in contempt. The
remaining judges held 4, 5, 6, 10, 23, 24, 35, or 80 jurors in contempt.
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once in the past three years." 5 Like sentences, fines were unusual -
twenty-five of the twenty-nine judges imposing fines during the past
three years had fined three persons or less." 6 Only two judges com-
mented that they thought that more recalcitrant jurors should be held in
contempt. The responses indicate that even those judges who perceive
compliance with jury summons to be a problem would prefer not to se-
cure attendance through contempt procedures, and that many judges
who do issue orders to show cause often do not follow with a penalty.
The survey also produced information about veniremembers who
avoid service as trial jurors by misrepresenting the truth during voir
dire. The questionnaire asked judges about the proportion of cases in
which they became convinced that a veniremember was untruthful. Al-
though they were not asked to, several judges elaborated on the reasons
that they thought veniremembers had lied. The most common reason for
dishonesty, according to the comments, is to avoid service. Fifteen
judges indicated concern about the number of veniremembers who lie to
avoid serving. As one judge concluded, "intelligent'panel members re-
alize and use the obvious responses to avoid jury service." Another re-
ported that veniremembers falsely represent "that they do not believe in
the presumption of innocence, cannot apply 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' standard, will not follow the judge's instructions, cannot be fair
because they believe the Defendant is guilty ... or don't like lawyers
or people who ask for damages."" 7
Most of the judges who were convinced that a veniremember had
been dishonest dismissed the untruthful veniremember. Doing nothing
and allowing the attorneys to handle it was another popular response to
veniremember deceit."l 8  Sixteen judges reported that they had
threatened contempt and four reported imposing contempt for untruth-
115. Twenty-three of the 42 judges had imposed a sentence on an offending juror.
Sixteen of those 23 reported imposing a sentence for nonappearance only once.
Sentences ranged between one and 100 days. Three judges specifically noted that they
had imposed sentences suspended upon service in another pool.
116. The remaining four judges reported fining 5, 24, 35, and 75 potential jurors.
Fines ranged up to $1500 (one judge), with the most popular amounts being $100 or
$250 (eight and five judges each).
117. The second most common type of untruthfulness, according to the judges'
comments, is the failure to reveal prior criminal history or other relevant information.
This kind of misconduct will be examined in Part II.
118. Two hundred thirty-eight judges responded that they had dismissed the
veniremember from that trial in this situation, 184 said they had allowed attorneys to act
if they chose, and 46 had dismissed the veniremember from service in any trial. One
judge explained, "I have never interfered with the responses given by prospective ju-
rors, assuming that a juror that didn't want to be a juror could find a pretext for avoid-
ing service."
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fulness during voir dire. Some judges, however, expressed frustration
about how to control this behavior. One stated, "I have never come up
with a good remedy for a well-coached veniremember who lied about
his/her feelings or attitudes (as opposed to lying about verifiable
facts)." Just as nonappearance has generated creative responses from
courts that are concerned that all who are summoned appear, judges
have employed a variety of punishments other than contempt for the
veniremember who lies to stay off the jury. Four judges apparently re-
fused to let deceitful veniremembers avoid service by demanding in-
stead that they sit through the entire trial as observers. Others denied
them their juror fee, ordered them resubpoenaed for service, or embar-
rassed them. Future responses to this behavior may depend in part upon
what judges learn about who is fibbing to get off, and whether letting
them go biases the outcome of criminal cases.
In sum, these responses suggest that jury dodging does not trouble
most judges, but does pose a serious problem for some courts. Most
judges do not use contempt to enforce appearance,* and those that do
generally do so infrequently and are often able to coerce compliance
without requiring payment of a fine or incarceration. Finally, however,
the survey suggests that veniremembers who are able to claim bias and
other subjective disqualifying characteristics often can, and do, evade
further service after appearing.
D. Future Directions
The foregoing discussion of jury avoidance past and present
reveals a distinct trend: the remedies of fines and bystanders have given
way to a very different, and for many courts more successful, prescrip-
tion for recruiting jurors - targeting the causes of juror resistance. This
shift has taken place for several reasons. Foremost has been the desire
to increase jury participation by particular groups - first, businessmen,
and more recently, all "cognizable" groups that the Court has pro-
claimed must not be systematically excluded from jury pools. Also
prompting the change in emphasis has been the high cost of punitive as
compared to preventive solutions, and the continuing futility of attempts
to impanel veniremembers who have strong incentives not to serve.
Contempt may deter overt defiance of a jury summons; it is practically
useless against the person who shows up and then lies to avoid serving
as a trial juror. Shorter terms of service, employer liability for juror
wages, the use of deferred service instead of hardship excuses, together
with the adoption of the combined summons and qualification question-
naire and automated tracking of those summoned for jury service, have
provided most courts with an adequate supply of jurors.
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In communities in which jury avoidance is high, lawmakers con-
sidering changing procedures for recruiting jurors are well advised to
keep these past successes in mind. For example, calls for the routine
imposition of criminal contempt penalties against jury shirkers may
meet with skepticism from cost-conscious judges and resistance from
overburdened police, prosecutors, and corrections officials who must ar-
rest, prosecute, and house these offenders. More novel punishments are
worth considering.
In a provocative recent article exploring' ways to ensure that the
jury remains a viable and effective institution of self-governance, Pro-
fessor Akhil Amar suggested that courts withdraw the franchise from
those who fail to report for jury service." 9 The proposal, however,
seems likely to promote less participation in democracy, not more, an
objection Amar acknowledges. 120 Perhaps jury avoiders should forfeit a
government privilege, not unlike the current federal law that conditions
eligibility for student loans upon registration for the draft, but it is diffi-
cult to settle on which privilege would be appropriate, efficient, or ef-
fective to withhold. The California legislature is presently considering
whether to bar jury dodgers from renewing their driver's licenses until
after they can prove they have complied with their jury summonses.2 '
For an even sharper bite, a state might suspend driver's licenses or
other government benefits when scofflaws fail to appear. At any rate,
some citizens may feel that they cannot spare a day or two for jury ser-
vice, even on dates convenient to them and with full pay. For them,
conditional sentences, community service,'2 or stiff monetary sane-
119. See Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 1169, 1179 (1995).
120. See id. at 1180. Rather than increasing the proportion of citizens involved in
governance, the proposal restricts that number to only those who care so much about
their right to vote that they will serve on juries against their will, and to those who al-
ready willingly serve on juries.
121. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 90, at 105-06. The shorter the renewal
period, the more effective this proposal will be.
122. For example, one Manhattan stockbroker sent an impostor to court during
voir dire instead of responding to the summons himself. After confessing that he was
merely a substitute, the impostor bolted. Authorities easily located and promptly prose-
cuted the true venireman, who ended up performing 500 hours of particularly fitting
community service: helping the Jury Supervisor with paperwork. The Jury Supervisor
reported that he was "a very, very bright, likeable guy," one of the best workers he's
ever had. This spring, months after completing his stint in the jury office, the stockbro-
ker completed his service as a sworn juror. Telephone Interview with Vincent
Hominick, Jury Supervisor, New York County, N.Y., June 19, 1996; Busy Executive
Finds Even Best Mechanic Can't Fix Jury Duty, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 19, 1995, at A3.
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tions' 23 may always be necessary deterrents of last resort.
Because courts appear to prefer to make jury service more conve-
nient for jurors rather than trying to police those who stay away, we can
anticipate more experiments with new incentives to serve. Using jurors'
social security numbers a state could offer jurors a tax credit or an in-
come tax exemption for compensation while on jury duty.124 An insur-
ance plan to compensate self-employed jurors for lost wages and em-
ployers for the cost of supporting employees on jury duty may provide
additional incentives to comply.'2 With creative scheduling, busy courts
could offer potential jurors their choice of morning, afternoon, or full-
day service.
Child care problems of potential jurors demand attention as well.
A century ago, when responsibility for child care and jury service rarely
overlapped, one judge in Seattle allowed a three-year-old boy to sit near
the jury box, in a small rocker furnished by the sheriff, sucking his
thumb and looking at a picture book, while his mother served as a ju-
ror. 2 6 One might expect that several decades of experience with jurors
who are also parents would produce more systematic accommodations
for child care, but the best that most courts offer is deferred service at a
later date. Child care vouchers or facilities have yet to be seriously con-
sidered by most courts. 27
It is also possible that courts in which jury shirking persists as a
serious problem may consider tackling some of the more intractable
causes of reluctance to serve, including even those trial features that lit-
igants have come to regard as constitutional entitlements. For example,
judges could limit the length of time a litigant has to present evi-
123. Professor Amar also proposed a fine equal to two weeks of salary in order to
address the avoidance-by-the-rich problem that lesser fines have posed for years. Amar,
supra note 119, at 1179. If fine caps are high enough - some jurisdictions have re-
cently raised the possible fine for jury dodging to $1500 - judges may have the discre-
tion to follow Amar's suggestion.
124. Precedent for such an exemption exists in the combat-pay exemption for
those who serve in armed services. See I.R.C. § 112(a)(1) (1994) (excluding from
wages and gross income certain compensation that members of the armed forced earn
while in active service in combat zone); see also CALuIoRNA REPORT, supra note 90,
at 45 (recommending tax credit for employers who compensate employees while on
jury duty for more than three days).
125. See CALIFORNiA REPORT, supra note 90, at 45-47 (proposing that state un-
employment benefits be extended to employees unable to work due to jury service); So-
bol, supra note 104, at 222 (proposing insurance plan).
126. See Lelia J. Robinson, Women Jurors, 1 Cm. LEGAL TiMES 22, 28-29
(1887).
127. A variety of other "soft" rewards are possible as well, such as the "juror ap-
preciation week" recently proposed by judges in Arizona. See ARIZONA REPORT,
supra note 103, at 34.
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dence,'2 identify jurors by number rather than name to alleviate appre-
hensions about serving,129 or consider cutting back on peremptory chal-
lenges to prevent veniremembers from taking advantage of the voir dire
process to avoid being selected to serve. 30 Certainly, courts and legisla-
tures are well advised to be cautious whenever targeting well-
established aspects of the trial process, just as they must be careful not
to overreact to a perceived problem in criminal justice before verifying
its existence on a local level or before comparing its severity to other
problems in the criminal justice system that demand attention as well.
Still, it is about time that lawmakers at least consider the effects on ju-
rors, and on the jury system, of procedures originally designed with
only litigants in mind.
II. JUROR MISCONDUCT DURING TRIAL
A. Jury Misconduct in America - How It Has Evolved
Just as changes in trial procedure and social attitudes over the past
two centuries have affected the way that citizens regard and courts en-
force compulsory jury service, they have left their mark on the rules
governing the behavior of those jurors who do serve. First, the opportu-
nities for juror misconduct have expanded due to longer trials and in-
creasing demands on juror behavior. In addition, some forms of jury
misconduct have become easier to discover or prove, although the law
still severely limits access to and proof of the jury's work after it is
complete. Finally, as jury misconduct has posed a greater threat to the
finality and efficiency of the trial process, courts have adopted two
strategies in response: (1) managed tolerance, in the form of trial proce-
dures and review standards that obviate the need for new trials when-
ever misconduct is revealed and (2) prevention, in the form of efforts to
assist jurors to behave properly. The discussion of jury misconduct that
follows traces each of these developments.
128. See infra note 278.
129. See King, supra note 91 (recommending that states consider using anony-
mous juries in all criminal cases).
130. Cf. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NoTRE DAME L. Rzv. 447, 485, 488 (1996)
(reporting survey of published decisions addressing Batson challenges revealed that
14% of the "race-neutral" reasons offered by litigants for their challenges involve be-
havior during voir dire, and that in 14% of those cases, the litigant challenged the juror
because the juror "wished to avoid jury service").
2708 [Vol. 94:2673
HeinOnline  -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2708 1995-1996
Juror Delinquency
1. Increasing Demands upon Juror Behavior, 1796-1996
Much of the jury behavior that we consider misconduct today was
also misconduct two hundred years ago, but jurors back then had fewer
opportunities to engage in it.'3' Trials of the nineteenth century were too
short to provide much of a chance for shenanigans. Whenever a jury
was not in the jury box or actively deliberating, a bailiff closely super-
vised its members, watching over the group to make sure it behaved.
Today that picture has changed. Felony trials with one or two witnesses
lasting a few hours or less, once commonplace, are now rare. Also unu-
sual today, primarily because of the increased length of trials, is the
routine sequestration of the jury. Changes in press coverage of criminal
proceedings have also enlarged opportunities for inappropriate behavior
by jurors during trials. Moreover, contemporary judges and litigants
have different expectations for jurors, expectations that have shifted,
and will continue to shift, as the boundary separating acceptable and
unacceptable behavior by jurors changes with societal views of the
jury's function.1 32
a. The Lengthening of the Criminal Jury Trial. Today, most felony
jury trials take three days or longer to complete; in some jurisdictions,
jurors spend a week trying the average felony case. 33 A criminal case
that lasts for several weeks is no longer the sensation it used to be -
one in every twenty felony jury trials in three counties in California
takes nearly a month to complete.13 4 Jury deliberations across the coun-
131. Some forms of misconduct were probably more prevalent in years past than
they are today. For example, there is less contact today between jurors and the parties or
the public through open windows or in crowded accommodations in which in the past
jurors, parties, and witnesses lodged during the court's term. See, e.g., Louisville &
Nashville Ry. Co. v. Tumey, 62 So. 885, 888-89 (Ala. 1913) (jurors shared bed, then
room, at boarding house with plaintiff throughout the trial); Farrer v. Ohio, 2 Ohio St.
54 (1853) (new trial granted in part because of conversations held between jurors and
various persons on the sidewalk below through the windows of the jury room).
132. Another potential catalyst for one type of juror misconduct -
veniremembers' efforts to conceal criminal histories - is the expansion of the jury pool
in many communities during the 1950s and 60s beyond hand-picked men whose reputa-
tions were well-known.
133. See DALE ANNE SIPES ET AL., ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL TRIALS 17-18, 79 (1988) (computing hours per day that were devoted to tri-
als in nine jurisdictions, revealing that median criminal trial length ranged from just
over two to over seven days); see also Sobol, supra note 104, at 173 (jury trials average
one week in two California jurisdictions).
134. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 12 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN] (reporting
that the number of criminal jury trials lasting between 6 and 20 days have increased
118% since 1973); SIPES Er AL., supra note 133, at 17-18.
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try have grown from short conferences that took only minutes to discus-
sions averaging well over two hours.'35
i. Causes. Longer trials have crept up on us gradually and for
many reasons. 136 Some attribute the lengthening of trials to attorneys.
Expanded provision of counsel for the defense during the nineteenth
century meant longer voir dires, more objections, more arguments about
evidentiary and procedural matters, and, of course, more orations to the
jury, all of which increased even further the time required to try even
simple felonies. 137 Others have blamed "the system of elective judges
with short tenure which swept over the country after 1850" for trial de-
lays, complaining that "elected judges can not afford to antagonize
[counsel] and so take refuge in a passive attitude and tend to become
mere umpires." 138
Another change during the nineteenth century which may have
lengthened trials in some jurisdictions was the withdrawal of questions
of law from the jury. When juries were no longer allowed to decide the
law for themselves the trial judge was obligated to 'instruct them care-
fully. Former practice in some jurisdictions had been to submit cases
without instructions. 139
135. SIPES ET AL., supra note 133, at 19.
136. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 88, at 185 (in Alameda County,
California, felony trials lengthened from a median of 1.2 days in 1880, to 1.7 days in
the 1890s, to two days during 1900-1910); KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 33, at 156
(most felony trials took less than two days in the 1950s); Gordon Van Kessel, Adver-
sary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 470
(1992) (noting that in 1922 Cleveland prosecutors were trying two to four cases per day
and that felony trials in Los Angeles took about three days in 1954); John H. Langbein,
Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 3, 10 & n.18 (1978) (half of felony
trials in 1976 in New Jersey lasted one to three days and five percent over five days;
Los Angeles felony trials averaged over a week of trial time); supra text accompanying
notes 20-24.
137. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 136, at 10-11 (attributing the lengthening of
trials to the provision of counsel during the nineteenth century and to evidentiary rules).
By 1887, felony defendants in Chicago were provided counsel if they were unable to af-
ford their own, and at least one writer lamented the "unseemly wrangles and displays of
wit and wisdom" that regularly extended for days the time required to select a jury. EL-
LIOTr ANTHONY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SELF DEFENSE, TRIAL BY JURY IN
CRIMINAL CASES, AND NEW TRIALS IN CRIMINAL CASES 207 (1887); see also Van
Kessel, supra note 136. In some jurisdictions, defendants had counsel much earlier. See,
e.g., Rice, supra note 22, at 256 (only eight percent of felony defendants lacked trial
counsel in Frederick County, Maryland, between 1818 and 1825).
138. WICKERSHAM REPORT, supra note 47, at 41 ("Rather than imperil their po-
sitions, they tolerate continuances and postponements, evasions of jury service and long
drawn out selections of juries, and the wranglings of counsel and ill treatment of wit-
nesses, so unhappily characteristic of American criminal trials.").
139. See, e.g., HORWrrz, supra note 47, at 143 (noting that "until 1807 the prac-
tice of Connecticut judges was simply to submit both law and facts to the jury, without
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The law of evidence also changed in ways that lengthened trials. In
the late nineteenth century, shifting and increasingly formal evidence
doctrine provided ammunition for argument during trial. And although
some recent reforms, such as the exclusionary rule barring illegally ob-
tained evidence, have narrowed the scope of admissible evidence, many
more evidentiary modifications since 1800 have increased the volume
of evidence available to both the prosecution and the defense in crimi-
nal trials. For example, many witnesses commonly heard in criminal tri-
als today, including defendants, their spouses, and convicted criminals,
were barred from testifying during at least part of the nineteenth cen-
tury.140 Hearsay rules were relaxed in the early decades of the twentieth
century.'4' Preliminary hearings and the testimonial evidence that such
hearings produce did not begin to replace less-accessible grand jury tes-
timony until late in the nineteenth century. 42
Other developments may help to explain lengthening trials. Proof
of guilt has become more complex. Early nineteenth century prosecu-
tors relied heavily upon eyewitnesses. By 1900, prosecutors were de-
pendent upon evidence collected and presented by professional investi-
gative agencies. By the late 1950s, one quarter of all felony trials
included expert witness testimony. 43 In the 1980s, felony trials in some
counties typically included the testimony of at least one expert and
expressing any opinion or giving them any direction on how to find their verdict," but
after 1807 they were required to give instructions on every point of law involved); Ire-
land, supra note 29, at 286 (stating that until instructions were required by statute in
1854, most judges in Kentucky did not instruct the jury unless one or both parties re-
quested instructions).
140. Until the mid-nineteenth century, criminal defendants (and parties to a civil
case) were not competent to testify, nor were their spouses. Until 1917, and much later
for some states, those convicted of a felony, or of a crime of deceit, could not testify as
witnesses. See generally 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 92-94 (John W. Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992). Defendants may have answered questions at trial, but not as witnesses. See
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Re-
main Silent, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2625, 2647-60 (1996) [hereinafter Alschuler, Peculiar
Privilege].
141. See 2 EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 293, 302,
306-07 (1961). Liberalization of the hearsay rules has continued. For example, state-
ments against penal interest, now a routine part of many criminal prosecutions, were
inadmissible in many jurisdictions until the 1970s. See MCCORMICK, supra note 140,
at 340-43.
142. See supra note 33. Also contributing to longer trials in some courts is the rule
requiring the government's disclosure of the prior statements of prosecution witnesses,
after the trial has begun. In New York, trials frequently have been delayed or recessed
for up to a day after the jury is sworn while the defense digests this material. See THE
JURY PRoJEcr, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 85
(1994) [hereinafter NEw YORK REPORT] (recommending that New York instead re-
quire disclosure before jury selection begins).
143. See KALVEN & ZEISEL., supra note 33, at 136-40.
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three officials, as well as fourteen or fifteen exhibits, in addition to lay
witnesses.' 44 In addition, as the percentage of criminal cases disposed of
by guilty plea increased between 1850 and 1930, more of the simple
cases may have been "pled out," increasing the complexity of the aver-
age criminal jury trial."45 With increasingly complex criminal conspira-
cies, the number of criminal jury trials with multiple defendants may
have increased as well. Between 1990 and 1994, for example, the num-
ber of federal jury trials with four or more defendants went up thirty-
five percent. 146 For all of these reasons, the contrast between the felony
jury trial of 1996 and the felony jury trial of 1796 is stark - the frame-
work is the same, but what rests upon it is a much more bloated and
complicated version of the previous crude, but slim, form.
ii. Effects on Jury Misconduct. Certain forms of jury misconduct
have been aggravated by lengthening trials. When trials were snappy af-
fairs jurors had little or no opportunity to misbehave before a verdict
was returned. They rarely left the jury box during the trial and reached
verdicts in minutes. Longer trials, with their recesges and breaks, al-
lowed jurors many more opportunities to expose themselves to outside
influence, conduct experiments, visit the scene of the event, share li-
quor, or otherwise act improperly before the verdict was returned.
144. See SnEs ET AL.., supra note 133, at 19, 34.
145. I am grateful to Professor Robert P. Mosteller of Duke University School of
Law for suggesting these latter two points to me. The relationship between longer trials
and plea bargaining has been noted before. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, supra note
33, at 34. Mosteller's insight is that bargaining may have been a cause as well as a con-
sequence of increasingly complex trials.
146. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 134, at 12. In recent decades defense attor-
neys have received even more leeway to question veniremembers during voir dire, and
appellate courts have insisted that some questions be permitted in order to preserve a
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Compare Hill v. State, 661 A.2d 1164
(Md. 1995) (holding that a judge's refusal to ask veniremembers about racial or ethnic
bias in the trial of an African-American defendant charged with cocaine possession vio-
lated the Maryland Constitution) and LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 80, § 26.2(d) with
THACHER, supra note 28, at 12-15, 18 (describing the use of "triers" in Massachusetts
as of 1834 and noting that in the early 1800s jurors were not even questioned except
upon motion of one of the parties). A comparative examination of cross-examination
practices from 1796 to 1996 may very.well confirm Professor Albert Alschuler's sug-
gestion to me that cross-examination, too, has expanded to the point at which attorneys
"consider it their professional duty to force witnesses to repeat their stories at least two
or three times." Letter from Albert W. Alschuler, Wilson-Dickinson Professor & Arnold
& Frieda Shure Scholar, University of Chicago Law School 2 (July 3, 1996) (on file
with author). The Court has held that other aspects of trial strategy are constitutionally
protected as well. See Peter Westen, Order of Proof. An Accused's Right to Control the
Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1978) (describ-
ing the Court's holding that the defendant's right to control the timing and sequence of
the presentation of evidence is constitutionally protected).
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Eventually, the sluggish pace of trials prompted courts to abandon
their first line of defense against jury misconduct: sequestration. By the
second half of the nineteenth century many courts treated the failure to
keep jurors sequestered ("juror separation") as harmless, 47 and by the
1940s most states had abandoned the rule barring separation prior to de-
liberations in noncapital cases. 4 Judges concerned about jury compe-
tence recognized that sequestration deterred many potential "reliable"
jurors from serving as jurors.149
The introduction of women as jurors in many jurisdictions during
the 1920s also increased the sentiment against sequestration. Male ju-
rors locked together in a small room overnight to sleep or argue were
expected to bear up under whatever inconvenience and embarrassment
such close quarters might cause. But women jurors were an entirely dif-
ferent matter. Few desired that women jurors endure the close company
of male strangers under such circumstances. 50 Pending the amendment
of statutory prohibitions against separation, judges and bailiffs took
whatever means they could to assure female jurors some privacy while
keeping the jury together, including using sheets to divide off separate
147. See Owens v. Commonwealth, 167 S.E. 377, 378-79 (Va. Ct. App. 1933)
(discussing shift in law in Virginia between 1812 and 1868); 2 SEYMOUR D. THOMP-
SON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRIALS IN ACTIONS CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
1827-28 (Marion C. Early ed., 1912).
148. See MINIMUM "STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 203-05 (by the 1940s, 29 ju-
risdictions permitted judges to allow separation during trial until deliberations, but thir-
teen states mandated jury sequestration throughout the trial during capital cases). As
they relaxed their separation rules, some states adopted statutes requiring judges to ad-
monish jurors not to talk among themselves or with others about the case during separa-
tions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1122 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996) (enacted 1872).
149. See Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549, 554 (1859) ("if the ancient rule forbid-
ding the separation of jurors, during a trial, should be enforced, at the present day, the
public would lose the services of the most reliable jurors, and a weary burden would
fall exclusively upon those who are unable to pay their fimes, and to whom and their
families the entire loss of time is a serious evil"), overruled, People v. Epps, 334 N.E.
2d 566, 570 (N.Y. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975).
150. See How a "Mixed Jury" Passed an All-Night Session, LITERARY DIG., Mar.
17, 1923, at 50 (relating how jury of men and women endured a night locked in a jury
room equipped with a bathroom door that revealed the occupant's silhouette and during
which the young female juror slept on the marble window-sill "wrapt... tenderly" in
the other jurors' over-coats while "her lover from across the courtyard... kept vigil");
Imogen B. Oakley, The Crime Wave and the Jury, 132 OUTLOOK 376, 378 (1922)
("[T]he chief reason why cleanly and intelligent citizens evade jury duty in the criminal
court is that a murder trial will consign them to the jury dormitory and compel them to
bunk next to men of doubtful cleanliness and of any 'race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.' . . . Modem sanitary science demands separate cubicles, and until they are
provided women jurors will be justified in refusing to go into a dormitory and prefer-
ring a jail sentence for contempt of court, for in a jail one may at least have a cell to
herself.").
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areas for women jurors.'15 Statutes were quickly passed providing for
separate bailiffs for women and men and permitting the separation of
male and female jurors. 52 Eventually, even jurors in the midst of their
deliberations were permitted to separate. 53
Lifting sequestration rules made misconduct more difficult to pre-
vent and gave jurors the opportunity to misbehave individually and
away from the watchful eyes and ears of the court officers. Consider,
for example, the use of alcoholic beverages by jurors. In the early
1800s intoxicated jurors posed problems for judges of a different sort
than they pose today. Alcohol consumption in many areas of the coun-
try was high, peaking in 1830 when, on average, every adult male drank
a half pint of liquor daily. 54 Liquor was often sold near the courthouse,
straining a court's ability to complete its term as veniremen showed up
drunk for the day's trials. 55 Once jurors were screened for drunkenness
and the trial was underway, the rules against separation and the dispatch
with which trials were conducted meant that jurors could not easily ob-
tain liquor before delivering their verdict. When liquor was discovered
in the jury room, the judge's first concern was whether a party to the
case had provided it, wary of the sympathy that a bit of refreshment
could stimulate for a generous litigant. 56 After courts began to provide
jurors with food and drink, and as intolerance of liquor consumption in-
creased after 1830, apprehension about the effects of liquor on a juror's
ability to fairly judge a case took the place of concerns about its
151. See R. Justin Miller, The Woman Juror, 2 OR. L. REV. 30, 42 (1922) (noting
that a room partition between the sexes complies with statute barring separation); Eliza-
beth M. Sheridan, Women and Jury Service, 11 A.B.A. J. 792 (1925); Women on Wash-
ington Juries, Tim INDEPENDENT, July 3, 1913, at 50-51 (noting bailiff coped with
women jurors by installing cots in a small rented hall and hanging a curtain across the
center of the room).
152. See, e.g., MATILDA FENBERG, WOMEN JURORS AND JURY SERVICE IN IL-
LINOIS 17 (1940); ROBERT VON MOSCHZISKER. TRIAL BY JURY § 413 (1922).
153. New York, however, clung to rules requiring sequestration during delibera-
tions until 1995. See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 142, at 112-13 (noting that as of
1994 New York was the only state to mandate sequestration of juries in felony cases).
Many states still forbid separation in capital cases.
154. See W.J. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMERICAN TRA-
DITION 8-21 (1979) (citing statistics and documenting the lifestyle of the early nine-
teenth-century male as one involving frequent visits to taverns, consumption at home,
while traveling, and at all times of the day).
155. See WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 84; Hall, supra note 11, at 8.
156. See THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 1846-47 (noting cases in which verdict
was attacked because of possible connections between parties and food or drink com-
sumed by jurors).
2714 [Vol. 94:2673
HeinOnline  -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2714 1995-1996
Juror Delinquency
source.157 Many courts forbade court officers from supplying liquor to
jurors, but alcoholic beverages sometimes accompanied meals supplied
by the tavern or hotel in which the jury was lodged. 158 The longer the
trial, the more opportunity - and, perhaps, incentive - to drink. By
1915, the use of intoxicants was termed "a common form of miscon-
duct among jurors." 159
One form of juror misconduct that surfaced only as the average
trial stretched beyond one day's work is the discussion of evidence
before deliberations begin. The custom of instructing jurors not to make
up their minds or discuss the case before the end of the trial was an off-
shoot of the rule barring expressions of opinion by jurors to nonjurors
regarding the verdict before the end of the trial. The theory behind both
prohibitions was that a juror might stick with his public statement and
close his mind to further evidence. 60 Nineteenth-century courts con-
ducting short trials rarely encountered predeliberation discussions be-
tween jurors. By the 1940s, however, most states had codified a ban
against "preliminary deliberations." In 1945, the dufy of judges to give
jurors this instruction assumed constitutional status. A divided panel of
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a conviction, otherwise
supported by the evidence, because the judge had not warned the jurors
to stay mum.' 6' The majority felt that this situation denied the accused a
fair trial as required by the due process guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
The court reasoned that to allow jurors to discuss only part of the evi-
dence, before the defense presents its case, shifts "the burden of proof
and places] upon the defendants the burden of changing by evidence
the opinion thus formed."' 62 Judge Woodrough, dissenting, argued that
there was no proof that the jurors had discussed the case before deliber-
ations, and that in any event the instruction was not "practical" in a
157. See RORABAUGH, supra note 154, at 8-9 (reporting precipitous drop in con-
sumption rates between 1830 and the Civil War); Use of Intoxicating Liquor By Jurors:
Criminal Cases, 7 A.L.R.3D 1040 (1966).
158. See, e.g., State v. Baber, 74 Mo. 292 (1881); FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at
250. But see MORRIS J. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM 28 (1968) (relat-
ing 1805 Pennsylvania trial in which the jury consumed five and one-half quarts of Ma-
deira wine, two quarts of brandy, two. quarts of beer, and one quart of cider, all at
county expense during one day's deliberation).
159. Howard H. Lehman, A Critical Survey of Certain Phases of Trial Procedure
in Criminal Cases, 63 U. PA. L. REv. 754, 783 (1915).
160. See PROFFATT, supra note 43, § 389 (citing cases); James P. Thomas, Recent
Decisions, Constitutional Law - Sixth Amendment - Juror Misconduct - Premature
Deliberations, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 983 (1994) [hereinafter Thomas, Recent Decisions].
161. See Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 863 (1945).
162. 147 F.2d at 328.
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trial that was seven weeks long. "No normal honest Americans ever
worked together in a common inquiry for any length of time with their
mouths sealed up like automatons or oysters," he argued. 163 Although
some states agreed with Judge Woodrough, more followed the major-
ity's reasoning - jurors who discussed the evidence before the end of
the trial became jurors who threatened the due process rights of
defendants. 64
b. Publicity's Perils. Longer trials and less control over jurors dur-
ing trials were not the only developments over the past two centuries
that provided more opportunities for jurors in criminal cases to stray.
Publicity about criminal cases increased during the period, creating new
pitfalls for jurors.
Beginning in the 1830s with the distribution of the "penny
presses" in New York and other large cities, "news" of crime began
reaching more people than it ever had before. 65 Short on truth and long
on melodrama, these daily papers thrived on reporting crime at a price
anyone could afford. Editors in smaller cities and towns at first contin-
ued to rely on the more traditional weeklies for the bulk of their stories,
but the newer presses grew and soon set the trends. 66 In Indianapolis,
for instance, the Indiana State Journal began its "crimes and acci-
dents" column in the 1840s, covering minor crimes and supplementing
its usual coverage of sensational murders. 67 Soon newspapers in New
York banded together into the Associated Press to take advantage of the
telegraph. News became more centralized, and local papers became
163. 147 F.2d at 330 (Woodrough, J., dissenting).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Resko, 3 3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 1993) (collecting
cases). In cases in which the jurors were given instructions not to talk but did, their
misconduct did not require a new trial unless the defendant was prejudiced. See
Thomas, Recent Decisions, supra note 160, at 990-91 (collecting cases).
165. Until the 1830s, crimes and those accused of committing them were the terri-
tory of the pamphleteer, whose sensational and often completely fictitious accounts
were popular reading. See ANDIE TuCHER, FROTH & SCUM: TRUTH, BEAUTY,
GOODNESS, AND THE Ax MURDER IN AMERICA'S FsrST MASS MEDIUM 9-11
(1994) (reporting that crime "news" for those who did not indulge in pamphlets was
"sporadic" due to the beliefs of most weekly editors that precious and expensive col-
umn space should not be wasted on information that readers were likely to know al-
ready and that the less readers knew about the criminal elements among them the better
off their communities would be).
166. See PAPKE, supra note 64, at 34-35 (noting that new presses reached ten
times as many people because of the low price, and that the new readers - mechanics,
artisans, office workers, and small merchants - were different people from those who
had read the traditional papers); id. at 44-45 (when advertising revolts led The Herald to
cut back on crime sensationalism, the gap was quickly filled by other newspapers de-
voted extensively to crime); TucHMR, supra note 165, at 90-96.
167. See David Jackson Bodenhamer, Law and Disorder on the Early Frontier:
Marion County, Indiana, 1823-1850, 10 W. HIST. Q. 323, 335 (1979).
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more dependent on the urban-based wire services for crime reporting.168
In the 1880s intense competition for subscribers in larger cities
prompted a renewed increase in crime and scandal reporting. 169 By the
1920s, criminal cases were discussed on radio as well as on front
pages, 70 and modem newsreels brought their images to theaters nation-
wide. By the 1960s, television again changed the way America received
its news, and the Supreme Court observed in 1966 that "unfair and
prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become increasingly
prevalent."' 7' This expansion of news and comment about prosecutions
occurred at the same time that jurors were first permitted to leave the
courtroom during trials, and at the same time that some of the most
well-publicized information about criminal cases became off limits as
evidence. 172 As a result, it has become more difficult for jurors to fol-
low instructions - if indeed such instructions have been given to them
- not to read, listen to, or watch news about the criminal cases before
them.
c. Misconduct, an Expanding Definition. Changing conceptions of
the jury's role have also affected what behavior has been considered
misconduct. As the jury's role shrank from law maker to fact-finder, 173
168. See TuCHER, supra note 165, at 194; Disqualification of Jurors in Criminal
Cases, I ALB. LJ. 327-28 (1870).
There is not a murder committed in the remotest mining town of the west but
finds its way speedily into the New York papers, and through these into every
village.... A burglary committed in any little country store in New England
finds its way in twenty-four hours into the note-book of a Chicago reporter.
Id.
169. See JoHN LoFrON, JUSTICE AND Tm PREss 80 (1966) (circulation war,
combined with better printing technology, "broaden[ed] and quicken[ed] the impact of
crime news on the public"); PAPKE, supra note 64, at 72-73 (noting that around the
turn of the century, even higher class papers such as the New York Times were devoting
up to five percent of their space to crime news).
170. See John R. Bender, The Free Press-Fair Trial Issue and Journalistic Profes-
sionalism: Practices in News Coverage of Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 1891-1980,
at 219-29, 340, 379-89 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri
(Columbia)).
171. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 53, 333, 362 (1966); see also Bender, supra
note 170, at 52-53 (noting that a study of the American Bar Association Advisory Com-
mittee on Free Trial and Fair Press in 1966, and a follow-up study in 1979, showed that
news reports frequently contained prejudicial information such as confessions and opin-
ion about the guilt of the accused).
172. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL. supra note 80, §§ 3.2(j), 6.8(a), 6.9(g) (describing
the Court's constitutional regulation of police conduct under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments that removed several items of commonly publicized infor-
mation from jurors' review).
173. See supra note 47; see also Dooley, supra note 48, at 353, 354 & nn.143-46
(collecting theories about why this decline in jury power vis-i-vis judges in the late
nineteenth century occurred, including the growing emphasis on uniform, predictable
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some conduct appropriate to the jury's former function became prohib-
ited. For example, jurors who were at one time allowed to consult dic-
tionaries were forbidden to do so as the judge became the sole source of
instruction for deliberating jurors. 74 States that once allowed jurors to
sentence defendants have barred them from speculating upon what a
defendant's sentence might be. 75 Early nineteenth-century juries rou-
tinely weighed a defendant's explanation, or lack of explanation, of the
charges. 176 By 1965 jurors were not allowed to consider defendant's si-
lence as evidence of his guilt.' 77 The expression of racial bias by jurors
has also been condemned by modem courts.1 8 Much more recently,
some judges have concluded that the failure to participate in delibera-
tions is misconduct. 79 The characterization of obstinacy as misconduct
is a modem extension of the impatience with hung juries that became
rules, a rise in the number of well-trained judges, and racist and sexist attitudes toward
minority and women jurors).
174. Compare Denison v. State, 93 S.W. 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1906) (holding that
because the jury was authorized to examine a dictionary, it was not error for the judge
to refer them to it) with Wilson v. State, 495 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (error
for judge to furnish jury with dictionary).
175. Compare, e.g., Luker v. State, 105 So. 2d 834, 841 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958) (jury
must be charged as to the permissible punishment in rape cases and fix the sentence),
cert. denied, 105 So. 2d 845 (Ala. 1958) and AUSTIN ABBOT, ABBOT'S CRIMINAL
TRIAL PRAcr ¢c §§ 726, 768 (4th ed. 1939) (collecting jury sentencing cases from
Texas, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Arkansas) with ALA. R.
CR. P. 26.6(a) (abolishing jury sentencing for noncapital offenses committed after 1980)
and Pruitt v. State, 457 So. 2d 454, 456 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (when judge fixes pun-
ishment, jury instructions concerning punishment are misleading), cert. denied, 457 So.
2d 456 (Ala. 1984) and People v. Van Arsdale, 26 N.Y.S.2d 11, 14 (County Ct. N.Y.
1941) (upon request, judge must instruct jurors that they must not consider the punish-
ment in determining guilt).
176. See Alschuler, Peculiar Privilege, supra note 140, at 2660-63.
177. See id. at 2663 (discussing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). The
effects of many of these expanding concepts of juror misconduct have been limited to
preverdict revelations; since about 1810 most courts have not accepted after conviction
a juror's word that he or another juror had relied upon forbidden inferences during de-
liberations. See infra text accompanying notes 186-95.
178. See, e.g., Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (permitting
proof of racist statements in jury room by other jurors); State v. Jackson, 879 P.2d 307
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (ordering new trial due to juror's comments about "coloreds");
Derrick v. State, 187 S.W. 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1916) (ordering a new trial after the
foreman told other jurors that convicting the defendant would help to quell the frequent
disturbances of Negroes near his home).
179. Such findings appeared in civil cases appealed by unsuccessful plaintiffs, and,
more recently, in criminal cases. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 179
(Ct. App. 1994) (upholding trial judge's decision to discharge juror where the judge
found that there was "good cause" to replace a juror who had "made up his mind
before he went in there," did not answer the questions posed to him by other jurors, did
not sit at the table with the other jurors during deliberations, did not look at the two vic-
tims in the courtroom, and did not cooperate with the other jurors).
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prevalent in the late nineteenth century, impatience that led to the wide-
spread adoption of the Allen or "dynamite" instruction for deadlocked
jurors. 180
The more skeptical judges have become of jurors' competence and
the more certain they have become of their own, the less leeway they
have given jurors to conduct themselves. This growing distrust of the
jury has influenced not only the very definition of misconduct, but its
discovery, as the following section explains.
2. Uncovering Juror Misconduct: Lowered Trust in Jurors, Growing
Protection for Defendants
Along with more opportunities for jurors to commit error came
more opportunities for attorneys to learn of it. First, longer trials have
meant more chances for jurors and others to come forward with their
concerns about behavior during the trial. Many judges who have al-
lowed jurors to separate have taken care to question returning jurors
concerning exposure to outside influences before starting trial again.
Moreover, even if some trial judges had been inclined to ignore or dis-
miss hints and allegations of jury misconduct which they received dur-
ing trial, the Supreme Court by 1954 had limited that option. In Rem-
mer v. United States,'8' the Court held that upon learning that a juror
may have been approached by an unnamed person offering a reward for
a particular verdict, the trial judge was obligated by the Constitution to
hold a hearing "with all interested parties" participating in order to
"determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and
whether or not it was prejudicial."'8 2
Second, by the close of the nineteenth century, trial judges were
less convinced that jurors were reaching their verdicts correctly. Their
increased willingness to grant new trials probably provided a corre-
spondingly greater incentive for defense counsel to seek proof of mis-
conduct after conviction. 183 For defendants whose requests for a new
trial due to jury misconduct were denied, appellate relief became availa-
180. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); Note, Due Process, Judicial
Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv.
123, 123-24 (1967) (tracing history of this instruction).
181. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
182. 347 U.S. at 229-30. Even prior to Remmer, some states, including California,
strongly encouraged mid-trial questioning. See, e.g., People v. Tinnin, 28 P.2d 951
(1934).
183. See WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, supra note 47, at 30 ("In the heyday of
technical procedure in the last half of the nineteenth century, a great mass of detail de-
veloped as to new trials, and for a time they were granted lavishly."). Today in some
states trial judges are obligated to make some type of preliminary inquiry upon receiv-
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ble only in the second half of the nineteenth century. 8 4 By the early
1900s, appellate courts regularly reviewed such decisions and other
claims of jury misconduct. 8 5
The avenues for postconviction relief, however, were considerably
narrower in some states than in others because of rules limiting defend-
ants' use of the most accessible source of proof of jury misconduct -
affidavits by the jurors themselves. American courts by about 1810186
had embraced a rigid rule barring testimony of jurors to impeach their
own verdicts. 8 7 In many of these early cases, the rule prohibiting the
use of juror affidavits or testimony to impeach verdicts was interpreted
to bar juror testimony about almost anything the jurors said, did, or ex-
perienced. 8 8 However, other courts during the mid-nineteenth century
allowed juror testimony concerning certain types of misconduct to be
offered as proof in support of a motion for new trial, particularly in
ing allegations of misconduct following a verdict. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 668 A.2d
1288, 1303 (Conn. 1995).
184. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581 (1878) (writ of error not available
to review refusal of new trial); ANTHONY, supra note 137, at 340 (reporting that in Illi-
nois, a trial judge's decision to deny a motion for new trial was unreviewable in crimi-
nal cases until the rule was changed by statute in 1857). The government argued this
rule in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 145 (1892), but the Court reviewed the
lower court's decision denying a new trial anyway, noting that the court "did not exer-
cise any discretion." 146 U.S. at 147. Appellate courts in Texas continued to decline to
second-guess trial courts on this score well into the twentieth century. Hubert Dee John-
son, Note, New Trial - Misconduct of Jurors, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 101, 107 & n.46
(1936) (citing cases from 1909-1916).
185. The Texas Courts of Appeals considered many such claims - jury miscon-
duct was, along with variance-between the charge and proof at trial, the fifth most fre-
quent successful ground of appeal in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals between
1900 and 1927, accounting for 2.2% of all cases reversed. See Keith Carter, The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals: Section 4, Legislation, 11 TEXAS L. REv. 185 (1933). A
similar study of 206 criminal appeals from Cook County during 1924-28 suggested that
the figures from Texas may be high for the period; not one of the 97 cases reversed
from Cook County was reversed because of jury misconduct. See Joseph E. Green &
Thomas J. Connors, Causes for Reversals of Cook County Convictions 1924-28, 27 ILL.
L. REV. 100 (1932).
186. Before this time courts liberally received juror testimony concerning miscon-
duct in the jury room. At common law, testimony or affidavits of jurors could be re-
ceived on a motion for new trial based upon misconduct in the jury room. See 5 JOHN
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352 (2d ed. 1923).
187. The rule was based on an English case that had been decided in 1785. See
Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
188. See, e.g., Henry v. Ricketts, 11 F. Cas. 1188 (C.C.D.C 1809) (No. 6385) (trial
court refused to hear evidence from jurors regarding the intoxication of jurors, the pres-
ence of "spirituous liquors ... sent to them in their blankets," and the departure of two
jurors from the jury room); Hulet v. Barnett, 10 Ohio 459 (1841) (rejecting juror affida-
vit concerning policeman's conversation with jurors in jury room); People v. Barker, 2
Wheel. Cr. 19 (N.Y. 1822) (rejecting jurors' testimony that defendant's conviction for
dueling was the result of chance); see also PotAT, supra note 43, §§ 408-09.
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criminal cases. 89 In 1892 the Supreme Court held that federal courts
deciding whether to grant a losing litigant a new trial due to jury error
were free to consider juror affidavits as proof of the existence of an ex-
traneous influence on the jury, but the Court continued to bar the use of
such affidavits as proof of the decisionmaking process of one or more
of the jurors.19°
In the decades that followed, the rule barring juror testimony
eroded in some jurisdictions, tracking the growing concern among
courts that juror misconduct can implicate not only verdict accuracy but
the constitutionality of a conviction. In some states convicted defend-
ants aired for the first time much of the jury's dirty linen that stricter
rules in other states concealed.' 9' By the late 1940s and 1950s promi-
nent judges - including future Justice Warren Burger and Judge Je-
rome Frank - proposed that all juror affidavits be admissible to im-
peach criminal convictions. 92 By 1970, both state and federal courts
recognized that some forms of jury misconduct threatened not only a
defendant's right to an impartial jury, but also his right to confrontation,
and allowed proof of such misconduct even from the mouths of the ju-
rors themselves. 93 Presently, courts continue to accept juror affidavits
selectively.194 Efforts by lawyers to secure evidence of misconduct from
189. See, e.g., Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866) (allowing
affidavit of jurors concerning quotient verdict); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 361 (1851) (considering affidavits of two jurors who had read newspaper ac-
counts); Ren~e B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in
Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 505, 532 (1995) (noting
willingness of judges in several states to accept juror affidavits in criminal cases).
190. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); see also McDonald v.
Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915).
191. Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 360, 368 n.60
(1958). In Texas, where rules regarding the receipt of juror testimony were particularly
liberal, appellate courts between 1905 and 1926 granted new trials in at least 30 crimi-
nal cases because of jurors' discussion of the failure of the accused to testify. Texas
continued to allow such proof quite recently. See Smith v. State, 530 S.W.2d 827, 829-
30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Contrast Texas's unique position with United States v.
Friedland, 660 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (upholding trial court's refusal to ex-
amine jurors concerning their alleged consideration of defendant's silence), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982).
192. See Klimes v. United States, 263 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1959); JEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 115, 144 (1949).
193. Compare People v. Mullen, 99 N.Y.S. 227 (County Ct. 1906) (barring juror
testimony concerning external influence) with Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966)
(bailiff's communications to juror denied defendant his right to cross-examine witnesses
against him) and People v. DeLucia, 229 N.E.2d 211 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that defend-
ant's right to confrontation mandated consideration of juror affidavits concerning exter-
nal influence).
194. FED. R. EvID. 606, enacted in 1975, retained the prohibition barring jurors
from impeaching their own verdicts, except in specific situations. The Rehnquist Court
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jurors have been vigorous, prompting many conflicting statutes and
rules of ethics encouraging or limiting attorney access to jurors after
trial.195
3. When Misconduct is Discovered- Salvaging the Trial
One might expect that all of this prying into jury behavior would
have led to a significant number of mistrials and new trials due to jury
misconduct, but there is reason to believe that the frequency with which
jury misconduct has led to a mistrial or a new trial has actually fallen
over the past two centuries. Judges and legislatures have coped with the
threat that jury misconduct has posed to the efficiency and fairness of
the jury system in two ways: they have attempted to salvage verdicts
once misconduct has taken place, and they have adopted additional
measures to deter and prevent juror misbehavior from occurring in the
first place.
a. Postverdict Review: Avoiding New Trials. Even though con-
victed defendants today are probably more likely than defendants in the
nineteenth century to raise jury misconduct as a basis for a new trial,
they are probably less likely to succeed in securing relief. Many deci-
sions from the first half of the nineteenth century reflected the attitude
that jury misconduct destroyed the integrity of the trial and required re-
lief regardless of its effect on the verdict. 96 This uncompromising
stance, however, was never uniform, and eventually softened. By the
first few decades of the 1900s, impatience with the fragility of verdicts
in 1987 interpreted the Rule strictly. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125
(1987) (barring juror affidavits as proof that jurors were intoxicated and using drugs
during the trial). Prior to Tanner, many courts had permitted juror testimony to prove
juror intoxication. See Christopher B. Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and In-
dictments in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REv. 920 (1978). Recent
commentary continues to echo the recommendation of Judges Burger and Frank, calling
for wider acceptance of juror testimony. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts,
56 U. CmI. L. Rnv. 153, 221-29 (1989) (criticizing the Court's "hear-no-evil" posture).
195. See, e.g., Ronald L. Palmer, Post-Trial Interview of Jurors in the Federal
Courts -A Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 Hous. L. REv. 290 (1968).
196. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) (noting that
some jurisdictions continued to forbid separation entirely, others allowed the govern-
ment to rebut a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and still others conditioned
relief upon proof indicating that tampering really took place); Johnson v. Root, 13 F.
Cas. 798 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 7409) (" '[W]here there is an irregularity which
may affect the impartiality of the proceedings ... inasmuch as there can be no certainty
that the verdict has not been improperly influenced, the proper and appropriate mode of
correction or relief is by undoing what is thus improperly and may have been corruptly
done.' ") (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496,
519 (1832)).
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on appeal had ushered in harmless error review for evidentiary, instruc-
tional, and charging errors and reduced the number of courts willing to
reverse convictions for juror misconduct without first considering
whether that misconduct had affected the jury's decision. 197
Although several illustrations of the ascendancy of harmless error
review for jury misconduct are available,198 the story of judicial treat-
ment of intoxicated jurors is particularly instructive. As the opportuni-
ties for jurors to drink during a trial rose with lengthening trials and
more frequent separation, judicial reaction followed a familiar pattern of
unyielding intolerance giving way to harmless error review. During
much of the nineteenth century judges in many states provided a new
trial merely upon proof that a juror had partaken. 19 9 But the cost of au-
tomatic reversal proved too high. Judges feared that too many convic-
tions would be sabotaged if reversal could be had so easily.20° Some
seemed to recognize that they could not prevent drinking by jurors ac-
customed to obtaining their "customary refreshment." One sympathetic
court warned that depriving a man of all alcohol during a protracted
trial would probably cause him to "fall into such a state of mental and
physical depression and irritation as to seriously unfit him properly to
discharge the duties of a juror."'20'
Trying to be appropriately condemnatory while at the same time
preserving the finality of the trial process, some courts tried at first to
197. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL. supra note 80, § 23.7(j).
198. Compare People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267 (1879) (presence of police officer
during jury deliberations required new trial, without regard to whether any improper in-
fluence was actually exerted over jury) with United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that continuation of trial in absence of sick juror was not "plain er-
ror" requiring relief when defendant failed to object to absence at trial). See also Mc-
Donough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (not every knowingly
false answer of a veniremember is grounds for a new trial) and Lee v. Marshall, 42 F.3d
1296 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (reversing trial court's finding that conversation be-
tween police officers and juror in deliberation room was "structural error" requiring re-
versal without a showing of prejudice and finding conversation innocuous).
199. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 13 Tex. 168, 182 (1854) (stating that the effect of
drink "is so very different on different men .... The only safe rule is to exclude it
entirely.").
200. See, e.g., Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452, 462 (1882) (arguing that a per se re-
versal rule "would hold out an obvious temptation, and furnish an almost certain oppor-
tunity to secure a new trial in every case, by the surreptitious introduction of liquor into
a jury room, and would tend to lessen the certainty of conviction in every criminal
case"); Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 546-47 (1874) ("[With the habit of drinking so
common as it unfortunately is, to hold that, if a juror should during a protracted trial
take a single drink of liquor, the verdict thereafter rendered must be set aside therefor,
would be giving to verdicts of juries a dangerous and unnecessary instability.").
201. State v. Taylor, 35 S.W. 92 (Mo. 1896) (denying alcohol would be like deny-
ing coffee or tobacco).
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minimize the destabilizing influence of rules requiring new trials when-
ever alcohol crossed a juror's lips by limiting automatic reversal to
drinking committed in certain locations or at certain times during the
trial. For instance, some courts would uphold verdicts if drinking oc-
curred only during recesses, but not if jurors used liquor in the court-
house. 202 This is understandable from the point of view of maintaining
appearances, which mattered quite a bit. It made little sense, however,
to litigants who were not likely to be persuaded that the potency of in-
toxicants varied with the location of the imbiber. Other courts were par-
ticularly intolerant of the use of alcohol during deliberations, but would
consider harmless its use at other times during the trial.20 3 The basis for
this dubious distinction was the belief that as long as jurors were sober
by the time they deliberated, their decisions could not be affected by
any fuzzy-headedness they had experienced listening to the evidence
and instructions during the trial.2 4 Such flimsy distinctions soon disap-
peared. In no state today does a juror's use of alcohol, where proven,
raise an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice requiring a new trial.
It is not surprising that judges were relatively quick to find jury
misconduct harmless. Unlike other errors in the trial process, the fault
for jury misconduct often lies with the juror alone, a visiting participant
in the justice system, and not with judges or prosecutors, its repeat
players. The deterrence of future misconduct by courtroom regulars has
always been a reason to grant relief to criminal defendants when those
regulars overstep the law, even when relief may not be required to pro-
cure accurate results.205 But granting a new trial to a defendant when
one juror misbehaves is unlikely to have any effect on the behavior of
202. See THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 1849 (citing cases); Morton John Steven-
son, Use of Intoxicating Liquors by Jurors, 59 ALBANY L.J. 208 (1899) (discussing
cases in which court did not object to jurors drinking during adjournments).
203. See, e.g., Graybeal v. Gardner, 48 Ill. App. 305 (1892), affd., 34 N.E. 528
(Ill. 1893); State v. Bruce, 48 Iowa 530 (1878); Lehman, supra note 159, at 783 (noting
the contention of some courts that the use of intoxicants "at any rate while the jury are
deliberating on their verdict, is of itself error, without any inquiry at all into the ques-
tion whether the defendant was prejudiced thereby").
204. See, e.g., State v. Madigan, 59 N.W. 490 (Minn. 1894). For exposition and
criticism of this rule, see Charles C. Moore, Use of Intoxicating Liquors by Jurors as
Ground for New Trial, 13 LAW NOTES 188 (1910). Of course, this idea that jurors only
make up their minds once they shut the door to the deliberation room has been thor-
oughly discredited by jury decisionmaking research. Still, the different treatment could
have had additional justifications. Misconduct by jurors who had retired to deliberate
implicated the culpability of the officer guarding them, and was also more difficult for
the parties to discover. They might otherwise be able to object before a verdict is re-
turned, securing a mistrial or other relief.
205. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88
COLUM. L. Rav. 79 (1988).
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future jurors. Indeed, courts have noted the availability of punishment
against jurors themselves when choosing to let verdicts stand, implying
that direct punishment of jurors for their transgressions would be more
appropriate than allowing convicted felons a windfall.206
Any resolution to punish jurors themselves seems to have been
spotty, however. Of the infrequent reported cases discussing formal
punishment (contempt proceedings or other prosecutions) of jurors or
former jurors for their misconduct, most involve jurors who served in
criminal trials that ended in acquittal or mistrial.2 7 Some courts have
seemed pleased that prosecutors focus on such jurors, suggesting that
the punishment of jurors who prevent convictions is a fair substitute for
the right to procure a new trial because of misconduct, a right defend-
ants enjoy, but prosecutors are denied.208 The prosecution of jury mis-
conduct, however, is no substitute for the ability to appeal an acquittal
tainted by jury error. Neither is prosecuting only defendant-friendly
misconduct particularly fair. A juror whose misbehavior leads to a
206. See, e.g., Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452 (1882) (refusing to set aside verdict
and noting that the jurors who drank liquor were fined); cf United States v. Olano, 62
F.3d 1180, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that the judge's de-
cision to go on with the trial absent an ill juror "is a deliberate action on the part of
court and counsel that infringes on the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights; it
is not a shortcoming on the part of a juror").
207. See, e.g., Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982) (holding that a prosecu-
tor is entitled to immunity from liability for the malicious prosecution of juror who had
served in trial ending without conviction).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding, as
part of former juror's contempt sentence, payment of nearly $47,000 to the United
States for Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Agency costs associated with
lost convictions - the "victims" of the juror's offense of receiving flowers and calls
from the defendant and refusing to vote to convict); In re Mossie, 589 F. Supp. 1397
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (rejecting claim of vindictive prosecution by former juror who argued
she was prosecuted only because she had held out for acquittal, but admitting that juror
probably would not have been investigated had the jury returned a guilty verdict); In re
Bassett, 15 N.Y.S.2d 737, 746 (S. Ct. 1939) (noting that the "misconduct of the con-
temnors is especially to be condemned. In a civil trial, or if the defendants had been
convicted, the evil wrought could be remedied by the granting of a new trial. In the
present situation, that remedy may not be applied [as the defendants have already been
put in jeopardy]"); In re May, 1 F 737 (E.D. Mich. 1880) (holding in contempt a for-
mer juror who held out for acquittal and noting that the court would have had to grant a
new trial if the jury had convicted).
A few courts have been troubled by the targeting of hold-out jurors for prosecu-
tion. See, e.g., In re Cochran, 237 N.Y. 336 (1924) (contempt may not be used to punish
juror for attitude in the jury room regarding the appropriate verdict); cf. United States v.
Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989) (expressing dismay at government's failure to in-
vestigate and prosecute jurors for misconduct after trial in which jurors voted to convict
defendant); People v. Diefendorf, 119 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1953) (reversing contempt convic-
tion because trial judge took into account juror's action of holding out in the jury room
in addition to his deliberate violation of the court's instructions during trial).
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guilty verdict is no less culpable than a juror whose misbehavior leads
to an acquittal or mistrial. If future jurors learn any lesson from such
prosecutions, it is that they can misbehave freely so long as they
convict.20
b. Preverdict Remedies: Avoiding Mistrials and Tainted Verdicts.
When misconduct is revealed before trial's end, the rule barring jurors
from impeaching their own verdicts has never provided an excuse to
sweep misconduct under the rug. As more misconduct has surfaced dur-
ing lengthening trials, judges have had to determine whether it necessi-
tates a mistrial. Few alternatives to mistrial were available in the
1800s. 210 Even waiver was not always an option. Some courts were re-
luctant to allow defendants to waive their objections to jury misconduct
because such waivers were not considered to be voluntary. For example,
a convicted defendant who had assented to the illegal separation of the
jury during trial could nevertheless demand a new trial on the basis that
his assent was compelled by the need to prevent jury resentment.21' Not
until the late nineteenth century, when harmless error was embraced to
prevent new trials, did courts experiment with procedures that could
prevent mistrials as well.
One of the most effective devices that courts discovered for avoid-
ing mistrials was the alternate juror. Substituting jurors midstream was
a very controversial concept when it first appeared around 1900. Until
that time, if a juror had to be discharged during a trial, the accepted
practice was to discharge the entire panel - a procedure then called
"withdrawing a juror" - and begin a new trial with a new jury. The
judge would discharge the juror in question, then administer the oath to
a new juror together with the jurors who remained from the aborted
trial, but witnesses would have to take the stand again and the trial be-
209. Even symmetry is lacking - unlike convicted defendants who seek new tri-
als, prosecutors are not hampered by the rule barring the consideration of juror testi-
mony to impeach verdicts. According to the Supreme Court, "A juror of integrity and
reasonable firmness will not.., expect to be shielded against the disclosure of his con-
duct in the event that there is evidence reflecting upon his honor." Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933) (upholding conviction of juror who held out for acquittal
against eleven men - literally pressing her hands over her ears in the jury room - af-
ter concealing on voir dire that defendant employed her husband).
210. If the juror was sick or inebriated, the court could simply adjourn and wait
for the juror to feel better, but the jury could not separate while waiting. See, e.g., State
v. Tatlow, 8 P. 267 (Kan. 1885).
211. See ALBERT W. BRICKWOOD, BRICKWOOD'S SACKETT ON INSTRUC-
TIONS TO JURIES 84 (3d ed. 1908); THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 1823; see also Peo-
ple v. Deegan, 26 P. 500, 502 (Cal. 1891) (DeHaven, J., concurring) (objecting to a rule
that would deem a felony defendant to have waived any objection to a drunk juror if the
defendant failed to object, and reasoning that the defendant should not be required to
bring himself into antagonism with the juror).
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gin anew.212 To avoid this cumbersome process some courts would take
actions that today seem extreme. For example, in one murder trial
around 1845, an Illinois judge ordered a juror who had taken ill to lie
on a pallet next to the juror box. 213 In 1895 California's legislature was
the first to provide that at the very beginning of any trial that was likely
to be protracted, a judge could impanel one or two alternate jurors to sit
near the other twelve throughout the trial and take the place of any juror
who became incapacitated, even without the defendant's consent.21 4
Other states, then Congress, followed California's lead,21 5 and today al-
ternates are routinely impaneled under similar provisions.
A second significant aid to efficient disposition of mid-trial mis-
conduct was the approval of verdicts by fewer jurors than the number
that started the case. By the late nineteenth century, at least one state
authorized judges to dismiss incapacitated jurors and accept verdicts
from the jurors who remained.21 6 Not until 1900, however, did the
United States Supreme Court hold that state criminal juries of fewer
than twelve members survived the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and not until 1970 did the Court oven-ale an 1898 case barring
juries of fewer than twelve under the Sixth Amendment.2 7 In 1983,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 was amended to allow a court to
212. See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 50 So. 499 (Miss. 1909); West v. State, 28 So. 430
(Fla 1900); State v. Davis, 7 S.E. 24 (W. Va. 1888). See generally ANTHONY, supra
note 137, at 306.
213. There, the juror fell asleep. See Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 368 (1846).
214. The California Supreme Court upheld this statute twenty-six years later, de-
spite a defendant's challenge that the use of an alternate juror deprived him of his right
to a jury trial under the California Constitution. See People v. Peete, 202 P. 51 (Cal.
1921). A similar statute passed in 1931 was upheld under the North Carolina Constitu-
tion. See State v. Dalton, 174 S.E. 422, 425 (N.C. 1934) (explaining that the act "was
designed to cure [the] evil" of the prior practice which required courts to restart trials).
Prior to such statutes, some states allowed the substitution of alternates providing all
parties, including the defendant, first consented. See BIERLY, supra note 43, at 141,
167-68.
215. In 1934, one of the chief proposals of the ABA's Program on Criminal Law
was the endorsement of the use of alternate jurors. See LESTER BERNHART ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 398 (1947). In upholding the fed-
eral statute, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals termed it a "forward looking statute and,
a needed reform in procedure." Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392, 397 (1944)
(considering 28 U.S.C. § 417a (1932)).'
216. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 4 Tex. App. 450 (1878) (upholding verdict of 11 ju-
rors (citing Tnx. CONST.. art. 5, § 13)).
217. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970) (overruling Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898)). It wasn't until af-
ter jury waivers (bench trials) were allowed in felony cases that some courts upheld ver-
dicts of juries with less than 12 members even when the defendant had consented. See
Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (trial in any manner other
than before a jury of twelve men is forbidden, even if the defendant consents);
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continue with eleven jurors in felony cases, even without the defend-
ant's consent.218 Authorized juror attrition, like the provision of alternate
jurors, was originally intended to provide an alternative to mistrial
when jurors become ill or otherwise unavailable during protracted trials.
Each has proved to be a useful device to assist courts to complete trials
when jurors misbehave.21 9
c. Prevention. All of this judicial maneuvering to minimize the
consequences of juror misconduct may have been necessary because
judges were not trying hard enough to prevent it. Calls for more explicit
instructions to jurors to keep out of mischief appeared as early as
1893,220 and they have continued for a century.22' Juror handbooks,
Camcemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858) (reversing conviction returned by 11 jurors rea-
soning that defendant could no more waive one juror than he could waive them all).
218. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). The amendment was preferred to an amendment
to Rule 24 that would have allowed for the substitution of alternate jurors after delibera-
tions had begun. See Amendments to Rules, 97 F.R.D. 245, 297-98 (1983). In 1991, the
federal courts opted to abandon alternates in civil cases and instead authorized judges to
proceed with whatever jurors remained should it become necessary to discharge jurors
during the trial, on the condition that at least six jurors remained.
The laws of some states may still prohibit this practice. See, e.g., S. 3820, 218th
Assembly, Cal., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing constitutional amendment that would allow
for verdicts by eleven jurors if a juror is discharged after deliberations begin). Other
states continue to require the consent of both parties. See State v. Gorwell, 661 A.2d
718 (Md. 1995) (reversing judge's decision to continue trial with 11 jurors over state's
objection).
219. A third change in trial procedure in some states during the late nineteenth
century may have tempered the effects of jury misconduct on jury verdicts - abolition
of the requirement that jury verdicts be unanimous. Support for abolishing rules of una-
nimity gained ground the same time as harmless error rules. Critics blamed erroneous
verdicts on incompetent or inexperienced jurors that made their way onto juries. See
LEssER, supra note 47, at 188-201; Francis Lieber, The Unanimity of Juries, 6 AM. L.
REG. 727 (1867) (criticizing the unanimity rule); Reform Our Jury System, 12 Rsv. RE-
viEws 77 (1895) (reporting the introduction of a bill in California to eliminate unanim-
ity in criminal cases and allow for the waiver of juries). Although several states have
authorized majority verdicts in civil cases and misdemeanor cases, only two states ulti-
mately adopted majority verdicts in felony cases. See LA. CONST. art. 7, § 41 (1921);
OR. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1929); OR. Rnv. STAT. § 17.355(1).
220. See LESSER, supra note 47, at 118 n.39 ("[O]ccasional lectures by courts to
panels of jurymen upon the general proprieties of their position would not be thrown
away." (quoting N.Y.L.. June 20, 1893)). Some states enacted statutes requiring such
instructions towards the end of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. § 415 (1811) (current version at N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 270.40 (McKinney
1993)). Some states' statutes required judges to instruct jurors not to talk to others, or
each other, at each adjournment. See, e.g., Ky. CRIM. CODE § 246, quoted in J.P. HOB-
SON ET AL., INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 679, at 807 (1914).
221. See, e.g., Suggestions For The Improvement of the Jury System, 1 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 630, 631 (1910) (calling for clearer admonitions to jurors); Edward
T. Swaine, Pre-Deliberation Juror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and Juror Re-
sponsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187, 202 (1988) (asserting that the bulk of juror instruction
occurs only after trial and that little attention is paid to instructing jurors about miscon-
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some of which contained admonitions against exposure to publicity and
warnings concerning other common forms of misconduct, did not be-
come accepted until the rise of court administrative organizations in the
1920s and 1930s,222 although many judges issued warnings to jurors
about the conduct expected of them before then.3 Today some jurors
are given elaborate and detailed instructions explaining what they can
and cannot do or say.Y4 Simple innovations such as the identification
buttons jurors sometimes wear have probably helped to reduce prohib-
ited contacts and limit the opportunities for jurors to overhear prejudi-
cial comments.
Despite these isolated improvements in preventing jury miscon-
duct, the overwhelming response of courts seems to have been to con-
tain its costs, not to diagnose and cure its causes. This may be because
those causes are too difficult to identify, much less eliminate. Or per-
haps this band-aid approach has persisted because judges have not con-
sidered jury misconduct to be a significant problem demanding addi-
tional preventive measures. The next section" reveals judicial
impressions of jury misconduct today that support this latter
explanation.
duct and how to avoid it). Following the Supreme Court's reversal of a conviction
tainted by prejudicial publicity in the 1960s, commentators called for more measures to
prevent juror tainting, some of them urging that judges take more care in ordering jurors
not to expose themselves to publicity during trials, and arguing that clearer instructions
would probably have prevented mistrials or reversals in several cases. See, e.g., AL-
FRED FRIENDLY & RONALD- L. GOLDFARE, CRIME AND PUBLICITY: THE IMPACT
OF NEWS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 109 (1967).
222. See, e.g., Comment, History and Criticism of Juror Handbooks as a Method
of Orientation, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 394 (1959) (noting that "jury primers" were
first used in New York courts in 1925, a response to the variation in preliminary in-
structions); D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Indoctrination by Court of Persons Summoned
for Jury Service, 89 A.L.R.2D 197, 201 n.5 (1963) (stating that 15 states used hand-
books by 1958 (citing Recent Case, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 115, 115 (1958))).
223. See, e.g., DEWrr C. BLASHFIELD, A TREATISE ON INSTRUCTIONS TO JU-
RIES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES § 360 (1902) (recommending an instruction list-
ing prohibited actions, which ended with the threat, "a violation of this injunction will
be punished severely by the court").
224. In the Western District of Texas, for example, federal jurors are told, in great
detail, who they can and cannot talk to, what they can and cannot say, and what to do if
someone approaches them or they hear something they should not have heard. They are
told that they cannot talk to each other about the case until deliberations, cannot use
nonevidence of which they are aware in deliberations, cannot investigate or experiment
with places or things, cannot relate any special expert knowledge to other jurors or seek
out information in books, and more. See Orientation for Prospective Jurors 5-7 (on file
with author). Some pattern instructions are considerably less detailed. See, e.g., FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4-5 (1988) (less
than one page of instructions concerning misconduct).
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B. The Present: Jury Misconduct in Courts Today
The survey results that follow provide a refreshing supplement to
the typically anecdotal treatment of juror delinquency. Judges' answers
to survey questions about the frequency and consequences of juror mis-
conduct are useful not only to those interested in jury misconduct itself,
but also to reformers considering several related issues. For example,
the decision to expand or contract voir dire may take into account how
often jurors conceal information or how successful judges are at deter-
ring deceit during voir dire. Proposals to limit trial length, to abandon
unanimity rules, to abolish sequestration, to allow for more juror testi-
mony impeaching verdicts, or to allow more access to jurors by attor-
neys after trial may all be affected by perceptions about the prevalence
of misconduct.
The judges who received surveys were asked to indicate whether
or not they had in the past three years become convinced before the
verdict that misconduct of various kinds had occurred, and, if so, in
how many criminal and how many civil cases. Thirteen different types
of misconduct were listed, with an additional question asking judges to
specify any misconduct they had learned of during trial that was not on
the list. Judges were also asked if they had questioned jurors about mis-
conduct after the verdict, and if they had ordered a new trial because of
misconduct during the last three years. Judges who had ordered a new
trial in the past three years were asked to specify the type of case
civil or criminal - and the type of misconduct that had occurred.
At the outset it is important to note some additional limitations of
the survey results concerning juror misconduct. First, since there are no
means to observe jurors during their deliberations, only jurors them-
selves can really tell us what they do. Judges, however, have a pretty
good idea of what trial jurors are up to.32 They are responsible for su-
pervising the jury and for curing any misconduct that occurs, and many
of them talk with jurors after trials are over about the jurors' exper-
iences. Second, the total number of cases in which judges reported ei-
225. An up-to-date survey of jurors themselves would be an excellent supplement
to this judicial survey. Few published juror surveys concern misconduct. One found that
slightly over one in ten jurors talked about the case during trial. See Elizabeth F. Loftus
& Douglas Leber, Do Jurors Talk?, TRiAL, Jan. 1986, at 59-60 (reporting survey of ju-
rors about discussing evidence before deliberations with another juror, a family mem-
ber, or a friend, and finding that 11% reported they had talked to someone). A 1991
survey of 190 jurors found that 39% failed to answer correctly voir dire questions about
crime victimization and friends or relatives in law enforcement. See Richard Seltzer et
al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. Crim. Just. 451, 456 (1991). An earlier
study of about 250 New Mexico criminal jurors produced the following responses:
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ther granting new trials or learning of misconduct before the verdict is
probably lower than the total number of cases in which misconduct ac-
tually occurred in their courtrooms. 226 Despite these limitations,227 the
survey provides important information, previously unavailable, about
the frequency with which judges nationwide have learned of miscon-
duct during trials, the frequency of their responses to that misconduct,
and the frequency of successful new trial motions due to jury
misconduct.
Always Usually Sometimes Never
Do you feel that jurors are perfectly honest
in answering questions during the voir dire? 17.8 70.3 11.9 0
At any time during the trial or deliberations,
did you feel that any of the jurors considered
evidence which was not presented or was
withheld during the trial? 5.2 7.9 51.8 35.1
At any time during the trial itself did you
feel that any of the jurors discussed the case
among themselves or with others? 3.8 3.8 36.6 55.9
Thomas L. Grisham & Stephen F. Lawless, Jurors Judge Justice: A Survey of Criminal
Jurors, 3 N. MEx. L. REv. 352, 354-58 (1973). Compared to the responses of these
New Mexico jurors twenty-five years ago, the judges who responded to my survey were
more likely to report dishonesty during voir dire (73% of judges reporting at least some
dishonesty by veniremembers in the past three years, compared to 12% of the New
Mexico jurors) and less likely to report consideration of nonevidence (20% of judges
compared to 65% of New Mexico jurors). Of judges surveyed, 20% thought that jurors
had talked to nonjurors in the past three years, 13% thought jurors had contact with par-
ties, press, or witnesses, and 22% thought jurors had talked about the case with each
other, 44% of New Mexico jurors who responded that at least one of these things had
happened. An ongoing study of jurors in capital cases so far shows that a significant
percentage of jurors in these unique cases do not follow their instructions. See William
J. Bowers, The Capital Jury: Is It ilted Toward Death?, 79 JUDICATURE 220, 221
(1996) (reporting that 40% of capital-case jurors interviewed considered the defendant's
sentence when determining guilt). An empirical analysis of case reports would also be a
useful addition to the research reported here, although only a small portion of the mis-
conduct that occurs in trials is reported in published opinions.
226. The survey did not ask about cases in which misconduct was revealed only
after the verdict but which was never the subject of a new trial motion, or cases in
which allegations of misconduct were raised after the verdict but in which no new trial
was ordered.
227. There is another reason to regard the findings from the survey as an underes-
timate of actual jury misconduct in courts today. Trial judges may be likely to underre-
port, rather than overreport, how often misconduct occurs in their courtrooms, even in
an anonymous survey such as this one, because the existence of at least some forms of
jury misconduct could be attributed to deficiencies in supervision or instruction. Also,
many judges have a great deal of affection and respect for their jurors, and may not rec-
ognize misconduct at the same rate that the jurors themselves or attorneys might.
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1. Overall Incidence of Misconduct
a. Misconduct Discovered Before the Verdict. According to judges
surveyed, most types of jury misconduct are not routine features of jury
trials. Only a small proportion of judges reported that they had become
convinced in the course of a trial during the past three years that any of
ten forms of jury misconduct surveyed had occurred. 228 In addition,
most of the judges who did report learning of misconduct said that it
occurred infrequently. By their own estimates, the 562 judges who re-
turned surveys had together tried a total of between 26,060 and 40,426
jury trials during the past three years. Judges reported encountering
most forms of misconduct during trial in only a small percentage of
these cases.
There were three exceptions to this predominantly positive picture,
each involving the kinds of misconduct that are easiest for judges to ob-
serve themselves without information from the jurors. First, seventy-
three percent of all of the judges responding reported that
veniremembers had not told the truth during voir dire in at least one of
the cases they had tried during the last three years - eight percent of
all judges responded that veniremembers were untruthful in many,
most, or all cases. Second, sixty-nine percent of the judges reported
cases in which jurors had fallen asleep; by judges' estimates, this had
happened in more than 2300 cases. Finally, eighty percent of the judges
responded that jurors, after being sworn in, had not reported to court or
reported late, with the total trials in which this occurred exceeding
3000.229 In addition to the thirteen specific categories, judges were
asked if they had learned of "other" misconduct before the verdict.
These responses are compiled in Table 1.
b. Misconduct and New Trials. The judges responding to the sur-
vey also reported that misconduct is not often the basis for a new trial.
Only seven percent reported that they had ordered even one new trial
228. For example, a tiny fraction of judges reported that they had presided over a
case in the past three years in which a veniremember had refused to answer a question
during voir dire, or in which they had learned that a juror had accepted a bribe. Twenty
percent of responding judges (N=1 10) reported becoming convinced that jurors had
considered material not admitted as evidence during at least one trial. Comments of-
fered by judges noted that these incidents included dictionaries, unadmitted depositions,
and a Bible. Twenty-two percent of responding judges (N=120) reported learning that
jurors had discussed the case before deliberations, and at least 28 judges commented
that they believe this happens quite frequently but cannot be sure.
229. Fifteen judges volunteered that this was either a minor problem or that jurors
usually had a good excuse for being late. Other judges cited traffic or car trouble as a
cause of lateness, or noted that they did not consider lateness misconduct.
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because of misconduct during the past three years.230 Less than one
quarter of the judges said that they had questioned a juror during the
past three years about misconduct subsequent to the return of a verdict.
The number of new trials granted due to misconduct was very low; only
fifty-one cases out of over 26,000 cases tried.
c. General Comments and Trends. The survey also asked judges
who had been on the bench seven years or more whether in their opin-
ion jurors were more or less likely today to engage in various forms of
misconduct than they were seven years ago. Most of the judges re-
sponding thought jury behavior had remained about the same. Of those
judges who believed that the rate of jury misconduct had changed dur-
ing the past seven years, most said juror behavior had improved, except
for two categories - untruthfulness during voir dire and talking about
the case before deliberations. 231
230. A few judges volunteered that they had learned, after a verdict, of miscon-
duct that did not lead (or had not yet led) to a new trial. One reported that "two jurors
during sequestered deliberation allegedly engaged in sexual (consensual) behavior with
each other with the connivance of a deputy sheriff who supposedly was watching them.
This occurred in the hotel after deliberations for the day .... "
231. The percentages of judges who responded that the proportion of jurors engag-
ing in misconduct was the same, less, or greater now as it was seven years ago for each
question were:
Type of misconduct
Refuse to answer questions
during voir dire
Consider material not
admitted as evidence
Initiate or fail to report
contact with parties, press,
counsel, or witnesses
Use drugs or alcohol during
jury service
Conduct experiments or view
sites contrary to instructions
Talk about the evidence
before trial's end
Do not answer voir dire
questions truthfully
Same Less Greater
85.7 11.4 2.9
9.2 4.6
9.1 2.0
84.8 11.9
8.1 2.4
7.1 8.3
8.0 11.7
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TABLE I
JUDICIAL REPORTS OF MISCONDUCT DISCOVERED BEFORE THE VERDICT
Number of Cases in Which Conduct
Reported
Percentage
of Judges
Type of Misconduct Reported Reporting' Total Civil Crininal
Survey Categories:
Late or absent 80%b 3026' 1404 1618
Not truthful during voir dire 73 d -a
Sleeping 69 2344 1303 1041
Talked to otherjurors about the evidence before trial's end 22 515c 241 273
Talked with non-jurors 20 295' 105 188
Considered material not admitted as evidence 20 200' 83 114
Feigned illness 16 305 162 143
Initiated or failed to report contact with press parties, witnesses 13 158' 63 94
Juror under the influence of drugs or alcohol 12 140 63 77
Visited scene of dispute/crime contrary to instructions 7 47 23 24
Refused to answer questions in voir dire despite chance to answer in 4 50 20 30
camera
Conducted experiments 4 38 14 23
Accepted bribe from party .5 3 3 0
Other misconduct -'
Failed or refused to deliberate Ib 10+ not specified
Confrontations or coercion r  I not not specified
specified
"Black jurors refuse to convict black defendants" .4 not not specified
specified
* Penrens ge orjdgces reporting that in at least one trial during the past hree y ars they had become coninced before a verdilt ad bees returned that this
condust had ocuncred.
The perentage ofjudge reponing conduet under rvey categoies reflcts the on mue ofjigs noting that they had beconme convinoed befre a verdict
w retuined that the specified con uct had occurred. dii ed by the number ofjdges answering that spcific q stio (Le. .5%judip reporting brthedJurnnn
means that 3 ot of the 550 judges responding to the question about bribed jors marked ye). The percentag ofjodgs rpeorting condact nuder bther
wniscondt rclects the number of'judges indicating the specsfic nonduct divided by the total mumber cfjudges responding to the ve i ( .e.. 4% judgei
reporting that "black jurors refise to convict black defendants" means that 2 out of562 Judges reported this as mlsconduct).
STotal includes response that did not specify casetype.
'65%ofrespondingjudges indicated venlremserus s untUuthful in soe case, but less than 114; 5.3% indicated venliremben were untruthfl In many
ese bat les than 1/2; 1.1% indicated veniremembers ir unthfal in m ases 1.3 % Indicated velremsosetrs were utohn d In all cum
4 Includes onlymisconduct reported by tsov or morejdges. Single reports ofether misconduct discovened before the verdict incltdedjuror was disnilipel In
court;juroarrested. juror frightened otherjuroes orith report he had been threaened;jror replied to defendant's atorney drintg dosing by zaying bhycs you
did"ulhen attorney d nied bedttling a witnrsn, alternatejurer %ent int dehberaions ae the juror had been exnoed; juror formed opinion on guilt befane trial
over. Onejudge reported thtjuernt oen 'ue by lot."
'Judges' explarations Include: Five Black junr gouged cye on a held-aut shite juror and accused him of racism daring detHel oud " partially
racially motivated argument bordening on physical daring dchbraitons,'juror threatcned anotherjuror."juror threatened physlcal violene,'•nd Juror
expressed racial bias to otherjuror in sae disisimlsation trial."
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Judges were invited to add their own general comments to the sur-
vey and eighty-eight did. The most frequent comment was that miscon-
duct never or rarely happened (forty-four judges), or that misconduct is
easily controlled by judicial supervision and attention to instructions
(ten judges)? 32 Several wrote that lying during voir dire was a signifi-
cant problem. Most of these judges mentioned that veniremembers lied
to avoid service.233 Two noted that veniremembers often concealed prior
criminal histories, one complained of jurors who hide religious limita-
tions on their decisionmaking, and one judge stated that a juror often
comes forward shortly after trial starts with information the juror should
have revealed during voir dire but did not.234 Eight judges observed that
jurors have been more disrespectful, confrontational, or cynical in re-
cent years, and two of them linked this attitude to the trial of O.J.
Simpson? 35
Nine judges volunteered concerns about jury nullification. Five of
these judges expressed concern about race-based nullification or racially
split deliberations? 36 Two were concerned about juries failing to convict
232. One judge stated that "Jury misconduct is so rare it is close to the point of
being unheard of in this country."
233. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
234. This judge gave as an example a juror who was embarrassed to admit that the
psychiatrist witness was treating him for an anxiety/disorder. There may be many other
reasons veniremembers do not tell the truth during voir dire. A federal judge from
Texas explained that veniremembers in his court are most likely to misrepresent that
they have the ability to speak and understand English; bench conferences with prospec-
tive jurors sometimes reveal that they really do not.
235. Comments included "Angry confrontational attitude," "Jurors are not better
or worse, just more cynical," "driver's license pool has brought in more prospective ju-
rors with no interest in supporting the jury system[; panels include those who] I call
'rock throwers' who delay and lengthen the voir dire examination, and if one ends up
on a jury, the other jurors usually pay the price having to deal with these people. This
confrontational attitude by a very small minority can make jury service more difficult
for other jurors." ..We have noticed a change in jurors since the O.J. case - more de-
manding, assertive, and even aggressive. Complain that we offer only coffee daily and
pizza during deliberations .... Don't seem embarrassed (to tell people they discussed
case before deliberations] or even realize that they violated court's instructions and or-
ders." "Jurors are more anxious to ask questions of witnesses that they feel the attor-
neys have ignored." "Jurors since the O.J. Simpson trial appear bolder less respectful
and more inclined to present juror problems." "Jurors recently seem more vocal re:
what 'rights' they have as jurors. They are more vocal and articulate about what they
perceived to be the failures of both criminal and civil law ... they are evidencing a
greater desire actively to participate in the trial process in an inappropriate manner.
They are demonstrating greater awareness of the trial process itself, but are often mis-
taken in what they believe the law is. They also seem to be less intimidated and far less
respectful of the process and judges and lawyers."
236. The comments were: "black jurors refuse to convict black defendants,"
"Blacks acquit black defendants," "consider Race, national origin, etc." "You have
stayed away from juror misconduct due to racial attitudes - certainly there are circum-
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in reaction to stiff mandatory sentences,237 one about jurors who use
verdicts to protest police conduct,238 and one expressed concern about
nullification in general, stating that "jury nullification may be the 'wave
of the future' of jury misconduct."239
d. Variation Between Courts. A comparison of the responses of dif-
ferent groups of responding judges reveals significant variations. Some
judges may be eager to seek solutions to what they perceive as a prob-
lem, while others would oppose expending further resources to alter a
situation they consider to be satisfactory.24° The differences in responses
also suggest that there is much more to learn about why misconduct
troubles some judges but not others.
State judges, for example, were much more likely than federal
judges to report that they had encountered jury misconduct before the
end of a trial. A higher proportion of state judges than federal judges
reported misconduct for almost every category of misconduct, and the
difference was statistically significant for jurors not telling the truth,
feigning illness, and talking to nonjurors about the case during the
trial.241
stances that 'we have to stick together' - re: a defendant - re: 'he is one of us' -
that would be more interesting." "Juries are frequently dividing along racial lines and
of course very little confidence in law enforcement. The only recourse I see is a limita-
tion on jury trials in certain criminal cases, or very strictly controlled judicial voir
dire."
237. "Jurors have learned of mandatory minimum sentence required for some
drug cases and for that reason have refused to convict." "Only recent difficulty has
been with some juror nullification over 'three strike' or other 'strike' cases."
238. "In my general voir dire in criminal cases jurors are asked whether they had
feelings one way or another concerning 'police officers.' Very few raise their hands.
(Those that do have poignant stories about police mistreatment.) We know that a great
many jurors have feelings but prefer to sit on a jury and vent their feelings in a verdict
239. One judge from Montana sent along a copy of a recent decision in which he
refused to dismiss jury tampering charges against a person who had sent veniremembers
letters advising them of the right to nullify.
240. For example, 27.3% of all judges responded that none of their recent trials in-
volved jurors who failed to tell the truth, but one percent of all judges believed that
most trials involved less than truthful veniremembers, and another one percent believed
that at least one veniremember had been untruthful in every case they had tried.
241. Ten percent of state judges reported that veniremembers had been untruthful
in many, most, or all cases, compared to only three percent of federal judges. (p<.05).
All of the judges who responded that jurors were untruthful in most or all cases were
state judges. Twenty-nine percent of state judges, compared to 13% of federal judges,
reported jurors feigning illness. (p<.01). Twenty-nine percent of state judges, compared
to 18% of federal judges, reported misconduct by jurors who talked to nonjurors.
(p<.05). There was, however, no statistically significant difference in the frequency with
which state and federal judges reported grants of new trials due to misconduct.
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There was a statistically significant relationship between the num-
ber of jury trials over which a judge estimated that he or she had pre-
sided during the past three years and the likelihood that the judge re-
ported certain types of misconduct - sleeping, lateness, talking to
nonjurors, and jury experiments. As one might expect, judges who tried
more jury cases were more likely to encounter this misconduct. But this
relationship existed only up to a point. Judges who estimated that they
had presided over 120 to 150 jury trials or more in the past three years
were actually less likely to report misconduct than judges who esti-
mated that they had presided over 90 to 119 jury trials. Judges who try
very large numbers of cases (primarily state judges) might try shorter
cases in which this misconduct does not occur as frequently, they might
take greater precautions that prevent misconduct from occurring, or they
might simply be less alert to misconduct when it does occur.242
Judges who have served longer on the bench appear to have more
confidence in the honesty of jurors than newer judges. There was a sta-
tistically significant relationship between the number of years a judge
had been on the bench and that judge's assessment of the honesty of ju-
rors during voir dire, with the newer judges responding more skepti-
cally than judges with at least fifteen years on the bench.243
Judges in large cities seem to encounter some forms of misconduct
more frequently than judges in smaller cities. The bigger the city, the
more likely it was that a judge reported that jurors lied during voir dire,
were late or absent for trial, or feigned illness.244 Lateness may be sim-
ply a reflection of how difficult it is to get around in a larger city or
find parking, but all three behaviors may also reflect a greater reluc-
tance on the part of residents of larger cities to serve as jurors.245
242. It is also possible that jurors in these busiest courts are better behaved than
jurors who serve on juries in courts that are not as busy, but this seems unlikely. There
was also no statistically significant correlation between a judge's estimated caseload and
that judge's report of new trials due to misconduct.
243. (p<.05). For example, 14% of judges on the bench 15 years or more re-
sponded that veniremembers were untruthful in many trials, compared to about 40% of
newer judges. For other types of misconduct, there was no statistically significant dif-
ference between the responses of senior judges and newer judges.
244. For untruthfulness during voir dire: (p<.01), for reporting late or not at all:
(p<.01), for feigning illness: (p<.05). There was no statistically significant relationship
between city size and reports of other forms of misconduct, or between city size and re-
ports of new trials.
245. One judge suggested that lateness is a special problem in courts that rely on
citizens from Indian reservations, both because many of these jurors lack transportation
and because "of the cultural difference regarding the need to arrive at an appointed
time."
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A comparison of responses from California, New York, and Ten-
nessee showed interesting differences in the frequency with which
judges reported discovering misconduct before the verdict, but no dif-
ferences in the proportion of judges reporting new trials for misconduct.
For all but two of the categories surveyed, a greater proportion of the
trial judges in California than in either New York or Tennessee re-
sponded that they had encountered misconduct during the trial, a find-
ing that would be expected given California's longer trials. 246 See Table
3.
Finally, the survey suggests that some forms of misconduct may be
more of a problem in criminal cases than in civil cases. The 103 re-
sponding judges who tried only civil cases in the past three years were
significantly less likely than the 105 judges who tried only criminal
cases to report that jurors were dishonest during voir dire, were under
the influence of drugs or alcohol, or viewed the scene of the dispute or
event without permission. 247
2. Judicial Response to Jury Misconduct
The survey results suggest that a large number of mistrials and
new trials are obviated by a court's ability to accept verdicts from juries
reduced in size by attrition or from juries that include alternates who
have replaced original jurors. Also, judges do not often choose to pun-
ish jurors when misconduct is discovered before the verdict. Instead,
they focus on providing a fair trial for the litigants.
a. Avoiding Mistrials and New Trials. According to the judges,
jury misconduct discovered before the verdict seldom requires starting
the trial over again. Only a small proportion of the judges who reported
that they had encountered misconduct also reported that they had or-
dered a mistrial as a result. Dismissal, or replacement, or both, of the
246. Alternatively, California jurors may be less controlled by judges, or less well-
behaved than jurors in the other two states, but these explanations are not reflected in
the new trial rates, which are just as low as in the other two states. Nine percent (N=4)
of judges in California reported granting new trials, for a total of five trials; 12% (N=6)
of New York judges granted new trials, and 7% (N=2) of judges in Tennessee reported
granting new trials.
247. Of the criminal judges, 14% reported that many, most, or all of their cases in-
volved at least one veniremember who was untruthful, compared to only 5% of the civil
trial judges. (p<.05). Nineteen percent of the criminal judges reported jurors under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, compared to 8% of civil judges. (p<.05). Nine percent of
criminal judges reported unauthorized visits to the scene, compared to 2% of civil
judges. (p<.05).
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juror with an alternate were much more popular options.24 See Table 4.
Although the number of judges who ordered mistrials for jury mis-
conduct was small, the likelihood that misconduct resulted in mistrial
varied greatly with the type of misconduct. Four out of the eight judges
reporting that jurors had failed to deliberate noted that a mistrial was
the result, as did three out of the seven judges reporting juror confronta-
tions. Juror experiments, visits to the scene, and consideration of mate-
rial not admitted as evidence also prompted significant rates of mistrials
(4 of 22 judges reporting; 6 of 36, and 25 of 110 respectively). When
these forms of misconduct occur, they tend to occur during delibera-
tions, so their higher mistrial rates would be consistent with the rules in
several jurisdictions that prohibit replacement or dismissal of jurors af-
ter deliberations begin.249
b. Letting Jurors off the Hook. Few judges reported that they cited
or even threatened to cite offending jurors with contempt for most
forms of misconduct.50 For behavior linked to avoiding service, how-
ever, judges appeared more interested in coercing, compliance or setting
an example for the other jurors. Of the eighty-seven judges reporting ju-
rors who feigned illness, thirteen reported that they had threatened the
juror with contempt and three reported imposing contempt. Of 444
judges reporting late or absent jurors, sixty-one (fourteen percent)
threatened and twenty-three (five percent) imposed contempt 51 Sleep-
248. These findings are consistent with a recent study in Los Angeles. See Califor-
nia Group Shuns Lobbying Process, Defeats Verdict Proposal, 10 Crim. Prac. Manual
(BNA) 229, 230-31 (June 5, 1996) (two percent of criminal trials end in mistrial due to
jury misconduct). The responses suggest that for many judges, alternate jurors, when
authorized, are routine: 42% of the judges reported using one or more alternates in
every case and another 20% had used one or more alternates in most of their jury trials.
As one judge explained, the rule allowing the substitution of alternates meant "I had a
situation during trial that I could fix at the time, on the spot, that could have created a
serious problem post-trial." Alternates are not authorized in civil trials in federal court.
249. Mistrial rates may also vary by location. In Tennessee, four out of seven
judges reporting preliminary deliberations and five out of ten judges reporting jurors
talking with nonjurors also reported that they had ordered a mistrial. Judges in Califor-
nia and New York reported this misconduct just as frequently, but only one judge re-
ported ordering a mistrial.
250. See Table 4. None of the six judges reporting juror confrontations or the eight
judges reporting refusal to deliberate indicated that they had threatened or imposed con-
tempt for this behavior.
251. Late jurors were sometimes required to forfeit juror pay as a penalty, accord-
ing to two judges. Of the 24 judges who reported that a juror had refused to answer a
question on voir dire, even after being offered the chance to answer in camera, 16 re-
ported that they had dismissed the obstinate juror, 4 reported threatening contempt, 1
reported holding the juror in contempt, and 3 reported that they took no action and left
it to the attorneys. Judicial response to deceit during voir dire was mentioned in Part I
- most judges either dismissed the juror or left it up to attorneys to challenge the juror.
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ing jurors were usually awakened and offered a break, or a chance to
drink water, cola, or coffee, but not reprimanded. Many other judges
stated that they left it up to the lawyers to take action when jurors
dozed, some noting that after all it was the lawyers who had put them
to sleep. The survey also inquired about whether jurors had been prose-
cuted for their behavior. Of the 539 judges who answered this question,
only fourteen reported having ever, in their entire career, presided over
a case in which a former juror was prosecuted for misconduct as a ju-
ror, and those judges who did report such cases reported twenty-nine
separate prosecutions. Six judges reported that those prosecuted for mis-
conduct as jurors served on juries that never reached a verdict, two
judges reported jurors prosecuted for behavior on convicting juries, and
one judge reported that the former juror had served on a jury that had
acquitted a defendant. No judge reported a prosecution of a former juror
who had served on a jury that had reached a verdict in a civil case. A
larger sample would be helpful to determine whether or not prosecutors
are more inclined to prosecute a juror for misconduct when that mis-
conduct deprives the government of a conviction.
C. A Look Ahead
1. Defining Jury Misconduct
The preceding study suggests that changing trial procedures and
social attitudes about juries will continue to prompt disagreement about
what jury conduct is misconduct.252 Efforts to define misconduct must
focus on whether the behavior undermines or advances the jury's pur-
poses. Such a focus will at least sharpen those debates over misconduct
that it cannot resolve. For example, if one assumes that behavior that
impairs the accuracy of verdicts and serves no other jury function is im-
proper, the propriety of various types of juror behavior may turn upon
whether they are accuracy-enhancing or accuracy-impairing. Consider
the rule barring jurors from talking to other jurors during trial about the
See supra note 118. Many judges indicated in their comments that they questioned the
juror further themselves before deciding whether to dismiss the juror. Two judges noted
that when jurors had lied they had declared mistrials. Several judges noted that false-
hoods were not verifiable or that the juror's dishonesty did not "rise to the level that
could be prosecuted."
252. For example, the catalogue of misconduct listed in the survey was for some
judges overinclusive (e.g., some judges stated that they did not consider talking before
deliberations to be misconduct) and for others, underinclusive (e.g., some judges indi-
cated that behavior not listed was misconduct, such as the failure to deliberate, coercion
in the jury room, or nullification).
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evidence. This rule is said to protect the defendant from premature deci-
sionmaking before the defense has had its chance to oppose the prose-
cutor's claims. If by discussing the evidence a juror tunes out what is to
come, the verdict may be less accurate than it would have been had she
kept an open mind. But the more common effect of the rule may in-
stead be to undermine accuracy, either by causing a juror to forget
much of the prosecutor's case, or by preventing a juror from pointing
out flaws in another juror's thought processes early on in the case when
opinions are forming. Without any opportunity to discuss the case dur-
ing trial jurors may not discover until after they begin deliberations that
they have questions or are confused about certain issues in the case,
questions that they could have raised during the trial when the judge
and counsel could have responded more effectively. As judicial views
about the effects of this traditional prohibition against talking during the
trial change, the rule is eroding, directly by repeal, and indirectly
through neglect.253 Note-taking by jurors, and even questioning of wit-
nesses by jurors, thought at one time to impair the accuracy of verdicts,
are increasingly viewed as improving verdict accuracy.254 Similar
changes have taken place regarding jury access during deliberations to
the charge against the defendant and to written versions of the judge's
instructions 55 Present debates about whether or not a juror commits
misconduct when she anticipates telling her story for profit, will in part
depend on whether or not such anticipation impairs verdict accuracy.256
253. Last year Arizona abandoned the rule in civil cases. See B. Michael Dann &
George Logan IIl, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 281-83
(1996). Five judges commented in the survey that they or their colleagues did not con-
sider this misconduct, and others noted that they did nothing to prevent this. See also
William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 142-43 (al-
lowing jurors to talk could clear up confusion and help ease tension).
254. Note-taking is probably more widespread than juror questioning. By 1965,
only one state completely forbade jurors from taking notes, and most state and federal
jurisdictions allowed judges to decide whether or not to permit note-taking. See Dragan
D. Petroff, The Practice of Jury Note Taking - Misconduct, Right, or Privilege?, 18
OKLA. L. Rv. 125 (1965) (tracing history of note-taking rules); R.M. Wheddle, Anno-
tation, Taking and Use of Notes by Jury, 14 A.L.R.3D 831 (1967 & 1994 Supp.).
Many courts continue to discourage juror-originated questioning. See, e.g., United
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 448-50 (2d Cir. 1996) (arguing that questioning tends
to impair juror neutrality and to encourage premature deliberations). For the latest com-
prehensive empirical work on the effects of note-taking and juror questioning, see Larry
Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking
and Question Asking, 79 JUDiCATuRE 256 (1996).
255. See Lehman, supra note 159, at 771 (noting change).
256. See Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POLy. REv. 389 (1994)
(claiming that there is no evidence that juror journalism negatively affects verdicts).
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The criminal jury, however, continues to do more than find the
facts. It educates citizens through their service, defines the reach of le-
gal obligations, enforces community standards of reasonableness, and
legitimates trial outcomes. If jurors are supposed to accomplish these
goals as well as decide what happened, as I believe they must, then it is
not enough to classify juror behavior as proper or improper by referring
only to whether it has a tendency to impair or enhance the accuracy of
the verdict. Allowing a juror to refuse to deliberate or allowing jurors to
acquit defendants in the face of strong evideice of guilt may not en-
hance accuracy, but that does not settle whether either type of behavior
should be considered misconduct. We must consider whether it is con-
sistent with the jury's educative, lawmaking, or legitimating functions.
Race-based nullification and nullification in cases carrying
mandatory penalties, decried by some of the judges surveyed, offer re-
cent examples of this problem2 7 Neither type of jury conduct is un-
precedented.258 Although differences of opinion about whether jurors
ought to exercise their discretion in these ways have been with us for a
long time, nullification is presently under renewed attack. In the aca-
demic literature and the press, its constitutional roots are assailed, its
wisdom questionedV59 It will take a more significant and sustained shift
in beliefs concerning the jury's political role before courts seriously at-
tempt to regulate nullification. Indeed, effective regulation may elude
257. See supra note 236. Compare Michael D. Weiss & Karl Zinsmeister, When
Race Trumps Truth in Court, AM. ENTERPRiEm, Jan. 1996, at 54 and Randall Kennedy,
The Angry Juror, WALL ST. J:., Sept. 30, 1994, at A12 with Paul Butler, Racially Based
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE Li. 677
(1995).
258. White juries have refused to indict or convict white defendants in certain
cases for various reasons for over a century, a phenomenon that in part has fueled ef-
forts to integrate the jury box. See, e.g., Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 882-97. In
the nineteenth century juries were accused of acquitting prisoners charged with crimes
carrying a mandatory death penalty, which in turn led legislators to "forthrightly grant
the juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact." McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971); see also 402 U.S. at 200 n.10 (noting that the practice of
jury sentencing in noncapital crimes arose in the colonial period because of similar con-
cerns by jurors that penalties were too harsh). For further discussion, see Albert W. Al-
schuler, A Teetering Palladium?, 79 JuDICATuRE 200, 201 (1996) (book review) [here-
inafter Alschuler, Teetering Palladium] (applauding jurors' efforts to negate the
harshness of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences).
259. See, e.g., David N. Dorfman & Chris K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgive-
ness: Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 861 (1995); Andrew
D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. Rav. 253 (1996); Chaya Weinberg-
Brodt, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 825 (1990);
see also CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 90, at 92 ("The Commission is unanimously
and emphatically opposed to jury nullification and proposals to inform the jury of this
power.").
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courts. Veniremembers determined to acquit for impermissible reasons
could be excluded from juries if they were honest enough to admit it.2 60
It would be no easy task, however, to evaluate whether a juror was mo-
tivated to vote for acquittal by a reasonable doubt about guilt or a for-
bidden agenda.261
Related to the concern of some judges that jurors are not partici-
pating fully or are engaging in improper nullification is the relatively
modem suspicion of juries that agree too quickly.2 62 Rapid deliberations
taking only minutes, often in the jury box, Were quite common, even
welcomed, 150 years ago. As deliberation times lengthened, speedy ver-
dicts attracted challenges from convicted defendants who alleged that
such hasty decisionmaking was misconduct, even a denial of due pro-
cess. All such challenges have been deflected by judges who reasoned
that there is no minimum time for deliberations and who refused to pre-
sume that jurors had abandoned their duties.263 As deliberation times
continue to lengthen, however, this tolerant stance may weaken. For ex-
ample, in ordering a new trial earlier this year, a federal judge in Chi-
cago concluded that a jury that had returned with a conviction for pos-
260. Just as prosecutors in capital cases are permitted to challenge for cause jurors
who will not sentence a defendant to die because of their opposition to the death pen-
alty, prosecutors could also be permitted to challenge jurors who insist that they are in-
clined to acquit under specified circumstances, assuming such behavior is prohibited.
Cf Lynne Bolduc, Time for a Change: Problems With the American Jury System, Wo.
mEN L.., Dec. 1995, at 13, 16 (noting that one of the goals of the Fully Informed Jury
Association is "to educate jurors on how to be deceptive during voir dire, to avoid be-
ing tossed off the jury."). Screening of jurors who were predisposed to nullify was actu-
ally practiced at the turn of the century in New York. Prospective jurors were asked hy-
pothetical questions about violations of "unpopular statutes which the average juror
[would] not consent to enforce," including the question, "Would you, being a juror, and
being charged by the court upon a point of law, and knowing this point of law to be un-
sound, decline to accept the ruling?" BENJ. R. TUCKER, A BLOW AT TRIAL BY JURY:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE SPEcIAL JURY LAW PASSED BY THE NEW YORK LEcis.
LATURE IN 1896, at 8, 10 (1898); see also Leipold, supra note 259, at 258, 313-16
(recommending instructing jurors that they are not allowed to acquit except for certain
specified reasons).
261. See Leipold, supra note 259, at 322-23. But see id. at 321 (suggesting that
special verdicts for criminal juries to specify the reason for their acquittals would assist
in controlling nullification behavior).
262. The most recent example of this concern, of course, is that expressed by
many after the verdict in the Simpson case. See Gail Diane Cox, Speedy Ci. Jury
Raises Doubts, NATL. L.J., Oct. 16, 1995, at A6; Weiss & Zinsmeister, supra note 257,
at 55 (quoting one commentator after the verdict, "The jury did not deliberate, it
emoted.").
263. See generally B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Effect on Verdict in Criminal Case
of Haste or Shortness of Time in Which Jury Reached It, 91 A.L.R.2D 1238 (1963 &
Supp. 1993) (reporting a fascinating collection of cases in which courts have considered
and rejected "too hasty" claims).
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session of stolen mail after meeting for only ten minutes had failed to
follow his instruction to deliberate and consider all of the evidence3 4
At least one court has granted a new trial in a civil case because it
thought the jurors should have spent more time talking together.265 Like
judges who believe that failure to deliberate is "good cause" for re-
moving a juror, or that a veniremember's intention to nullify should be
the basis for a challenge for cause, judges who disapprove of some
hasty verdicts may be unable to recognize, or at least unwilling to en-
courage, the independent political role that each juror fills when she
joins a jury in a criminal case.
The renewed attention to such acts of juror independence could be
explained by recognizing that judges are only beginning to be called
upon by litigants to evaluate the propriety of this type of conduct. Until
relatively recently, judges have not learned until after the jury an-
nounces a deadlock or an acquittal if its members refused to deliberate
or acquitted for political reasons or bias. By then the litigants and the
judge have no recourse. Those few jurors who can be proven to have
disobeyed independent criminal prohibitions against perjury or obstruc-
tion of justice or bribery could be prosecuted,266 but the bulk of this be-
havior - as well as any resulting acquittal - has remained untoucha-
ble. Today, longer deliberations, more intense observation of jurors by
courts and attorneys, and the duty to replace or dismiss deliberating ju-
rors who misbehave are shifting debates about the propriety of this jury
behavior from the editorial page into the courtroom.
2. Responding to Misconduct
Assuming courts can define misconduct, they should try harder to
prevent it before it happens and to cure its effects prior to the verdict,
rather than to rely primarily upon restrictive and expensive postverdict
remedies. For just as gains in compliance with jury summonses have
been achieved by diagnosing what keeps jurors away and targeting
those aspects of service for elimination, courts should strive to diagnose
what conditions facilitate juror misconduct and concentrate on remedy-
ing those conditions. We know remarkably little about what conditions
264. See United States v. Cunningham, 916 F. Supp. 817, 820 (N.D. Il. 1996) ("It
was not possible - especially in light of the relatively complicated nature of the evi-
dence relating to constructive possession - that the jurors actually 'deliberated' the ev-
idence, as they were instructed to do.").
265. See Kenan v. Moore, 195 So. 167, 169 (Fla. 1940) ("[T]he record as a whole
indicates that the jury could not in sixteen minutes have duly considered the evidence
adduced and the charges of the court .... ").
266. See supra text accompanying notes 207-09.
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foster misconduct.2 7 For example, jurors may be dozing during trials
because they have nothing to do for hours on end except to sit and ab-
sorb detail. Recognizing this, some forward-looking courts are trying to
involve the jury more, allowing them to take notes, ask questions, and
talk among themselves about the case as it proceeds. Jurors may con-
ceal information during voir dire to spare themselves embarrassment or
to avoid other negative consequences. Providing anonymity or more pri-
vacy during voir dire may help them comply with their oaths. Clearer
instructions could reduce inadvertent mistakes by jurors. To the extent
that such measures can prevent misconduct from occurring, they en-
hance the fairness, and the image of fairness, of jury trials.
Deterring misconduct by punishing jurors themselves seems to be
a less desirable approach. The same considerations that discourage
judges from gearing up contempt proceedings against recalcitrant jurors
probably also dampen enthusiasm for contempt proceedings against ju-
rors who disobey instructions during trial. Calibrating sanctions against
jurors for misconduct is particularly tricky - too strict a penalty may
deter jurors or other trial observers from reporting questionable con-
duct,268 too lenient a penalty may make misconduct an attractive, or at
least a costless, option for escaping service.269 Leaving the regulation of
juror behavior to prosecutors is no solution either, as it poses too great
a risk of selective and vindictive enforcement.
In addition, remedies for misconduct that operate before a verdict
is reached have significant advantages over postverdict remedies. Proce-
dures that may help judges discover, assess, and cure the effects of mis-
conduct before a verdict .is reached avoid expensive postconviction pro-
ceedings. A failure to deliberate or a coercive exchange between one or
more jurors may be impossible to prove or cure after the trial is over,
267. Why, for example, is misconduct more frequently reported by state judges?
What steps could be taken to remove the incentives for jurors to lie about prior
convictions?
268. As one commentator has noted, the sanctions for misconduct should not be so
high that those who misbehave, their fellow jurors, and their friends and family mem-
bers would be reluctant to report this activity. See Swaine, supra note 221, at 203-04.
269. "Punishing" misbehaving jurors with dismissal may result in more miscon-
duct, not less, when one considers the jury avoidance behavior documented supra Part
I. Denying the juror her fee upon proof of misconduct is a handy compromise proposed
by one commentator (and adopted by at least one judge responding to the survey). See
id. at 204 (recommending that judges withhold fees from jurors involved in miscon-
duct). Unfortunately, research suggests that losing a nominal jury fee is not likely to
make much of a difference to many jurors. See G.T. Munsterman, supra note 83, at 217
n.5 (noting that in Dallas's fee donation program, 30% of jurors donate their fees); Wil-
liam R. Pabst, Jr. et al., The Myth of the Unwilling Juror, 60 JuDICATURE 164, 164
(1976) (concluding that fees have no effect on juror satisfaction).
2748 [Vol. 94:2673
HeinOnline  -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2748 1995-1996
Juror Delinquency
but it is both provable and curable before the verdict, when the rule
against jurors impeaching their verdict and the double jeopardy bar
against retrying an acquitted defendant do not operate. Moreover, unlike
postverdict remedies, preverdict remedies are the courts' only present
hope of preventing irreversible yet error-tainted acquittals. And unfortu-
nately, it is the acquittals perceived to have resulted from error, not er-
ror-tainted convictions, that seem to do the most damage to the public
image of the criminal jury today.270
One preverdict device for nipping misconduct in the bud that
seems to have achieved some popularity in the last few decades is the
practice of substituting alternates even after deliberations have begun.
In 1933 California amended its already-pioneering alternate jury statute
to authorize judges to substitute alternates for jurors who were dis-
charged during deliberations, as long as all of the jurors were instructed
to begin deliberations anew.271 Since then, ten states have joined Cali-
fornia, several of them only recently.272 The federal courts have resisted
such a change, preferring instead to give judges ii criminal and civil
cases the power to end a case with fewer jurors than the number that
began rather than allow them to replace deliberating jurors.273
Of course, both substitution and dismissal of deliberating jurors
carry the risk that holdouts - or jurors perceived as potential holdouts
- will be accused of misconduct by observers or by other jurors in
hopes that they will be dismissed. As is the case with many jury inno-
vations, there is no empirical evidence in the form of surveys or other
studies to refute or verify whether jurors in jurisdictions that allow attr-
tion or substitution during deliberation are any more likely than jurors
in other jurisdictions to be "framed" by other jurors or to invent ex-
cuses themselves to get dismissed when the going gets tough.
270. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WrrH JUsTIcE FOR SOME 178-81 (1995); Al-
schuler, Teetering Palladium, supra note 258, at 202-03.
271. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1089 (West 1985) (first enacted 1933).
272. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-171 (1994); IDAHO CRAM. R. 24(c)(3); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-1-20.5-2 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3412(c) (1995);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 234A, § 68 (Law. Co-op. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-
118 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:13 (1983 & Supp 1995) (first enacted
1993); N.J. R. GEN. APPL. 1:8-2(d) (enacted 1972); NEV. REv. STAT. § 175.061 (1991)
(first enacted 1967); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRM. R. 6.5 (enacted 1989).
273. See generally Joshua G. Grunat, Note, Post-Submission Substitution of Alter-
nate Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases: Effects of Violations of Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure 23(b) and 24(c), 55 FORDHAM L. Rev. 861, 868-70 (1987); Lester B.
Orfield, Annotation, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 46 (1962).
Postsubmission substitution of jurors has been upheld as constitutional in federal and
state courts. See Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases).
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Another promising reform is enhancement of the dialogue between
jurors and judges during the trial. Judges can take an active role in dis-
covering and correcting misconceptions of the law, and, more impor-
tantly, the jurors can take a more active role in solving problems in
their consideration of the case.274 This is, in some ways, a throwback to
the control judges once exerted over juries, control which has been so
circumscribed that any contact between judge and juror during delibera-
tion is now viewed with suspicion.275 A range of contact is available -
judges could actively poll the jurors in writing or orally, alone or in a
group, about misconduct or misunderstandings,2 76 or simply emphasize
their invitation to jurors to write notes to the judge if they have ques-
tions during deliberations. Either change would provide the judge with
more opportunity to clear up jury problems before those problems affect
the verdict. The survey suggests that judges already appear to be taking
steps like these to discover and control harassment, coercion, and recal-
citrance in the jury room before deliberations, and to cure it before a
verdict is returned.277
The one preventive approach few have yet dared to consider is to
examine those procedural features of the American jury trial that seem
to foster misconduct. It may be that giving the judge much more control
over the presentation and duration of proof,27 prohibiting publicity
about criminal cases before and during trial, or simplifying some evi-
dence rules, for instance, might help to prevent some forms of miscon-
duct. Precedent has established so soundly the procedural facets of the
trial process targeted by such changes, however, that each is practically
impervious to change. Courts continue to develop more information
about the costs to the public, jurors, and litigants of America's complex
274. See ARIZONA REPORT, supra note 103, at 115-21; Swaine, supra note 221,
at 202 (advocating that judges be encouraged to instruct jurors to report misconduct
prior to verdict).
275. Cf Lettow, supra note 189, at 528 (noting the practice of many eighteenth-
century judges of talking to jury about their verdict before discharging them).
276. See, e.g., Dann & Logan, supra note 253, at 283; Arthur D. Austin, Why Ju-
rors Don't Heed the Trial, NATL. L.J.. Aug. 12, 1985, at 15, 18 (arguing judges ought to
be less reluctant to clear up juror questions about confusing instructions).
277. A return to sequestration however, may be one front-end solution to miscon-
duct that causes more trouble than it prevents. See James P. Levine, The Impact of Se-
questration on Juries, 79 JUDICATURE 266 (1996); Marcy Strauss, Sequestration
(forthcoming, on file with author). After the Simpson trial, the judge in the Oklahoma
City bombing case requested briefs detailing alternatives to sequestration. See Seques-
tration Alternatives Offered in Oklahoma Bomb Case, 10 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) No.
1, at 13-17 (Jan. 3, 1996).
278. Cf General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 66 F3d 1500,
1504, 1508-09 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1017 (1996) (upholding trial
court's decision in civil case to limit each side to 23 hours a piece, and to deny defend-
ant extra time to present a rebuttal case, and only five minutes to cross-examine each
remaining witness, and noting that due process was provided by giving defendant "time
to conduct limited cross-examination" of the witnesses).
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and ever-lengthening trial procedures. Perhaps lawmakers will decide
someday that these costs warrant the reconsideration of some of these
procedures.279 For now, however, there is little basis in the foregoing re-
search to conclude that today's judges believe that the costs of jury mis-
conduct have risen high enough to justify radical changes in procedure.
Undoubtedly many more steps can and should be taken to ease the
trial burdens on jurors and reduce the likelihood of verdicts based on
misunderstanding or foul play, steps that fall short of tossing aside
respected, constitutionally based decisions of the past century. Most
courts have yet to take steps to improve and clarify jury instructions, re-
duce trial time, or help the jury accomplish its task in other ways. Now,
as before, jury misconduct cannot be ignored, but must be carefully
managed, lest "[jiury trial . . . degenerate into a farce, become a hiss
and a byword, and the reproach of all good citizens. ' 280
CONCLUSION
Our commitment to compulsory jury service by average citizens is
one of the most fascinating and defining features of the American trial
system. It has also proved to be both a blessing and a curse for efforts
to control the behavior of jurors. Some conditions of jury service that
might have facilitated juror misconduct have been curtailed because of
their deterrent effect on prospective jurors. Because jury duty is a right
of citizenship, however, we have not attempted to create a pool of pro-
fessional juror volunteers with the training and experience to avoid mis-
conduct. Nor do courts retain or dismiss jurors from further service
based on how many mistakes they make. Instead, our present system
enlists reluctant amateurs to perform a demanding and unfamiliar job,
in secret, with little accountability. In such a scheme, some degree of
misconduct is inevitable. The challenge for courts of the next two cen-
turies is to settle upon acceptable definitions and tolerable levels of jury
misconduct and to find ways to minimize both jury misconduct and
avoidance that preserve the fundamental features of trial by lay jury. If
history is any guide, an ounce of prevention may continue to be worth a
pound of cure.
279. See, e.g., ARIZONA REPORT, supra note 103, at 71 (recommending that
judges be given express authority to limit the amount and type of evidence each side is
allowed and how much time each side has to present its case, make opening statements,
etc.).
280. Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Bowen, 79 S.E. 1113 (Ga. 1913).
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